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Von, IX.—Nos. 32 anp 35.
विश्वनाधपञ्चाननकृतसिदालमुक्रावनीषि भाषापरषिदः ए ८. |
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CATEGORIES OF TIE NYA'YA PH WITIT A COMMENTARY BY ` VISWANATHA PANCIIANANA. ` EDITED, AND THR TEXT TRANSLATED FROM THE onIctNAL SANBCRIT, ९ By Da. ए, कापर yf
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“CALCUTTA PRENTED BY J. THOMAS, B.PTIGT MISSION PRES
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PREFACE.
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Tne Asiatic Society accepted already in 1847 my offer to publiah the text of the Nyiya with a translation, but only the Introduction to this work appeared in the Journal of the Socicty, the MS. of the translation having meanwhile been
“Yost (vide Journal of the Asiatic Society,e July; 1847). The present translation is based upon a rough copy of the former, which I afterwards found among my papers. The notes are entirely new, and the introduction has received so many addi- tions, that it is almost a new essay. The Sanscrit text, in ac- Cogdance with an enlarged plan, is now accompanied wit its commentary ; it will thua form another cdition of the one pub- lished by the Committee of Public Instruction, which is out of एति and satisfy thereby a desideratum, long felt in the GR roment Sanscrit Colleges, where the Bhisha Paricchéda is introffaced ns a clise-bodk
INTRODUCTION.
In the following introduction to a translation of the Bhdsha Pari- echéda,* one of the most celebrated works of the Nydya philosophy, it has been my endeavour to subject the logic of the Nydys, as well as
the leading ideas of this and the Vaiséshikn systems, to a critical re-
view, in order to bring the discussion about the merits of the philo- sophical researches of the Hindus more to a point. Colebrooke’s ex- position of those systems, though founded on the ablegt and most exact researches, as well in a philosophical as in acritical point of viow, does not suffice for this purpose, as if is a mere abstract fromm the works of those schools, and does not eter upon the discussion of the position they are to hold as systems of philosophy.
It is well known, how difficult it is to write a history of ancient India, only a few strictly historical records having been left to us by the Hindus themselves, The same difficulty obtains with regard to the history of their philosophy, as in the mind of the Hindus philosophy was associated with the idea of being raised above change, and no regard therefore paid to the social and intellectual condition. of the time, in which lived the founder of a System or higesuccessors who more
* 1 have translifed Bhésha, in deviation from its ordinary senag “ speech," by “categories of the Nydya philosophy ;'g for Bhésha means here evidently not
speech” in general, which wonld give no sense whatever, but ^ Nyéya Bhésha,.’ speech in the Nyfya, that is to say the Philosophical Janguage क terms of the Nyiye In the Sabda Kalpa Drums, ^ Bhésha” (gnder th® head of Bhésha Patiochéda) has@he meaning of Paribhishspwhich is explained by the authoritative lenguage Of the teacherg which conaidery the meanings of the words (Padérthe). This sense agrees essentially Pith the rendering ghich J have given.
11 Antroauctton.
developed it. Still it is not impossible to write #@ bvistory of Indian philosophy, if it be limited to the task of tracing the gradual develop- ment of philosophical principles and modes of thinking, without reference to a strict chronological order; for the internal natyre of a ‘qioctrine will point out its more ancient or modern date. At the same time we must admit, that, gven in this eattempt, we can only partially succeed, The dogtrine’ even of those who are considered as the founders of the different schogls, bear the marks of a far advanced progress in systematical arrangement, and must therefore have been the result of a long series of preceding philosophigal enqniries.* Hence it would be preposterous fo expect, that we should be ublesto discover the first steps of their researches. We, however, decline here embarking upon a historical research of such a kind, believing, that under the present * circumstances, when ouly so few of their philosophical works have
# Lassen’s Indische Alterthumskunde, vol, ii. p. 477. His (Panini’s) text-book . Continued to be the norm of the whole following time, and the labours of his suc- ९688078 were limited to the task to narrow or amplify his rules or more lucidly to + arrange them, From his work the same effect results, as from other purauits of the Hindus on the geld of science. “By a person of superior talent the labours of his predecessors were rendered more perfect and brought to a close; he united them ina ay stdin of rules, or Sditras, which he condensed as much as possible, This ex- position remained the standard of all Inter times, and formed the foundation for the succeeding teachers of the same science, whose effurts were in general directed to the correct explanation and elucidation as well as to the emendation and perfection of the fundamental work, and by whom the science was carried to a higher degree only as to its extent, but not as to its contents. We may discover a double motive, from which this manner of exposition took its rise. Firat, the sum total of the results which had been gained, should be condensed in the shortest form and hence the learning by rote facilitated... .. Secondly, this mode of exposition rendered the understanding of the text difficult and often impossible, unless it was accompanied by an exylanation. Such an explanation was at the disposal of the teachers, antl by their guidance alone tht pupils were able t) comprehend the obscure sense of the text-books. The Bidhmans, the only possessors of the scienges, thus secured for themsglres the privilege of communioatieg them only to those whom they thought worthy of this information, aud of preventing the other castes from an initiation with them. It is only im this sense that a secret doctrine of the Brahmans can be ad- [11 From the circumstanée, that for each single science text-books of this kind wire generally acknowledged as standards, it was aconsequence, that the worl’ of the firat founders nd of the predecessors of the person who brought a science 66 getfeetion, were forgotten and frequently lost, .
VY IWS AMAIZAINAUN Wit चे UUTTTIICS छ पाठ VAISUSNIKA, 81066 we are of Colebrooke's opinion, that both sprang, from the same root, aud are but branches of the same school ; the one being directed more to the explanation of material, the other of logieal forms.* Or to state it more exactly, —to the Nydya belong the logical doctrines of the forms of syllogisms, temns and propositions; to the Vaiséshika the aystematical explanation of the categories (the simplest metaphysical ideas) of the metaphysical, physical, and psychical notions, which notions are hardly touched upon jn Goutama’s (the supposed founder + of the Nydyn) Siitras, They differ in their statement of the several modes of proof; the Nydya asserting four medes of proof—from per- ception, inference, analogy, and verbal communication ; the Vaieéshika admitting only the two first ones.t
The name of logic, usually applied ‘to the Nydya, does not correctly define it. It does not treat of the theory of syogisms and thg notions connected with them, as its direct objegt, but only as a component part of its investigation. It rather aspirA to the distinction of giving a complete system of philosophy, based upon the most elementary meta- physical notions, and the division dedicated to the explanation of syl- logistical forms, is not even more explicitly treated than other parts of the system. To call the Ny Aya logic, would be the same as to assign this name to the philosophy of Aristotle. There is no doubt, however, that the Nyéya has first among the philosophical systems of the Hindus thoroughly examined the art of reasoning, and shaped it, into ite present form. Hence it gaineg such ascendamey among tho learned Hindus, that भण them, however¢hey may deviate fromother doctrines of the Nydya, refer toit as to theiretandard in logic, and deem its study necessary for the purpose of giving a firm basis to their reasoning. -
* Vid. Colebrooke's Miscell. Essays, Ypl. i. p-@61. % The view above given, was based upon the Sitres of Gautama, without # re- * ference to 4 work of the Vaistshika school. I have since tompared the Gétrage of Kanéda and fOund my view completely confirmed, a2
iv Introduction.
It is indeed one of the principal merits of the Nydya, that its pro- gress is marked by an admirably exact division of the topics, treated nit, and in this respect it is not only superior to all other systems of the Hindus, but even modern philosophy might, with advantage, study , it on account of its clearness and exactness. Though none of its inves- tigations has been carried on to a satisfactory end, the Nydya has, with the means at its command, fully described the circle within which it moved. We must at the same time admit, that notwithstanding its exactness, there is one inherent fault in its exposition, viz. the neglect of all analytical method, a fault of all systems of the Hindus, which has, perhaps, more than any thing else, contributed to the narrow limits of their mental horizon. This fault, which, however, it shares with many other expositions of philosophy, for instance, to mention a cele-
+ brated name, with Spinoza’s system, is rather a fault of exposition than of the system itself ‘for no synthesis (in science) is possible without
_ analysis, and having well understood the leading notions of a system, we can easily trace the analytical way by which they were obtained This apparent absence of analysis in the construction of the philosophi- eal systems of the Hindus is the reason why so many enquirers have done injystice to their philosophical talent. For want of a clear analysis, unabte to understand the aphor'sms of the Hindu schools, composed in a language in form as well as in thought, foreign to them, they thought the philosophical productions of many centuries and of an ingenious people, a web of either abstruse or puerile notions. On a closer exami- nation we shall come to 8 juster opinion of them, and although we find alimit as well in the range as the depth of their enquiries, we shall come to place them among the nations which advanced the intellectual progress of mankind
That Windu philosophy will, however, have any great influence upon the development of Eucopean philosophy and mediately of European civilization, mugt be denied. Why should this be the anse? Although we must admit, that the philosophicel researches of the Hindus are as worthy of attention ag thoee of the Greeks, still it is at the first glance evident, that the Philosophical works of the former are unfit to be transferred to another soil, while tfiose of the Jatter will have always tke epame influence upon every rising generation in every clime andgge. This - difference lies not so much in the development of the system
Introduction.
as in the form. Yeuare compelled to think by reading the works of the Greeks, they introduce you into the process of their thoughts, aud by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until कनै qttrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of their systems,
from which point it is easy either to look back upon the way you have made or toradvance further, The Hindus, on the other hand, are dog- matical, They commence synthetically with + statgment of their principles, yet do not condescend to unfold the train of thought which has led tothem. Hence it is impossible for any one to understand their writings who has not previously, to a considerable degree, been practised in philoscphicalsenquiries. ‘The punishment however of this mystery and exclusion is the want of interest,.felt in the study of their writings. ‘The same doctrines which might have been instrumental in enlightening thousands, are now forgotten, or in the possession of a few - who are hardly able to comprehend them
Among the general metaphysical notions, the notion of substance is the most important one, as upon it all other notions are either founded or are closely connected with it, and whatever may be the solution of « all other metaphysical problems, it must be influenced by the notion of substance °
Substances are, according to the Nydye, the substrata of qualitiesend actions,* a definition, which is the right One, as the basia of further in- restigation—it is the right one, because founded on experience. Sub- stance, we add, is in so far the substratum of qualities and actions, as the existence of qualities and actions depends upon the existence of substance ; if quality were independent of another, it could not represent another, whose quality it is. The existence of substance must there- fore be absolute, that is to say, not dependent upon the existence of another ; for in this case, it would be comprehended, not by thg notion of substance, but by that of quality. And cons®quently, to think the idea of substance by any notions iacluding dependance, ig a contradic. tion. This contradiction (of comprelending gubstauce under the notion of quality, and therefore of dependance) was cammitted by the Nydya by the distinction between eternal and non-eterngl subsifnces, because the
* Or rather of qualities alofle according to the mod ern school of the Nyéya, the definition, that substaitoes are the substrata of qualities and actions, belongs to Kanéda,
©
vi Introduction.
existence of the latter is not independent. In the notion of eternal substance, however, the true notion of substance is included, which is => be independent of time and cause,
Another question is, how a substance is united with its qualities? That a substance should have qualities, appears a matter of course, and to question it, shows a vast progress in metaphysical thinking. Al- though the Nydya entered not expressly into the discussion of this sub- ject, it must have felt its weight, as they found it necessary to invent a contrivance for such a connexion. A substance is, according to them, united with its qualities by a relation, called intimate relation, which is something real, and is neither in substancespnor qualities, nor actions. We do not intend here tq analyze this notion any further (stating, how- ever, that the difficulty is not really removed by it,*) but we turn toa third point in the notion of substance. Substance, according to the Nydya, is not only uifited with its qualities by the relation, just men- tioned, but all substanees are united with the general notion of sub- stance, and single substances in the same way with the notion of their own class, This general notion is rather a common property ; for it does exist, independent of the mind which may conceive it, in the substances (also in qualities and actions) themselves, and is even eternal in eternal substances, not etergal in transient substances. ‘This notion exactly corresponds with that of the so-called realists among the scholastic philosophers, who maintained the reality of general notions. Duns Scotus, for instance, asserted, that general properties (notions) were not only in objects potentid, but act, and that generality was not only formed by the understanding, but that it existed previously to the mental conception per se as a reality, viz., the quiddity itself, which was
* For if it is necessary, that qualitics require some link to unite them with sub- atandés, it iDalso necesaggy, that thie litk should be united with them by similar link, and 80 on. The difficulty, as regards the connection of qualities, is briefly stated, thus. ‘Tne existence of qualities is dependent upon the existence of the sub- stance, whose qualities they are, but not‘vice versa. Substance in accordance to its rotion, is independent of qualities. Substance therefore is something of itself, and also something on wagon ११५१५६१ are dependent, and in this latter respect it is not substancé, which is to be independedt of qualities. That is to say, the notion of
+ substance in this form is contradictory, and should be abandoned for a notion which
is consistent.
Introduction. vii
indifferent to geneval-or individual existence. A cause, however, was requised to remove this indifference, viz. another more extensive quiddity, closely united with the first, and with the principle of indivee duity. (a{terwards called haecceity.)*
In one point the Nydya went a step in advance of most of the anci- ent systems of philosophy, viz., in its assumption, that the special qualities of substances are effects ; for instance earth is the intimate (or material) cause of smell, the soul of knowledge, Sc. ‘They were no doubt urged to this assumption by the contradiction, which arises, if beside substance, a quality which is necessary and therefore belongs to the quale of thé subsgance, is admitted, If quality is an effect of substance, its existence is evidently derived, and the contradiction re moved. Although, however, this hypothesis is a step in advance, it is not the complete solution of the difliculty ; for here again the question will arise, how it is possible, that a substance caif become a cause, that is, produce something, which is foreign to itself
Substances, as before said, according to the Nydya, are either eter. nal or non-eternal. Eternal are space, time, ether, soul, and the atoms of mind, earth, water, fire, and air. NSn-eternal are al} compounds, or the things which we actually perceive, and whicl, must have a cause of their existence. Thus substances are divigled into those which arg with- out cause, and those which have a cause? न
There are three ०५०९३ ;- 1, ‘he cause of intimate relation, or material cause, as yarn is the material cause of cloth ;—2, ‘The proximate cause, or the actual uuion of the parts which are to form a compound ; —and 3, ‘The instrumental cause, viz. the cause by which this union is effected.
This is similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, who admitted four causes ; A material cause, a moving cause, a formal cause, and an end cause, The instrumental cause includes Arisotle’s formal, moving, aud” end causes. ९ ° ॐ
The notion of causality is certainly well considered, and infinitely su- perior ¢o the notions which other Indian systegs formed of it; for there are already made some steps in advance towards the’ proper discussion of this notion, if a difference in causefis acknowledged. In the’ enunie- qation of causes—the cguse of motion appears to have been omitted ; it is,
* Vid, Teaflemann's Genchichig der Philosophie, Vierte Auf. p. 286,
viii Introduction.
however, contained in the notion of instrumental causality. All activity according to the Ny4ya is limited to motion, acts of the mind being eeonsidered by them as qualities, and as all actions abide in substances, we must think every substance as a cause of motion (viz, the last, cause). They did not, however, discuss, whether motion was necessary to all substances, or only to some or tp one, that isto say, whether there is a primum mobile or ndt’; they did not discuss the question, whether or not different motions require different causes; nor did they lastly enter into an explanation of the notion itself.* They appear in fact not to have been aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the idea of causality, which undoubtedly is one of the most difficult metaphysical notions.+ The contradictions in the notion of cause and effect appear with special force to apply to such causes, by which a change in the qualities of a substance is effected, aa chemical, animal, and psychical effects, Such effects are, however, Senied by the.Nydya. Material causes must be understood as only the substrata, or the materials for a new union, as for instance, the two hilves from which a pot is produced, are the ma- terial cause of the pot. There are therefore no real changes, but only changes of the agcidental form, which substances may assume in their connexion with others; and there should not be changes at all we add. Eveay gompound substance, agcording to the Nydya, is ultimately pro- duced from simple substances. Simple substances, however, are eternal, and all their qualities are also eternal. If this is the case, there is also
* Tho contradictions which Zeno found in the idea of motion, are well known, and without fully acknowledging their weight, it is impossible to obtain a correct notion of it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and endeavoured to remove Zeno’s objections to this notion. How important it is, correctly to define this Rotion, is evident even from the influence, which it exercised on the Nydya, where mation is considered as an act, ang even as the only act.
+ Vide Sext. Emp. Aes. mathem, in Ritter’s History of Philos. Vol. iv. p. 339. That cause could not be later than effectpis evident ; but also;the effect cannot be later than the cause; for if so, the cause, being antecedent to the effect, would be without effect, and a cause without effect, is a contradiction. And if the effect would be consequent to the cause, it would be, when the cause is no more, therefore an effget without cause, Both therefore must be necessarily together. If this be con- ceded, then there is the difficulty, why the one nore than the other is producing (or cause). Thes@ are only part of the difficulties, andwithout solving them, the qhjectjons made against causality, are quite just. ५
Introduetion. ix no change of qualities in any compound substances, becanse by any con- nexion between them, different from an accidental relation, they would assume changes, contradictory to the notion, under which they are con- veived. As the Nydya, however, admits an actual change in compound substances, in which qualities, not to be met with in the simple substan- ces, are produced, and moreover admnits a comppund, in which there is a comparatively firm connexion of the parts with each dther,it hns deviated from its notion of causality, and is hence guilty gf the contradiction which it first endeavoured to escape. Notwithstanding these deticien- cies of the Nydya, we still maintain, that it approached nearer than any other Hindu system, to the true notion of causality, caugality being, according to Pantheistic, not less than to skeptical idea, a product of habit in the association of our ideas.
In passing from the general metaphysical (ontological) to more special investigations (comprehending natural philosophy and psycho- logy), we may first observe, that the same cleargess obtains in the latter asin the former. Existence, or rather that which exists (ro dytus dv, in its connexion with material and immagerial phenomena, is much more distinctly conceived than in other systems of the Hindws. We find in- deed the same material elements as in the latter; viz., earth, water, light, air, and ether, and also the same «@alities ; but while in alleoshers they are only generally described, here there is made an attempt to ex- plain the special phenomena as well as the sources of our perception of them, or in one word, we find here the basis of observation, and of the first lineaments of the consequent reflection upon the results of that ob- servation. We meet here also with the first remarks about space and time, and even with some correct notions of their nature, and although both of them are placed among the substances, we must not forget the intrinsic difficulties of this subject, which in our times only hag len more satisfactorily investigated by Kaftt, Fichte, and PPerbart. ‘The error of considering spacé and time as subst{nces, is a consequencg of the notion the Nydya had formed of substanfe, viz. ag the eubstrate of qualities and actions, This idea would, indeed, hav@been correct, had tHe no- tion of existence been preserved. ‘The Vedinta certainly had a much mfre exact idea of existence, maintaining, that which evists (ro Gyros dv) must be simply existent, without any attribute whatever, and should strictly not be even consideredéy a plurality of notions, ‘The Vegantg,
x Introduction.
however, by denying the reality of phenomena, had nothing to explain, while the Nydya, retaining the crude notions, given by observation, had no principles whereby to explain them. The most interesting poiut in this part of the system is the investigation into thy nature of matter, an investigation which was indeed entered into by other Hindu systems, yet not with the same success, The Védanta, for instance, reduced the objects of the senses, or the things composed of the gross elements, to clements which are finer and imperceptible to the senses, undopbtedly fou the same reasons as the Nyaya, viz. because the origin, the changes, and the destraction,of the material things compelled the mind to fix the notion of existence upon somé other natures, not affect- ed by those conditions, But according to the Védanta, the simpler elements are only simple, because they are unmixed with others. As regards space, however, No reduction was made, and their view on this point is very like the doctrine of Anaxagoras, who also started from an original identity of the elements with space, The Védanta indeed did not confine its thoughts to those elements, but proceeded to the suppo- sition of a substance, in which there is no difference whatever, but for what reason this supposition was here made, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory reply, and as regards the principal point, space filled out ey matter, it was not ewn touched upon. The Nydya, on the other hand, has examined matfer under this point of view, and arrived at the theory of atoms,* in‘the same way as Leucippus and Democritus. It proceeded even further. With Leucippus and Democritus atoms have some, though imperceptible, extent, and also different figures and mo-
* It is astonishing, that the Nyéyaikas made the supposition of such a substance anthe ether, which, like space and time, is pervading and infinite. It is not space itaelf, but 9 kind of matter, filling out apace, and can therefore be distinguished from {f merely by a less degree of density. 11 80, the consequence should have been, that it was also cbinposed of parts, tho last elements cf which are atoms, Instead of this, egher is some thing analogSus to space, by its befng infinite, and yet filling gut an infinite space. In fact it mppears, they assumed this notion of ether only historically, or as & part of the views on matter which had been formed pre. viously to them. Te doctring, of the five elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth) is qne of the most ancfent hypetheses of Indian philosophy. It is taught already in the Upanishads, and probably more anclent even than the doctrine of the soul. Hence it Passed over into the different systeras, fiz. the Védanta, Sankhya aga Nyfys, modified according to the different ciews they held of substance.
Introduction. xi
tions, while the Nydya held them to be absolute units of space, without any dimensions and motions, that is, mathematical points as regards space. They are eternal and unchangeable, and while they are without, cause themselves, they are the cause of the material universe, They are imperceptible to the senses, and the knowledge of them is obtained by inference.
The system of Democritus is throughout a érude materialism. The last elements of existence are with him atoms which have no qualities whatever beside form and motion, ‘The soul itself is merely a com pound of round atoms, and a deity is of course impossible. A theory of atoms of such a kind a contradictory in its principle, and in its re- sults leads to an annilulation of truth in general. The Nyfiya is vastly superior to Democritus’ theory ; for atoms are first conceived in their real notion as units of matter without any extent, and secondly the theory of atoms forms only a subordinate part of their researches.
The same clearness and toa certain degree camprehensiveness is met with in their psychological enquiries. ‘I'he facflties of the soul and ite relations to the material things and other objects of knowledge, are methodically described. ‘The Nydya®draws a marked line between matter and spirit, by distinetly stating the uotigns, under which either is perceived.
The soul has, according to the Nydyapqualitich, opposite to the quali- ties of the substances perceived by the senses, and is therefure distinct from these substances, that is to say, as regards special qualities ; for as (0 qualities, ascribed to, substances as far as they are substances, both must of course agree. Qualities of the soul are the emotions and desires, volition and aversion, etc. and knowledge. Knowledge is pro- duced by intellect, which is one of the qualitics (faculties) of the soul, Intellect is again fourfold, it is perception, inference, analogy and verbal knowledge. Perception (viz. pgreeption generaljy, as well vf external as of internal ebjects), is the source from which all other knowledge flows, or rather, without objectsgof perception the other facylties of intellect have no materials to work upon Gill knowledge, that is per- ceived, is perceived through a medium, ghrough #an instrument, by which the soul is in communion either with objects from without or
‘from within itself, External objects are perceived thrqugh five external senses, these Being in contact yith the mind, while internal objects, and
xii Introduction.
by them the soul, are only perceived through the mind. The doc- trine of the communication of the soul with external objects is very _ Gurious and interesting, not only because it is original, but because it shows a remarkable acuteness in overcoming difficulties, met with in every system, which considers substances not only as individual beings, but also as a common essence that exists, although dependent upon the individual substances, मू perceive individual external substances, and their properti¢s in common with others, it is necessary that the inter- course of the senses with the external objects should take place accord- ingly, that is to say, that individual substances should be perceived by the connexion of the senses with these indi-idual substances, and the common prdperties by the connexion of the senses with these common properties, Substances are then perceived in their different पलक tions, viz, first, in the relation of, this individual substance and this individual quality, or of this individual substance and this individual ; farther, in the relation, which this individual substance has with its class (general” essence) or with its generality ; and lastly, in the relation, which this individual quality or this individual act of this individual substance has with ifs class or generality.
This, however, is not sufficient; for a full comprehension, there are require also yeweral notions corresponding with those relations. A tree for instance would not be perceived, without the general notion of a tree, by which a tree at any place and at any time is perceived. ‘This general notion requires again a hind of special knowledge, by which the general notion of a tree is referred to a certain tree. This kind of knowledge, thongh corresponding with the relations of all substances, which have both general and special properties, and though (impli- citly) contained in every object of perception, still differs from the gene- ral properties of the things. It is a conception of the soul, produced by its own activity. Chis knowledge then is internal perception, that is to say, it is not produced by inferace, or analogy, ०९ verbal commu- nication, but it is immediate and complete, as all knowledge by percep- tion, “ Every perception of external objects then, according to this ex- position, is based upon two glements, au external and an internal, or as these expressions do not exactly fepresent their notions, an immediate and mediate, an ghjective and ideal knowledge. Inthe same way are the objects of the soul perceived, viz. its different qualities, as aversion,
Introduction. xili
volition, &c, are called. Though the soul is the object of the mind, it
is not directly perceived by it, but is inferred from its qualities. It is
not necessary here to explain the other faculties of intellect, viz. ina ference, comparison, and verbal communication, as they are discussed in
another part of this paper. We here only add, that they must be con-
sidered as farts of the quality of knowledge, gy, us we would express it,
as modified operations of one and the same activity*of thy soul,
The mind, by which all knowledge is perceived, is not a quality or faculty of the soul itself, but an independent subsgance, atomic in its nature.* Henee only a single gerception or idea is at one time perceived by the soul, ° .
The soul itself is eternal, and therefore so,also are its qualities, we should say, also its knowledge, although this knowledge be not perceiv- ed by the soul itself, It is at the same time every where, not, however, as an infinite soul, as the universal: soul of the Vetinta, where all things constitute the pervading soul, be it even a piece of matter, though bound by ignorance to a state of apparent material existence, but in the same way as space and time are connected with every thing, ‘There is a general soul, and there are individual souls. ‘Thegeencral soul has the same qualities with the individual souls, withthe exception of aver sion, pleasure, pai, merit and demerit, decause these qualities enpuld involse imperfections, ‘The individual®soul is subject to the law of transmigration, and happiness and misery are the consequences of ita good or bad actions. It is, however, possible for the individual suul to emerge trom the vicissitudes of worldly existence by the attainment of true hnowedge.
Here it is necessary to point out what place the notion of the general soul or the deity (I'swara, the Iuler) holds in the system of the Nydya,
The Vedinta denies a personal deity. There is a supreme soul, but this soul is all in all, individual souls are cemanations {fan it, ag sparks from fire, and are essentially identical with it. Nature in its first elements as well as in its development dgpends upon it. ‘The
* How 18 mind united with the soul? Not by ‘ony act wf vither ; for they are independent ofeach other, They are united by sofething without they, vig gby the power of God, in the same’ way, ag atoms are united with cach other ; fur these latter, although the matefial causes of compound substances, aré not causes of their connexion,
xiv Introduction.
Védénta in fact destroys the distinctions between God and nature ; every distinction is delusion, and there is nothing but one all-pervading,
~knowing and blissful being, and even such distinctions as of existence, knowledge, bliss, are not real distinctions, they are but contrivances to approach to the true idea of the One,—If there is nothing but existence, but knowledge, but truth, there should be no difference whatever, and least of all any delusion, on the contrary, there is with man almost nothing but delusion ; only few approach the true notion of God, and but inadequately; in most men there is only difference found, and nature is altogether opposed to it, Nay, this is not only the case in the lust emanation of this deity, but if we comprehend nature in its principle, where all differences of substance, quality, furm, &e. dis- appear, if we comprehend it ns dependent upon the soul, it is ignorance, that is to say, indiserete matter, it is non-existence, non-knowledge, Xe, but this, Proteus-like being, of which it cannot be said, that it ex- ists, nor, that it docs ndt exist, is to be placed upon the soul, to be under- stood by it. This is to say: in theory the Vcdiinta acknowledges but one principle, the infinite soul, in fact, however, two, soul and non-soul, ignorance or matter,
With reference to fiod, the Sinkhya is divided into two sects, the theistical and the at heistical. ५
* Col. MLE. pp. 251-2. God, Prwara, the cupreme ruler according to Patanyali, is a soul or spirit distinct: from other souls, unaffected by the ils with which they are beset, unconcerned with good or bad deeds ond their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts, In hun is the utmost omniseience, He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythology) himself पान fimte, unlimited by time,
Kapila, on the other hand, denies an Yewara, ruler of the world by volition, alleging, that there is no proof of God's existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred द्रप reasoning, nor yet res ९१९५, Ue acknowledges, indeed, a being issu. ing from nature, who i¥ intelligence absoluty, source of all individual intelligences and origin of other existences succeeavely evolved and developed. [६ expressly
attirmsyethat the teath of such an Fawarn is demonstrated, the Creator of worlds,
in such sense of creation; for ' the existence of ctfects,”” he says, "^ is dependent
upon consciousness, pt upon Tswara,” and,‘ allelse is from the great principle. Yop, that being is ११५९ havitn, a beginging and an end, dating from the grand de- velopment of the universe, to terminate with the cohsummation of all things, But an infinite being, Creator and guider of the universe, by tolition, Kapila positively dgnies, | ५
See also Wilson's Sankhy$! Karka, pp. 166 to 168. e
Introduction.
Kapila denied altogether a deity; the I'swara whom he admits, is only a finite being; for although he assumes a being, whose intelli- gence is absulute, yet this being issues fiom nature, and is again to terminate tn nature. It is very much to be regretted, that of Patan- jali’s doctrine nothing as yet has been published, [८३ ditticult to form an exaét idea of his being trem the words, quoted by Colebrooke, According to them he has some attributes of the deity ; heis of the utmost omniscience, infimte, unlimited by time ; but how he iz eon. nected with the creation and ruling of the universe, y is impossible to conceive. Uf his doctrine in ot her gwints agrecs with the atheistical Sankhya, all the developmént of the world in its different forms is indes pendent of him; for it is the necessity of nature, that certain cmana- tions are issuing from it, and returning to it after certain penods, It would rather appear, that he is a hind of Epicurean deity, blissful in himself and wueoncerned with the भित of the world.
The Nydya is essentially theistical. According to them, Cod is per- sonal, He ts not, a9 it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere hnow- ledge, mere bliss, but he is a substance, of whieh existence, Xe, are attributes; tur it iy impossible to think of cristence, snowledge, &e., without referring them toa subject which existsgwhich has knowledge, Xe. He is not the supreme soul of the Vediuta whieh 1s १९०५५ universe, but distinguished as well from Me world as from fimte spirits, He is not a mere emanation from uature, as Kapila asserted, but alto- gether different from nature, and self-existent, Heis also not, as ap- pears to be Pitanjal's opinion, a mercly omniscient being ; but he is of infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, and nature could not exist in- dependent of a God, or could exist only without order, harmony and object. And this idea is not only a fortuitous addition to the system, but one of its chict springs; for all the substances in the world, with- out God, remain unconnected, here may be ems, but they do not constitute a world, t hey are solitarf, unconnected, without any apparent difference ; of themselses they have no action, produce no effecty, and hot even the simplest compound of two atoms can arise from them alone, much less a compound of a certain ॥ 1५, and fur certain objects, 100 the world in its unite, harmony, and iufimte variety of fornts. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, Without enjoyment, withsut de clopment and without a final end, fur
xvi Introduction.
they are not united with mind, the instrument, by which they are con- nected with the world, among themselves and with the creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who by his infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervading harmony of the world. ‘This argument for the existence of a deity is essentially teleological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the world as to its form, not as to its matter, The Nydya epproaches most closely of all Hindu systems the Chris- tian notion of God, as its deity is an infinite spirit and at the same time personal, as it is wholly distinct from taatter, and the creator and ruler of the universe. + {It would be superfluous to point out the marked distinction, drawn here between body and soul. Though a higher development of philo- sophy may destroy ‘the distinctions between soul and matter, that is, may recognise matter, or what is perceived १७ matter, as the same with the soul (as for instance, Leibnita did), it is nevertheless certain, that . 10 true knowledge of the soul is possible, without first drawing a most decided line of demarcation between the phenomena of matter and of the soul, In the Nyaya there is even an approximation to the doctrine, thag soul and matter are as to their principles one and the same, viz. in the theory of atoms, accordg to which atoms are the negation of space. From this notion we may draw the inference, which has not been drawn by the Nydya, it is true, but which would have been only a necessary consequence trom the premises, that matter, being a compound of atoms, is only a phenomenon, as regards its extension through space. Where then is here shown the difference between the soul and the true substratum of metter? Let us see then, what is the soul? ‘The sont is ditferent from matter, as this last is perceived by the senses as extended through’ space. Thee distinction is tue, but further to conclude, that the soul is also different from mattet in its real nature, where matter is not extended, is certainly hasty, aml does not follow from the premises. What then is the soul aogording to them ! [tis all-pervading, infinite, hike ether, space aul timg, ¢ This answer, though tar from satisfactory, slfows, that they felt the पीलौ ty in determining the notion of che soul, when theie other notions had undergone a decided alteration. — ‘The most peculiar notion in their psychalogicai theory is the existence of
Introducteon. xvii
of the mind independent of soul, although most intimately connected with it; for through the mind only the soul perceives, as well its own qualities, as the qualities of external substances. How could the Nydya have made कं supposition in which the contradiction is so evident? For it ia casy to conclude, that if the mind is independent, its perception is also independent. If the mind perceives, this, perception is not in the soul, and if this perception is in the soul, it is not pérceivgd. ‘The soul then has knowledge, which isnot real knowledge, because not perceived, and the mind has no knowledge, though it perceives. = + :
We inay solve this difticulty at leagt in some way. The mind was first undoubtedly consider@l as an internal sense according to the ana- logy of external senses, in order that there be a wnity of perception, and that, as the external objects are perceived through different media, the objects of the soul be perceived, through an analogous internal medium, a supposition, which has also been made m modern (English) plulosophy, So far the Nydya might have considered the mind as an internal sense, but they met with a difficulty, which was not felt in the same intensity by modern philosophers, 11 knowledge ॥५ [ल~ ecived by the soul through the medium of he mind (the बाला sense), why is it not always present in the mind? why does it disappear and give place to other objects of pereeption, ete. ? Locke was surprised at the narrowness of the human mind, Without being able to aecount for it; the Nyaya in endeavouring to account for it, invented an inde- pendent substance, the mind, which is an atom, and according to its atomic uature only able to represent or to perceive one object at one and the same time.
This, | think, is the solation of the dificulty, and though it is cer- tainly only an evasion, because its supposition creates greater diflicultie than the former one, it still gives evidence of ५ spirit of enquiry in the schvol, ‘
In comparing the psychological theory of the Nydyg with more modern doctrines (with the excepflon of the latest period) wé yiust admit, that in a metaphysical point of view tleere is no great difference between them. The same objections are to, be made to cither, the docfrine of faculties beings involved in the same contradictions as that Of qualities, In eitherscase, if you are to explain, whatthe soul is, you have to state, what it is? independent of its quatics or faculties, aud
xviii Introduction.
also to enumerate the latter. Your explanation will thus point out a quale, which is not a unity, but something defined by a variety of no- tions. This, however, is not the place to discuss the matter, and we wished only to remind the reader, that modern philosophy in this respect cannot boast to have advanced one single step beyond that of the Hindus, that is to say, ip the metaphysic of the soul, although it would be absurd tadeny, that modern psychology, as to the observation of psychical phenomena, has made rapid strides towards perfection.
In passing over to the strictly logical enquiries of the Nyaya, we have to premise, that we cannot view them with the same satisfaction, and although we may make ample allowance“tfor the different forms of language, in which they are explained, we are compellcd to confess, that they are neither exact nor complete.
The Nydya has treated the logical topics in the inverse order of that adopted by us, viz. first inference, then ideas, and lastly propositions. This order is followed, not in consequence of a different method of ar- rangement, but in consequence of the subjects being based upon different grounds, and flowing from different sources. Logic might undoubtedly be treated aualytically and commence with the exposition of syllogisti- cal forms, Consideving argument asa fact, we might analyse various Arguyients, and proceeding & their elements, that is to propositions, gradually arrive at ideas or ndtions, But the Nyadya, far from following such an analytical course, holds inference to be a quality (or moditication of'a quality), different from the quality of forming names and notions, and discusses inference before verbal knowledge, evidently with the purpose of showing, that the latter in some way depends upon the former,
We, however, treat these doctrines in their common order, with no other intention than to make ourselves better understood.
Verbal knowledge is one of the divisions of intellect. The first act or the first conditiow of understauditg words, is the forming of the name! A name is corresponding ta certain object, and this object is connetted with the name by the power of the name. A name which has such a power, is a word.» The clear and distinct knowledge of what is implied in a word, is produced by a third act, and is the meaning of a word. ‘This latter is in fact identical with idea or notion, as is evident from the examples given, as for instance, a tree isa thing which hag root, stem, branches, leaves, etc.
Introduction. xix
Here again is the order perverted, the name is certainly not the first operation, and the object to be named, the second, but just the reverse. There must be objects to be named, aud though we may admit, that the clear idea ofa subject often succeeds a name, still the object, of which the notion is formed, is the first, and we must assert, that what precedes the notion, also preeedes the name.
The enquiry, how ideas are formed from a variety ‘of sispilar objects, belongs to psychology, and hpwever interesting this question otherwise may be, logic has nothing to do with the psychical process, by which ideas are produced, [f this were the eage, we might still have to wait for a logic, asa psychological theory has not yet been established to general satisfaction, whale logic as a science has been complete fur more than two thousand years. By the considering first of the names and after- wards of the corresponding notions, the real character of a notion has been at least obscured. From the given examples we see, that a notion, instead of being defined by the genus, under whieh itis contained, and the specitic difference, is explained by a genus, which iy distant from it by anumber of intervening notions (for instance, genus of tree thing) and by a specitic difference, which besides its own differewee, enumerates properties whieh it partakes with others (fur instance rout, stem, leaves, cte, specitie dilference) न ६ oo
Phe meaning of a word or idea, ought fo have been considered in its connevion with other ideas, ag made up by genus and differentia spe- evica, and as excluded from them by their compatible, contrary, and contradictory opposition. Here, however, are genus and species raved to categories under the names of generality and particularity, being there the common properties of substances, qualities, and acts, while the opposition of idens or terms is treated in the yeventh category, that of negation, Negation is the category which arises, if the categories are mutually denied of cach oth@. It is the mfl@ual differener of the categories and therefore the same with logical opposition.. Negation is again of four kinds, mutual negatio® antecedent negation, (uegatiyn of athing, that is to be,) emergent negation @estrnction) and absolute negation, Of them antecedent and emergeft gicgations are not logical but metaphysical negations, Viz. the relations which a thing may hive with regard to its orizin or tessation in time. Mutual negation corresponds to contrary opposition (Sppositio contrarian) dt terms. Fur insfance
xx Introduction.
black is the negation of white, of red, &e. aud vicé vers’; here the one is not denied in an absolute, but in a relative manner. Absolute nega- tion* would correspond to contradictory opposition (oppositio contra- dictoria) as is evident from an allusion to it in the explanation of a nega- tive inference. Here it is said, that a notion is the negation of its abso lute non-existence, पिर instance cloth is the negation of its absolute non-evistence, noti-cloth, or A= Non—Non— A, that is to say, a is the negation of what is in contradictory opposition to A.
From this arrangement then did not only result an imperfect exposi- tion of the logical relations among ideas, but aus important metaphysical error, by whieh logical relations of ideas are’ considered as real proper- ties of substances. = «
In finding the logica} treatment of notions by no means satisfactory, we may at the same time observey that there are many ४ aluable remarks on some psychological and grammatical relations of ideas which we do not recollect to have found elsewhere. These we have given in a note to the text, where this subject is explained,
A proposition to convey a distinct meaning, must, according to the Nyaya, have fear qualities :
1. Contignity, which, according to some, is the uninterrnpted sueces- siow of the words pronounce: ina sentence, 30 that for instance, the first word of it be not pronounced in the present moment, and the next half an hour afterwards, according to others, the arrangement of the words according to their grammatical connesion, for instance, that a preposition be placed together with the word which depends upon it, and not with a word, to which it does not refer.
2. Consistency, or the mutual agreement of the words, according to their sense, so that contradictory terms be not connected.
3. Structure, or the grammatical (terminations) forms of the words, which correspond in‘their meanings (for instance, that the verb agrees with the subject in number and person.)
५
५
* There is a difference of gpinion in the Nyaya with reference to absolute nega- tion. Some appear cunceive it merely as a negation of present existence, others as the negation of a contradicfory 10114 9. In this last sense Cult brooke underst 20d it, (Mis. Essays, Vol. 1, p. 288,) and this is also the interpretation of the Mimiinaa, (Wilson’s Sankhyd Karika, p.19.) That the author of the Phisha Paricchéda
adopted also this sense, appears to me evident fiom the above explanation. ‘
Introduction. Xn
4. Intention, that is, the meaning which the speaker wislies to con- vey by a sentence.
‘There again the logical characteristics of a proposition have been omitted, as all those points, with the exception perhaps of consistency, belong to the grammatical structure of a sentence.
The logical explanation of propositions, as a ygtter of course, passes over any grammatical form a proposition may assume ; ig treats only of the relation between two igeas, and its simple question is, whether two ideas can be connected or not. Py
It is evident, that in this way neithey quantity, nor modality of pro- positions could have been fliscovered. We might, however, dispense with them, as these forms are not strictly logwal; but not even the division of propositions according to their quality has been made by the Novaya. . ‘ i
The theory of ideas and propositions is the weakest point in the logic of the Nydya; they are more successful in explaiging the form of argue ments; for though the theary of syllogism is far from exact and com- plete, we must admit, that: they understood the general character of a
syllogism, According to Gautama a complete syllogism oontains five members (Avayava = proposition). The propAition (pravijna, that which is
to be proved by the argument). 2 The reason, argument (hetu) 3. The instance (Udaharana, drishtunta), 1, The application (upa- uaya). 3. The conclusion (nigamana), for instance :
1. This hill is fiery,
2. For it smokes,
3. What smokes is fiery, as for instance, a culinary hearth,
«This hill smokes, €. Therefore it is fiery. +
The modern echool of the Nydya reduced the syllogism to three, and even to two members, and thi$ last reduction appearg to have been most generally adopted,* as it is fa the Tarka Sangraha and Buisha
* Colebrooke (Mis. Essays, Vol. I. p. 292), adver€ed only §? Gautana’s Sitras, and, not toa more modern work of the Nyy a, Whey be asserted, that the regu. Jar syllogi«m of the Nyaya confisted of five members. The modern echdut of Ale Nyaya (ride Dr, Ballantyne’s Lectures on the Tarka Sangraha, p. 31), declares the five membered form rhetorical ig distinction from ats logical form, which cons tains only two member = Dr. Ballantyne has clear! pointed (his out in buf ,,
xxii Introduction.
Paricchéda. In this form the two premises, viz, major and minor pro- positions are condensed into one premise, of which we shall now give a description,
That a syllogism be correct, two things are required, 1, a general proposition, in which the subject (reason) is invariably connected with a predicate (conclusiqn), more comprehensive than the subject, and
» & minor term, With which the subject of the general proposition is connected. That, there is this double gounesion of the minor term with the reasan, and of the reason with the conclusion, is to be decid- ed by consideration, which is (he intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as connected with the general predicate or the predi- cate of the conclusions This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion ean only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as deter- mined by the reason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion,
For instance: let ¢ man from tormer observation kuow, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, ay for instance ona enlinary hearth ;
tise on the दुत sytem, and also in his Lectures on the Nydya philosophy, Me says, (दिद) systemof plulosophy, p. 5.)
८ Now, in this form of the syle zism (which we do not find alluded to in Mr. Colebrooke’s essay), there is neith r more nor less than there ism the Anstotele ayllogism., The wonder would be if there had been. ‘The first formal ditt rence observable is, the wrapping np of the premises in one logical datum, ‘The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable members of a single statement ap- pears to have been this, that it as only when simuituncous!y present ta the mind that the prenuses suggest the inference, and this simultaneousness of cagmz mee is secured by combining the two assertions ina pertud, or sentence, of which the whole becomes intelhgible only when the Iaat word in at has been uttered... .. If we sepae rate the two members of the orginal datum in the evample above cuted, we obtain
the follow fig * Whatever smokes, is fiery ;
The hill smokes, . « Therefore the Intl is fiery 1" and p. 9. To return to or text-book, The author tells us, that a man, after having, to the satisfattion of hy own mind, inferred the presence of tre from the perception of smoke, may wish to Impatt his cons tchion to another, In other wotds having wseertained the truth as a logician, he may wish as a rhetorician, to establish it ta the satisfaction of somebody else, Here we step distinctly out uf the province of logir, and enter that of rheturic.
Introduction. xviii
let him see afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising from a hill, he will recollect the general proposition, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, Hence the knowhlge arises: This hill is possessed of smoke, whick is invariably conneeted with tiie, This knowledge, this one act, by which there is a progress from one object toa third by a second is consideration, from which the conclusion arises: This hillis fiery.
This is in its principal points the theory of the Ny aya of the form of the syllogism, It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle, The differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two premises are combined into one, The ex- position is certainly not sample, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in thr natural form, which iy the connexion of two ina proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applied to the conclusion ; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conelusion also should not be stated ina separate sentence, butethe whole syllogism should form one sentence, for instance, in the evfimple : This hill, de- termined by smoke, which is determined by fire, is determined by fire. Yet the difference iy only apparcat ; for The ४११९१, as Aristotle, con- nects one notion with the other through a third w igh which the latter is conneeted, or excludes itby a third, from phich the second is exelfided
The sceond difference is, that the Neaya wahted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but to guard against falve premises, and for this purpose the consideration was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the preposition was exemplified, ‘Their consideration was therefore not only directed ty the logical opera. tiun of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argument should be the regult of one and the same operatiog, which of course is impossible
With the exposition of the forne of syllogism the logteal thapry of the Nydya is nearly completed. Gautama digided inference into three kinds ; 1, inference of an effect from a cause, as if rafi is inferred from a collection of clouds ; 2, iaference of A cause from an effect, a9 it वना 1s concluded from an increase of the water ina river, aud 3, inference from general noticns, as4f cardi is inferred to be a substance from its
xxiv Introduction.
having the quality of smell. This division, it is hardly necessary to remark, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. ‘The modern school of the Nyaya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms ; which are: only aflirma- tive inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given in illustration, it appears, tht the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara dnd Camestres ; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestres for all general negative ones. Here, however, is their theory finished, «and we find no trace of the different tnoods the syllogistical forms can enter into.
It is a remarkable circumstance, that the general form of syllogism should have been found by the Hindus, and yet that they should not have discovered the Uifferent figures aud moods, the diversities of which are the result of mereccombination, We think, this deficiency was the consequence of two calises especially,—first, of their technical language, which although precise, is yet cumbrous and not comprehensive, and secondly, of their pious regntd for every thing traditional, be it in political institutions, ju religion, or in science, ‘The Sitras, which are the folndations of their systams, have always remained text-books, and any discovery that had been*made in theory, did not prompt them to attempt a new exposition of science, but gave only occasion to a new interpretation of the school.
The Bhaisha Paricchcda itself is a work of the modern Nyaya. The author Viswaudétha Panchénana Bhatta, the son of Vidyauivasa Bhatta, accompanied the text with a commentary under the title “ Siddhanta Muktivali” (the pearl-wreath of truth), and he is known also by his commentary to Gautama’s Stitras, which bears the title “ Nydya Sutra Vritti.” “According ¢e the statement of the Pandi 8 he lived about two hundred years ago. The Bhasha*Paricchéda isa text-book in the schoole of the Nydya in Bengalw ‘There is no Pandit of any repute who doves not know it yell, and many know the whole of it by heart. And indeed it is a§mirably adapted for the purpose of introduction into the study of the Nydya philosophy. It is acsuecinct exposition of the principal topics of the whole system, and may easily be committed to memory. It is written in the well knoen Anustup metre. The style,
Introduction. चद
however, is not poetical at all, but that of the most sober prose, and nowhere is the attempt made to combine the graces of imagination with philosophical method.
The cotrse, followed in the work, is simple. The author gives first the leading ideas of the system, that is, the most comprehensive metaphysical notions, viz. the notions of subgtance, quality, action, ge- nerality, particularity, intimate relation and negation. — He then enue merates the various substances, qualities, actions, Xe. and defines the properties common to all categories as well ns those common to more or less of them, After this expositign the different substances in their relations to themselves, क other substances and to their 4 talities and actions are explained. In the same way the author discusses the qualities of substances, and his work is finished, when he has treated on the last quality, enumerated at the commencement of his treatise
The commentary is in thought and language a very different com- position. It is written with the object of supporting the views of the author and of the school in its controversy with other doctrines, and enters therefore frequently into intricate discussions in establishing the fundamental tenets or defending ‘lisputed pointseof the system, and makes use of the whole armory of the sometimes very abstruse technical language of the Nyaya. ° oe
This commentary has again been Smmented upon by Mahadeva Bhatta, but Treeeived a MS. of his work too late to make any other use of it than to compare it with the tevt.*
The Sanscrit text of the Bhisha Paricchéda was first printed in Ben gali characters in IN21, with the addition of a Bengali translation of the text and of the commentary. ‘The translation of the latter, however, is rather, 9 paraphrase, as the alterations are sometimes considerable.t
* The MS. isin the Library of the Sanscrit College of Calcutta, of which, however, I was (gr slong time not @ware, as it is nBt#mentioned in the lint of books in that Library, printed in the Sanscrit Catalogue of the Amatic Socicty. It haa two titles, ^" Mahadeva Bhafta-kritagMuktivali Prakésa and the sharter one. “ Dinakari वद In bis introduction, the author mentions also the name of hin father, Balakrishna.
t The title is, ^" 4 system of Logic, written in Manacrit, by the Vengrable Saye Boodh, and explained in ४ Sdoscrit « ‘ommentary by the very learned Viswonath
Tarkalancar, translated Ynto Bengalee by Kashee Nath Turkopunchanun, Cal cutta, 182]
xxvii Introduction.
Another edition of the Sanscrit text together with the commentary, appeared in 1827, under the auspices of the Committee of Public In- struction. The text is correct, but not so the commentary. It is full of mistakes, omissions and interpolations, The interpunctation is either faulty or entirely disregarded, and the numbers of the successive Slokas are not attached to the corresponding portions of the commentary, so that an easy referenee of the one to the other is impossible,
The present edition has been carefully revised partly by comparison with Mahadeva Bhatta’s commentary, partly by a reference to the cor- rections in the copy of Jayandrégana Tarkapanchdnana, the professor of Nyiya in the Sanscrit College, which heehad the kindness to lend me, and forwhich I offer my grateful acknowledgments.
The notes which I have added to the trauslation, are chiefly given for the purpose to elucidate the principal points of the system of the Nydya, in accordance ®with the object of this work to contribute to a fair estimate of the merits of Hindu philosophy, and are therefore more copious in such parts ‘as contain the distinguishing features of the Nyaya, for instance, the ontological portions, the doctrine of atoms, their notion of the dgjty, and their logical theory. They are less copious in portions which contaiy their explanation of the differences of matter ; for ag piatural science with theelIiudus has hardly made its beginning, their explanation is without Any value. I would, however, guard here against the misconstruction, that their failing to explain the phenomena of matter, affected also the correctness of the principles, by which they tried to explain them, Natural science with reference to those phenomena is quite distinct from the philosophical theory for the interpretation of them, Democritus’ explanation of natural phenomena may be entirely false, and still his theory of atoms may be correct, (although it is not in our opinion,) which is at least partly borne out by the fact, that in modem chemistry thetheory of atoms has been adopt- ed, although no one would admit the fipplication of it which Democritus made fer the explanatjon of the phenomena. The cause of this is a double one ; first, philosophy is quite distinct from natural science, the latter being based upon observation and experiments, the former upon thé relatfons which notions have among each other, Secondly, a phi- losophical system may have obtained the true principles for the ex- planation of intellectual and material phenomena, but at the same time
Introduction. xxvii
not have fully investigated the intermediate notions which may be necessary for explanation, A hasty application of these principles without due regard (0 such notions and to the results of natural science, is very apt to throw discredit upon the previous researches by which 8 system arrived at its principles, and also upon philosophy itself.
To mark the more the method of the philosgppical discussion of the Nyaya, 1 have generally preferred to give their interpretgtion in their own words, and therefore made large extracts from the commentary in as literal o translation as possible, which I hope, willbe found also useful to the student of the Nydya in general, as facilitating the read. ing of the commentary andthe understanding of the technical Innguage of the ४१५११.
DIVISION OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE NYA'YA PHILOSOPTLY,
SALUTATION दण GANE SA.
1. To Krishna, radiant like the new cloud, the thief of the clothes of the milhinaids, to him, who is the seed of the tree of the world, be adoration, :
2.0 There are seven categories,’ subsdance, quality, action,
. . च . . . e . generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation,
1. Padartha is explaned in vers 14, as that whiel, is object of huowledze, the commentary addy abject af prgof, of nomination ; but ay this apphes to every idea, the defiygtion is toa wide, and ११६॥॥ {0 have been restricted to the most generad abject fot knowledge. ४
[ have followed Colebrooke वा translating Padartha with eategory, although that term somewhat differs from the idea which Aristotle expresses by the same. According to him, categortes are the most extensive clagges of what is denoted by the simple word (the word in no connexion with another), Cat. 2. ray nari popdequtay ot 7१५५५५४ Aeyo- PVE EXO TOV YTOC OUT URE OP KT A. He cnnmerates ten, १1८, essence (otata), quantity (तदल), quahty (कत), relation (xpos १९), the where (५), the when (rare), position (१८५५), to dg possessed of (दनम), action (कनद), and passion (तवक)
Ritter in his history of philosophy (English Transl. Vol. HY. p. 66) remarks on them: “If the categories hag been put forward ag an accurate and exhaustive division of the, modes of being, it would be pen to many objections, but Arist&tle docg not usually ascribe mach importance to this caumeration of the most general notions, go that we may regard “it as nothing more thau an attempt to exhibit in a clear
2 Dwision of the Categories
light. the signification of words taken absolutely in order to show, how truth and fulsehood consist in the right or wrong combination of these elements.”
However, as most of Aristotle’s categorics refer to classes of existence ot to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy, the term of category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely alopt it here, viz. as referring to the notions, which express the general foring of knowledge, or what is the same, the general modes of existence. It will be interesting to compare the categories of the Nyaya with-those of Kant, with which they have a curious resemblance.
They are: 1. Quantity. १, Unity. b. Multiplicity, ८९. (7112
2. Quality, 9. Relation.
a. Reality a. Tference and subsistence (substantia and accidens).
b. Negation. b. Causality and dependence (catse and effect).
८. Limitation, ८ Community (Mutual cansality).
4. Modality.
a, Possibility (impossibility). bs Enistence (non-existence). ९, Necessity (aceidentalness),
The categories may be divided, according to the commentary, into two classes: into categories of affirmation, and negation, It was, however, not necessary, expressly to introduce this division in the teat; for, the seventh being the category of negation, it is self-evident, that the six preceding must be categories of negation, ‘The number of seven cate- gories is adopted by the Vaiséshikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nyilya, as established in the Bhishya.
Kanida acknowledged only the six first categories, excluding nega- tion. Gautama, the founder of the Nydya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (categories) soul, body, sense, object of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, condition of the soul after death (transmigration), retribution, pain, deliverance from pain. Two more categories, power and similarity, adopted in the Upamana Chintamani, are contained in the first six categories, aud mest therefore be rejected.
Of the Nyava Philosophy. 3 3—5, Substances’ are earth, water, light, air, ether, time,
2. The detinition of substance* is to be the substrate of qualities, and tu have substantiality (v. v.24). ‘Tu explain this more fully, itis said in the commentary to be the substrate of qualities cither in the relation of intimate union (Samavaya Sambandha) or in the relation of antecedent negation (Prégabluiva) that is of future existeage, ‘The latter definition iy given to obviate an objection which may be raised from the condition of substances at the time qf their production. Wei substances are produced, they have according to the Nydya no qualities, [1 they have no qualities, Chey are no substances ageording to the detinition, that sub- stances are the substrates of qualities. By the second definitiqn, that they are substrates of qualities either in the relatiof of intinate union, or of future existence, this objection is removed,
With regard to substantiality or the genus of yibstance the commen: tary remarks: Tf somebody (this is the statement of the Charvakas) would say : There is no proof that substantialityds a genus ; for it is not proved by perception, as melted butter or lack (aeeording fo your owa admission) have no substantiality,--we gontradict because substantiality is proved by the necessity, that there should be sonf™fhstinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of an effect, or Come distinguishing at tribute of the intimate cause of the पज agi separation (हत्या the parts composing a substance). ‘This argument ty founded on the supposition of the Nydya,that every cause must have some distinguishing attribute (कार्णं यन fafeamiat eg) under which its comprehended , itis acause, because tor instance, it has the general attribute of earth, water, Ac. Substance therefore, ax the cause of qualities, for instance earth of smell, must be concewed by the drtinguishing attribute ‘of snbstantiality, The genus substantiality depends therefore nat on per ception, but on inference. °
Some suppo®, continues the Commentary, da fies to be also a sub stance ; for, they argue, it ig proved by perception, i hawcolour and ae. tion, and is neither carth nor any of the other sidhstances. Its organ 1५ the eye, at the time that itr: without light. This argument is not valid ;
[|
e 11 Kandda gives the followihg defimtion of eubstinee, Vide Vand shika Siitras It Adhyaya, 1th Sitra, क्वियागुकनत समवायिकारणमिति FATE |, Substance ie
the substrate of qualities भात actio@, and hag intimate caunality,
4 Division of the Categories
space, soul and mind ; qualities’ are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction, priority, and posteriority, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aver- sion, volition, gravity, fluidity viscidity, faculty, fate, (merit and demerit) and sound.
6. There are five cactions,* throwing upwards, throwing downwards, gontricting, expanding and going.
7. Wandering about, evacuating, trirkling, flaming upwards, moving crookedly, are included in going,
8, Generality’ is considered two-fold, extensive and non.
for, darkness being proditced by the absence of light, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another substance. The supposition of its
colour arises from delysion, ax docs also the supposition, that it has action, viz., from the cessation of light. If darkness were a separate thing, and not ineluled'in the category of negation, as gold is included in light, an infinitenumber of substances, (viz. in accordance with an infinite number of negations) myst be assumed.
३, The déffition of quality,* which is given in verse 89, is: Quality is, whoge substrate is shbstance, and which is without quality and action, that feeto say, there is yo qualify of a quality, nor an action of an action, or the notion of quality would be changed to that of substance. The argument, by which it is proved, that quality in a class, is the same as that, which proves the same of substance.
4, Action,f according to the Bengalce translation, is the special cate- gory, which in the relation of intimate union is present in a substance which has velocity, or the category, which after a duration of five mo- ments is subject to destruction, viz,, at first, there is contact ; 2, Separa- tion; 3, Destruction of a former cennection ; 4, A new connection £0 Cessation of the actiot :
पि 5. Commengary.—Generality (or class) is intimate union of many
* Kanida’s definition of quality is : yaqyqqy गणवान् सयागविभागेश्चकारपमन- Vy vfa गणस णं || CA. 1. that is, quality is sued in substance, has quality and doeg not depend upon conjunctfon and separation without cause
+ एकद्रयमगणं संयागविभामेष्वकारणमनपे समिति कम्यल क्षं || A. 1. action is, whose site is substance alone, which is without quality, and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause ¢
Of the १५00 Philosophy. 9
extensive. Existence, as including substances, qualities and actions, is called extensive.
9, The class which differs from this is’ called non-exten- sive; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non- eatensive.
10. By its including many things, it isextensive ; by its be- ing included in a more extensive class, it ‘is nga-catensive.
ee ry e
in something eternal, or is eternal ayd the mtimate union of many. Tt is said, “in something cternal,” because intimate union of many evists also between things in contact. Of muay," beeause mitundte union in somcthing eternal exists also in such infinite quanta ay the shy, “a rae timate uno,” beeause the existence of many in something eternal refers also to absolute negation, Consequently there is fh generality or genus, where only one individual evisty, or where there is no difference of individuality, or where there iy confusion, or w here there ॥ retrogresy in infimtum, or where an idea ay changed to its contrary, or where there is no relation, For instanee, the shy forms no दुम on aceount of its individuality. Phe notions of a donkey ang of anass (in Sanserit the terms : घटः and Way are selected, cother of which aeans ajar) are no class, The notions of element and fornf are no Class, because the vakte of these notions 13 confoundadl. = Generality iso class, because, there is 10 place of support for it, Qt would require a retrogress आ infinitum ; for if there isa class of a elass, or a notion ef a notion, there must also be a class of the class of the class and so further) particularity is no class, because it would thus be changed (oats contrary. (Parteularity by be- coming generality would be the contrary of ita notion.) Intimate union 13 no class, because it iy not in the relation of intimate union (in the ree lation of intimage imion are onlyssubstances, qualities and actions),
According to their defimtion%f class only substance, quality, and action, further the gencral notinsof those three, which is rendity, the notions of the substances, with the exceptign of sky, space and time, the notions of the different qualities and actions as’well ay the notions which are included in them, form ‘yeneralitics or classes. ‘The othe four categories are not classes, but ax the Bengales ‘Translator calls them, Upadhis, titles, gtneralecharacteristics.
6 Division of the Categories
The ultimate condition of eternal substances is called particu- larity.°
11, The connexion of a substance with its componing parts, as of a jar, &g. with its two halves, &c.; further the connexion of substances with qualities and actions, and lastly the con- nexion of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes 18 cajled initimate relation."
meses: <= --9--
Comm.—The ultimate condition of eternal substances is particu- lnvity.* The ultimate condition, viz., the condition, which remains ultimately, last after all (according to the Beu.galce translation, the con- dition which remains until the general conflagration of the world), than which there is no further particularity, that is to say, the condition, abiding in one substance only; for in compound substances from a jar down to the union of two atoms there is mutual difference, by means of the difference of all their respective parts ; but the mutual difference of atoms is particularity ; this is a difference by itself, and a particularity further than this docs therefore not exist.
7. ComigeThe relation, of parts with things possessed of parts, of generality with sipgle objects, of qualities with things possess- ed of qualities, of actions with objects possessed of actions, is intimate relation. Intimate relation means constant relation. It is proved by the fact, that the intellect, when determined by qualities and action, is in the relation of what is determining and what is determined (predi- cate and subject) for it is a determined intellect, as the sentence: The man bears a stick, is the result of a determined intellect. ence, siuce in this case neither the relation of contact uor any other relation is possible, intimate relation is proved.
As the Bengalee translation expresses the meaning much more clearly, Thave given it here instead of the explonation of the original. Intimate relation, excluding distinctive relation, is constant relation of ouly one thing which regulates a condition, By the term “constant” the relation of contact is excluded, by the term “ excluding distinctive rela- tion,” the relation of distinction, by the term “ which regulates a con-
+सामान्यविशषश्तिबद्रापें 1) ^. 1 Both, generality and particularity depend
on intellect. The commentator, Sankara Misra adds, ^" generality is the intellect, which is found in many ; particularity, which is separated fiom others.”
Of the Nyaya Philosophy.
12, 13. Negation’ is two-fold, universal negation and reei- procal negation, ‘The first includes three kinds, antecedent
dition,” the relation of ideutity, ay for instance of the shy ; for the relation of identity (the relation, that a thing is to be comprehended under its own notion) is not regulating a condition, by the term “of only one thing,” the notion of mutual neg, , ॥ the relation of contact, is for instance, a jar with the ground — The नहह of distine- tion is three-fold, vie. as referring to time, space and 1१५५५. Tn the distinctive relation of time aud space are all things. “The, distinetive relation. of place is again two-Told, Yhe distinctive relation of nega- tion, and the distinctive relation of identity (of a Ching with itself) The distinctive relation of negation as the site Gf negation. In the dis- tinctive relation of identity is for instance the notion of the shy with the shy. In the relation of dentit} remains eeery [ताद् with itself Tn mutual relation iv the notion of the jar with the ground, ति, Comm.— Negation is the reciprocal negation of Che six cate. genes, Chat iy to say, negation arises from the six categories, being dened of each other, Negation iy two-fold, universal negation and mutual negation, Universal negation is negation, diferent from inutual negation. Mutual negation 19 the negation of identity. Universal negation is of three hinds, antecedent, enyergent,and absolute neghfion. Antecedent negation is a negiton, which is afterwards removed, for instance, if itis said, in this half'a jar is to be produced, there isa ne. gation of the jar, which is to be prodaced. Emergent negation or de- struction iy a negation of what is prodaced, for mstance, in the sentence, in these parts a jar is destroyed, there is 4 negation in the cause (the parts) subsequent to the production of the cect. Absolute negation iy constant universal negation, for instance in the sentence, here is no Jar. Here, this objection may be पीठः [ष gar or any other thing is removed from a certain place, and again brought back to it, the no- tion of absolute negation cannot bg applied ; for, absolute negation be- ing constant negation, the notion of absolute negation is not produced, when the jar is brought back. Hence they Have ays@ned a fourth hind ofe negation, referring (o the liability of a thing to be produced or ge. estroyed, excluding absolute negation, For instance, in the notion: a black pot isenot red, and a red not black, there is antecedent and
8 Dursion of the Categories
negation, destruction and absolute negation. The common notion of all seven categories is object of knowledge,’ and similar ideas,
14. The five first categories" are positive, many and in the connection of intimate relation. The three first (substances, qualities, actions) have the attribute of existence ; qualities and the sabscquent categories are without qualities and actions.
15. Claes (génerality), and the subsequent categories are considered to Bewithout generality ; causality” isa predicate of all substances which are not atoms (whose measure is not an
9 atom), .
emergent, but not absdiute negation, The modern school, however, reject this view, because they deny, that a contradiction has been prov- ed; according to their opinion absolute negation is met with in emer- gent as well as in antecedent negation,
Negation is assumed as a distinct category ; for in denying it, an in- finite number of negations, corresponding to the things, whose negations they are, would be necessary. ¢
9. (का knowledge, &८, viz. capable of being known, named, proved, Ke. <
। Ws Comm.—The general jotion (definition) of substances, qualities, actions, generalities and particalarities is multiplicity, positiseness aud connection by intimate relation, Multiplicity is also found in negation ; therefore the distinction of the five is: the state of position in many. It is said, “which are in the connection of intimate relation,” and not, which have intimate relation, because otherwise the categories of ge- nerality and particularity would be excluded. ` 11. Comm.—Causality is an attribute of all substances, whose measure is not an atom (पारिमाण्यं meats, whose measure is an atom.) Or: Atoms, considered as a measure, have no causality. A substance whose measure is an-atom, cannot be the cause of any thing; fora measure commences things, which are included in its notion (as for instance the half of a jar is the measure, from which the jar is produced) but this is impogsible in this instance ; for a measure produces a measure, “x- ceeding the measure, contained in its own notion (that is from a mea- sure is produced something greater than itself) hence ay the greater is
‘
of the Nuaya Philusophy.
16. The notion of the necessary previous existence of a thing, which has not the fault: of superfluous causality,” is causality.*
17. Of this three hinds are specitied, vie. causality of in- timate relation, of noneintimate relation (the connesion of the
produced, if the measure commences from the %grept, so from the inti- uitely small (the atom) would be prodaced something Enabler (more anatom). This is impossibl® (heuce the measure cdtitained in the con. Junction of two atoms, is not produced from the meashire gf an atom, but from कपल) Por, the same reason causality must be denied of substances which are infinite, further of any class, transeending the senses, and lastly of particularity. (The rensou for thay. is clear any thing infinite which can be eveceded, must have become tinite , there cannot be any thing whieh exceeds the senses mor® tha Another thing, both being thought under Che same idea, v4 to eveced the sewses. Particular are the diytnetions of eternal thing?, they cannot be diy tinguished by any thing ele, because they are the last disuanetions.) 12. 1 give here a note of the [काका] translation, ag calegory, wlich has not the fult of supertluons causality, and whose evistence coustantly precedes, is causality, or 1 14, by the existence ar none * The क Sitray of Kanada, referring तै ८।॥९ (१1१, are 9 RICOTTA काय्याभादः। ।५ ^), कार्याभावात् कारकाभावः॥ 14 Adh, का रकपूववंकः ara eur dst Adh. कारकमिति द्र्य कय्येममयायाते || lth Adh कार ममवायात् wef । (खनमवागिकारलानाति प्रषः |) fh Ah. Aare कारणेकादेमभवायाद। 10|| Adh, 11 there is no ६४१९, there is 10१. ०९ If theré 1s no effect, there 14 NO तपत, The quality af the etfect depends upon the cause e The cause, which refers to substance, is” intunate case, Hee ५॥ 4 ५।।।१॥ in foam. tinately related to effects, (१२. compound subst पपनम ५१1५५] and actions ) Action is a non-intimate cause, because they ure tntunately related: ty the cause ‘thy mumate cause.) . : ९ . © In the same manner are qualifies intimately lated ty «ubetaners + (१८८९८५१९ they are also १०१-१५८ (ह Causes.
10 Division of the Categories
component parts), and instrumental causality is mentioned as the third by the followers of the Nydya philosophy.
18, That from which in its intimate relation an effect is pro- duced ; (for instance thread from which cloth is made,) is causa- lity of intimate relation; that which is proximate to this, (the conjunction of the theeads) is the second cause, (of non-intimate relation), afl as the third (instrumental causality) must be con- sidered what is different from either, (fur instance the loom of the weaver.) *
19. There are five classés of superfluous causality,'* viz.
existence of which the ‘existence or non-existence of an effect is neces- sary. If there is no thread, there is no cloth ; if there is no conjunction of the two halves of है jar, there is no jar ; if there is no virtue, there is no happiness, &९, There are three kinds of causes, intimate, non- intimate and instramehtal causes, Such things as, intimately united, (that is, such as are in the connection of intimate relation) produce an effect, are i imate causes, ‘Two atoms for instance are the cause of a bi-atomical compound, threads of cloth, the two halves of a jar. Non- intimate is a cause, which is, proximate to an intimate cause, that is, which is connected with the dntimate cause; for instance the conjune- tion of two atoms is the provimate cause of the bi-atomical compound, the conjunction of threads of cloth, the conjunction of two halves of a कण, Instrumental is the cause, differing from either ; णि instance, the instrumental cause of a jar is the stick, of cloth the loom, of a bi- atomical compound god. It must here also be borne in mind, that an effect may be destroyed cither by the destruction of the intimate cause, or by that of the non-intimate cause, as a jar is destroyed by the destruction of the (४० halves, afd a bi-atomical compound by that of the conjunction of the two atomg — The intimate, non-intimate and instrumental tauses are called special causes ; God, the omniscience of God, desire, endeavour, time, space, antecedent negation and fate (vir- tue and vice) gertral causes.
^ 13. «A cause is calle?supertluaus (wayurfeg:) if, without its co-oner- ation, the effect is produced in another way. Commentary, Faults of superfluous causality are: $. The notion, unger which che cause is per-
of the Nydya Philosophy n
Ist.—The general idea (class), under which the former state of a cause is perceived ; 2nd, that the existence or non-evislence of which can only be comprehended dy the eristence or non- evistence of the cause ; 3rd, that of which the previous existence ts applied to the effect, when its previous oxistence is already applied to another (effect). ०५
20. 4th, that the existence of which is applidita the effect, because it necessarily precedes the existence af the producer of the effect; and Sth, that which is superfluous besides the thing whose former existency is heveshary.
21,22. Of the first class is an example the notion, under which the stick (by whieh a jar is made) is perceived, of the second the form, &c. of the stick, of the third the ether, of the
ceived, as for instance the idea of a stick (few the class of a atick) hy which (stich) for instance a jar is produced, 2. Such things as cannot be thought of themselves as causes of the existence or gy existence of aueffect, but are causes af the existence or पूना of an effect only by means of the real cause, as foriustanee the shape of a stick ; (for it cannot be said, that, if this or that shape of a stick ix given, the cHlect, viz. the jar, is given, nor, if this or that shape of a stick is not given, the jar, is also not given.) 3. The appheation of a cause to an effect, if this cange has been already applied to another effect, for instance, if the ether should be considered as the cause of a Jar. ‘The ether could be only the cause of a jar by its being perceived auder the wotion of cther ; thix, however, is the intimate cause of sound, and itis thorefure first taken as the cause of sound, and secondly as the cause of the jar, 1. The ap. plication of a cause to an effect fy which (egyse) the (actual) cause of an effect is produced ; for instance, if the father of the potter would be considered as the cause of thg jar, for the potter ofly + he pra- ducer of the jar. 5 The application of any thing “(as cause of an cifect) which is not necessary to the production of the effect, ax for instance the donkey, carrying the garth, ६८. which a jar is made, 6 all the kinds of superfluous causality the last alone is necessary, as including the other kinds.
12 Division of the Categories
fourth the father of the potter, of the fifth the donkey, &c. Among those superfluous causes the last alone is necessary (because the others are included in it),
23. Intimate causality belongs to substances, non-intimate causality only to qualities and actions,"*
24. Dependence’ the attribute of every thing, save eter- nal substantes. ‘The property of all nine kinds of substances ie: to have substantiality and qualities,
25. Karth, water, light, air and mind are the sites of com- prehensive and non-comprehensive generality, form," action and velocity.
20, Time, ether, soul and apace have the attributes of ubi- quity and infinity." Of the five elements, viz. earth and the subsequent four substances (water, light, air, and ether), are the first four the sites of touch.
27. The commencement of things takes place in the four first substances, The special qualities of ether and goul'* are : limitation tOxpace, and momentary duration,
11, Intimate causality belaags to substances ; nou-intimate causality to qualities and actions, that ix, intimate causality is the common attri- bute of substauces, non-intimate casality that of qualities and actions.
15. Comm.—Dependence in the common attribute of all { hings ex. cept cternal substances ; itis to be thought under the idea of intimate re- lation. Eternal things are only dependent on distinetive relation (vide p. 7) a8 for instance on the relation of time. Eternal substances are atoms, (via of nir, fire, water, earth) ether, time, space and soul. ‘The common attribute of substances is, substantiality and substrate of qualities,
10. Form (ata) iz, the measure of which ig limited,
17. Infinity (परमं सहत) is, the measure of which exceeds every other measure. :
18, Comm.—The special qualities of the ether and soul are: a state which does not pervade (is limited), and a state which has only momen- tary duration. (A state which dots not pervade is such as is produced ouly in one part, and is not present in another, And a thing has momentary duration, if in the third moment after its pfoduction it is
of the Nydya Philosophy. 1
शत, Earth, water and light, have the properties of colour, fluidity and perceptibility by the senses र earth and water have gravity and taste; the fluidity of carth and light isa derived one,
20, The soul and the elements have special (contrary) quae lities; that which is considered the property of the one, is the opposite of the others. पैः
30, The qualities of the air are touch, number,quantity, in- dividuality, conjunction, disjunction, priorit®, posteriority, ve- locity and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and vqocity are assigned to light.
|. Water is the site of 1 qualities, yiz. of the eight, before mentioned, and further of velocity, gravity, fluidity, colour, savour and viscidity. ,
2,38. Barth has the same qualities. with the exception of
viseidity, and the addition of smell. ‘The || qualities of the soul are intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, mime ber, quantity, severalty, conjanetipn and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit. ‘The qualities of Gime and place number, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunefion, The same quas lives together with sound belony to the ether. <
21. Those five qualities, together with intellect, desire and volition are sited in God, the same five qualities, with priority and
posteriority and velocity, in the mind. .
destroyed.) The special quality of the ether is sound, whieh does not pervades for it is produced ina anal part only of the ether, and not found in a different portion, Tt hay only momentary duration; this means, it is destroyed in the third moment, after it has commenced to crist. Becange the respective qpecial qualities bf pervading substances are destroyed by the same qualfies whieh are afterngrds produced, therefore the first sound ig destroy@d by the sceond. ‘The sam® is the case with knowledge, &c. ; for knowledge is produced in the soul, which isa pervading substance, within the limited spec of the body, and it is absent in any other part tf space, for instance in the part Belonging ‘toa jar, In the same manner knowledge continues only for two moments, and” pervading substances are therefore those whose syegal
,
14 Division of the Categories
35. The earth is the cause of smell (the intimate cause), and the site of the various colours. Savour is of six kinds (sweet, Vitter, pungent, astringent, acid and saline), smell two-fold (fragrance and stench). ,
36, 37, It has three kinds of feel, hot, cold and temperate, It is twofold’® eternal fd non-eternal; eternal as considered in its atoms, ndn-eternal as being composed of parts; this latter is threefold, orgafism, organ and object (inorganic matter),
38. Organisms are viviparous, oviparous, engendered in filth and vegetative; organ is the “sense of gmell ; objects are all compound substances from the sinallest, of two atoms, to the largest, Brambd’s egg,
qualities are: existencé that does not pervade, and momentary duration. The special qualities of scarth, Xc., are: existence which does pervade, and continuance for a longer tine,
10. Comm.—FEarth ig two-fold, eternal and non-eternal, eternal in its atoms,* agp-eternal, if different from atoms, viz. if consisting of two, three, &e. atoms, Earth, if non-eternal, is composed of parts.
Ifit is said: ‘What evidarce is there, that earth is composed of parts; (viz. a part bei already a compound of two, three, Xe. atoms) for you obtain the same notion, if any carthly substance, as ajar, is thowsht to be composed of the totality of the single atoms. Under this supposition you need not fear, that the invisibility of each single atom implies the invisibility of a jar, &e., which consists of atoms ; because, although cach single atom is invisible, yet the totality of them is visible, as froma certain distance the hairs of the head together are visible, although none of them alone is visible, Moreover we arrive at the idea for instance of one extended great JN, a3 we arrive at the idea of one great heap of rice” . 1
We eeply: “TE one atom is no object of the senses, a totality of atoms is also beyond the perceytion of the senses. Ag to your example,
सट्कारशवब्रित्य,।। 3. A, Kan, Sit. ` खता विषरोताद्षः।। 4. \.
An atom is, what exists has no cause, and is without commencement and end ;* an atym is contrary to what has a meagure (अनःपर मरता २ अति दोपे 1)
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 15
90. Water has white colour; its taste, and feel, are sweet and cold; it has also viscidity, and its fluidity is innate.
40. As to its eternity and non-eternity the same holds good as before ; its organisms are not born. Its organ is the tongue ; its objects are the sea, snow and similar substances,
41. Light is hot to the feel, its cMl6ur white, its fluidity not innate, but an effect from some cause ; eternfly and non- eternity are attributed te it in the same way 4s to the earth.
2, 43. Organ is the eye, objects are fire, gold, ee. The feel in the air is consigered ag natural; it is femperafe, neither hot nor cold; its motion is crooked ; its qualities are touch, &८,
we maintain, that a hair, although at a distance, is not beyond the perception of the senses, because it will be perceifed, if brought nearer, Nor can you say, that from a totality of invisible atoms a totality of visible atoms is produced, on the ground, that it is not contradicted by perception ; for visible things are not produced from invisible things ; otherwise heat of the eye for instanee*would one or thy, other time become visible, If you say, that a quantity of inyisible heat, contained for instance in very heated oil, may prpduce 9 visible burning, we object ; for the visible burning arises from “the visible parts, cons tained therein,
You can algo not maintain, that from the invisible compound of two atomg the production of a compound of three atoms (which is visible) is impossible ; for we do not say, that the visibility or invisibi- lity of a thing arises trom ity own nature but from its necessary canses, as greatness, manifest form, &e. A compound of three atoms for ine stance is visible on account of its greatness, but not a compound of two atoms, as it has no greatness, Tljs, Rowever, is acgording to your view, impossible, becatise there is no groatuess in an atom.—s in this manner it is proved, that earthly substancesgas a jar, are composed of parts (a part, as above already reminded, is a compound of at least (wo atoms) so it is clear, that they are not eternal, in consequence of their produce tion and destruction. And éhere is no*difference between the mountam Meru, and a mustard geed, heeause in either there 15 the game composi- tion of ‘parts after parts., Thegefore it iy necessary, that there should
16 Division of the Categories
Eternity and non-cternity are assigned to it as before to the other elements, Its organ is the skin, which extends over the whole body; objects are all substances, intermediate between the vital air and the great clement.
44, 45. The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound, organ is the ear., Plough one, it has many titles. Time” is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the support of the Worlds; it is the catse of the knowledge of
= ध. Seva, Rete =-= =
be somewhere an end (in the divifion of parts). To say ; that the point, where the end is obtained, is not eternal, would be to admit the pro- duction of an effect from a thing which is not in the eomnection of intimate relation, Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one gr@t thing to ailother still greater, finds its end in the assumption of the shy and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cessation of the progress from a small to a smaller thing, Thus the necessity of atoms is proved. There is certainly no end of the divigon, if one has amived at the compound of three atoms, because a compound of three atoms as an object of the eye, has parts liken jar, &e. ; for fiom the argument, that the parts of a compound of three atoms have parts on acconnt af its size, like the half of a jar, it is evident, that such a compound has parts, Nor can you say, there is no necessity for this (for assuming parts of such a small compound as that of three atoms) because many things (atoms) are required to pro- duce a magnitude for so small things. This, however, does not prove the necessity of a continuation of parts after parts, because thereby 4 regress is infinitum would become necessary.
20. Conm,—Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This,ig proved bythe perception of the now.” If for instance the perception : here is now jar, is given, there exists a union betwegu the*motion of the sun ayd the jar. This is not conjunction (vide p. 7) or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more tifings,) but it is a relation of a different kind, which is produced by time.—That time # to be thaught under the notion of a substrate, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-geueral) causp of the perception of-priority
of the Nydya Philosophy. 17
priority and posteriority ; though one’ it has many names as that of moment, &e.
46. Space is the cause of the notions of distance and proxi- ity ; it is one and eternal. 1
47. Though one, it obtains various designations, as east, west, from the division of its attribute. The sau is governing” the
^ ध a and posteriority. Or if both detinitions are combined: Time is the
substrate of the special anion, which is the now-intingate cause of priority and posteriority. e ५
२1. (ण पण ene, it has many names, viz, moment, hour, day, &c., past, future and present time, Past is the time, whose destruc. tion is present, as yesterday ; future is the time, whose future existence is present, a3 to-morrow, and present is {he time, whose future ¢xistence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future moment, betanother moment, be- cause there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be (he case at the general contlagration, where also the terms of “ momeudy” day,” Se, are applied. $
22, Comm.—" The soul is ruling the senses and the body."—Tye
elass of soul isthe class, by which the intimate ‘cause of happiness, and unhappiness, &¢e, is comprehended (or : soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness, &e. and the substantiality of the soul is proved by its being the substrate of the qualities : happiness, unhappi- ness, ९८.) Pswara (the ruler, God) is thought under the same uotion (class) ; but since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to him, he is not subject to happiness or unhappiness ; for we do not admit the invariablencss of the rule that, that which is a con. sequence from the nature of a thing, wil necessariby exist,*
Otherst say: The notion (class)ehy which the soulf is thought, is uot applicable to I'swara, as there is ng proof for this; yet hence 1०८४ not follow, that a tenth substance must be assymed, ध the soul is dis
* Or in other words, for though it is necessary, that when there is an effect, there is also a cause, yet it is not necessary, that, when there is a cause, {५९९४० invariably an effect, .
+ Probably the adcient Nyaya, is megnt. $ The individual soul.
18 Division of the Categories
senses and the body ; for an organ (instrument) must possess its agent.
48, There is no consciousness” in the body, as is proved by its disappearance after death. If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed
tinguished from the 6ther substances by the idea: to be subject of knowledge. “Is governing’the senses,” &c., because it successively produces the coxscience of the senses gnd of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: I know, Iam happy, &e., yet it cannot at first be proved agakist one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, etc. To prove this, the text says: “for an instrument must possess its agent.” As an instrument, for instance a knife, the instrument for cutting, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed.
23. To show, that the body is not the agent, it is said in the text : * There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappear- ance of cofsciousness after death.” If it is maintained ; ‘Conscience is knowledge, and this in your opinion is not present in the soul which he: obtained liberation. Why should it therefore not just as well be absent in a dead body, because, if life ceases, also knowledge ceases !” We answer: this is impossible ; for, if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles,
Nor can it be said, ‘that by an impression, produced in a former body, an impression in the second body is produced,’ because this would oblige you to assume an infinite number of impressions. —Further, if con- sciousness were inl.crent in the body, a child could not commence to take the milk from the breast of its motner ; for the cause of this action is the xnowledge of what accomplishes the desire, and at that time there does not exist the.recol'ection of any means, accomplishing the desire. According to my opinion the commencement of the action takes then place “by the recollection of the causes of'the desires, experienced in a former birth. Nor canit be objected : ‘Well, if this be true, let any body
of the Nyaya Philosophy. 19
46). . The mind ig likewise not the site’ of consciousness, because then hnowledge and other infernal qualities: would remain imperceptible.
recollect any thing else, experienced in a former birth” for there is no- thing which calls it into recollection, Tn this > there is no other means but to admit of fate for the individual soul, ना this js the case, the body is without commencement, and also the saul. Hence the
cternity of the soul also follows ; for what is without b ginning, cannot be destroyed. ‘ °
‘Well, let us then transfer to the eves and the other senses the notion of cause and agent with regard to huowledge, for atherwise no cause ty possible.” ‘Phe answer is: “Tf such were the ease, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed.” 11 the eyes and
“other senses were destroyed, how could, by the absehee uf the eye, recol- lection remain, as the subject which perecives exésts no more, aud ay if is quite unreasonable, that the same thing should be seen by one, and recollected by another sense, because perception aud recollection must depend on the same subyeet, as beng cadse and cect,
५५, Coma ~ Let then conserousiess not belogig to the senses (ex- ternal) but be maintained tor the eternal mgd.” The answer of the tevtin £ ©The mind is hhewise not the site क consciottsues’, beeause then know. ledge and other enéeraa/ qualities would: remain imperceptible," for ay the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if huowlcdye, happiness, Xe. were placed in the eternal mind, Tow mind ty an atom, will afterwards be explained,
Uf itis said, (by the Vedautists) 2 Phe soul is knowledge 5 far its consciousness is proved by ats selfsmanifestation ; but knowledge of tha or that object, happiness, Xe. age sPeoml 1५111२७५ 1१. And beens thiy (special form) hax only the existence of a production (भावत्वात् , Ttranclated जन्यभावलात) ity duratioy is momentary. Further, mye the
preceding knowledge is the canse of the consequent knowladge, and the
former again the effect of a preceding, there is कनि) im deep sleep an uninterrupted chain of hgowledge down to the Cine of nnivarsal dy: straction, as the sinell of mush remains incloth, Aud by the com. munication of the impressions, produced by puor aud [गा acts of
20 Division of the Categories
knowledge, with posterior and posterior acts of knowledge, recollection and similar acts are possible,’
We deny this; for if the object of recollection is the world, omni. science would be obtained (because knowledge isa product of self mani- festation) ; and if the object is something, there is no proof for the se- cond member of the alternative; for hence would also follow, that in sound sleep knowledge were manifesting its object.
And if you say, ‘that in this state (in the state of sound sleep) know- ledge remains, but without form,’ we objedt also; for you cannot prove, that knovledge manifests itself, as otherwise such things as a jar, Ke, would also be possessed with knowledge,
Nor can you say, ‘that this would answer your purpose ;” fur it is impossible to reject the perception of a jar and similar things,
If you maintain, ‘that this is a special furm of knowledge,’ we would ask, what is'that férm १ Is it distinguished trom knowledge, we agree with the assumption of something different from knowledge. Is it not distinguished from knowledge, then in accordance with the general notion of knowledge, a jar of blue colour would be the same with one of yellow colour, becauce by its own nature there is no distine- tion of knowledge.
If you pretend, ¢ that any special property of knowledge, as yellow and” blue colour, &c. must be abandoned,’ we object, because the con- trary notions of blue, yellow, &e, cannot be predicated of one and the same thing ; otherwise it would be dificult to connect any meaning with contrary ideas,
Nor is there any communication of desires, because the commu- nication of desires even between son and mother is impossible.
You can also uot say, ‘that there is a rule for things, that are the causes, and others that are the effects of communication,’ because there is no communication of desires.
And if you define ‘communication’ to be the production in something else,’ there ‘s again a contradiction ; for there is no producer,
If you contend, ‘that it is produced by another kuowledge,
” you must admit another kaowledgé of the same kind, and so on in in
finitum,
If you think, ‘there is but litth contradiction in a momentary know- ledge,’ you cannot prove such a knowledge, and your assumption is complicated,
of the Nyaya Philosophy. 21
For the same reason consciousness in bodies of momentary duration is rejected, because it has the fault of complication and cannot. be demonstrated ; in the same manner the production of the fruit from the seed and from collateral causes js evident, so Chat there is no need of assuming a special form of making, Xe.
* Let the assumption of a momentary knowledge be complicated, yet you must grant, that) the soul is eternal knowledge, Which canto be destroyed for the Sruti says: Lo, this is the soul, trug huowledge, the infimte Bramha. : ४
We object also to this, because sucha knowledge is evident without object, and beeause it eanugt be proved, that knowledge has no object in this ease it would not have even itself’ ys an छ" (1.
Therefore, it has been proved, that the soul is पलल from hnowledge, and that it is eternal.
Troe knowledge, that is the supreme Bramlia, if not found in indiy 1. dual souls, beeause they are clearly distinguishedefrom it by knowledge and ignorance, happiness and wohappioess and similar qualities, and in consequence the difference af Tywara is established. Otherwise servic tude and Liberation were names without fea,
That be objected: Phe same textot the 4 cdg which evplaing the difference of Lowarn, brings aly forward hig identity by his indifforengy ; for it save: Let us strive forthe state of inditffence, therefore all is placcd upon the soul,” and also: © fn the state of hberation ignorance is aumbulated.”
We deny this, because, the difference being eternal (constant) its anmlulation is impossible, Admitted evcn,that the ditterence is destroyed, a duahomas for Has very reasoa established, and st eannot be suid, that duality is destroyed, Ando as it is well saul, that to Bramha in hig state without qualities, and therctore without the quality of eristence, existence is vet attributed, so at 1५५10 well said, shat although there is no duality, sill Ahere are two possgesed of duality,
If you say, ‘that the absence of unteality Which is the Place पिला. tity, is there meant with existence,’ we say likewise, Ghat the absence of identity which is the state of two possessed of dualify, is meant with duality [|
Although every unit is compreheuded by the notion of unity, still
one is not both, as it is satd : दृष्ता is no attribute of carth and water,
22 Division of the Categories
which is clear to every body. As regards the passage of the Sruti, establishing the indifference at that time (the time of liberation), it es- tablishes in fact an equality by the removal of unhappiness, &c., as it may be said, that this Purdhita by, great prosperity has become a King, In this sense it is said in the Sruti: न Te who is without sin, obtains the supreme state,” megning equality.
God is ygt the soul which is knowledge and happiness, but the sub- strate of knowladge. In such a sentence as: “ Bramha is eternal know- ledge and happiness,” the term “knowl€dge’”’ means the substrate of knowledgt, by the authority of'a passage like this: “ ट who knows all, is omniscient ;” hence happiness means also a porson who is happy. .....
Tlence is also the doctrine of the Sinkhyas refuted, which is as follows.* Nature, (Prakriti) is the agent ; the soul (Piirnsha) remains
* To understand more clearly the argument of the Ny Aya against the Sinkhya, I shall briefly state the principles of this क्ली पाट, According to the Sankhya there are two kinds of substances which are the substrates of all phenomena, nature and soul, Nature (Prakriti) is one and undistinct in its original state, which 13 incom- prehensible to the senses. A» such itty Mula Prakriti, nature ag the root of all things. It is productive, and in its productyons various, Nature in its state as production is Viktiti, changed, or detived nature, The first production 1s intellect (Buddhi) or the great one, Mahat, which as a production of nature bas no consetousness.—The soyh(Pirusha) 14 mamfold, or tlre are many souls, The soul, as contrary 10 nae ture, is not active, but it is conscious, Accordingly it has no activity in the pro- duction of ideas, which ave given to the soul by intellect, and the opimon, as if the soul were an agent, isa mere delusion,
The following quotation from Prof, Wilson's Sankhya दिद will still: more cluendate the subject ( 1५) eee LL—Nature, the root (of all) is no production, Seven principles, the great or intellectual one, Ac., are productions and productive. Siateen are productions (unproductive), Soul is neither a production nor productive,
Bhashya, Mila (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradhana (chief) from its being the roat of seven principles which are prdductions and productive; such nature 1s the root. No production,” Ttis not produged trom another. ११११ Seven principles,” —Mahat andehe rest, from its being the great (mahat) clement; this 1s intellect (पवौ). . eeoe The seven pripeiples 82 1. intellect; २ egotiom 3—7, the five subtile rudi- ments, These seven are productions and productive, in this manner. Intellect 1s produced fiom the chief one (natufe) that again produces egotism, whence itis productive (prakrits), Egotism as derived: from intellect, is a production; but as 11 gives origin to the tive subtile clemests, its productive, The subtile rudiment
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 23
without stain (that is untouched, neither active nor suffering) as a lotus. leaf by water; but it is conscious. It is without causality, because there is no difference between cause aud effect (cause and effect are identical) and hence with the destruction of the effect, that which is like the effect, would also be destroyed. ‘This idea (that the soul is conscious) is necessary, because the pereeption of consciousness whieh is found in intellect, would be otherwise 7701 Tntellect isa modification of nature. Tutellect is also called greatness ai the inter: nal organ, Under the condition, that it (intellect) ९९.५५ or not exists, the soul is subject to transmigration or liberation, [ts mgdifieation has the form of knowledge through the channel of the senses. [at (this moditication of knowledge) is in connection with external things, as with a jar, Xe., the pereeption of agency takes place पा the soul, and the perception of consciousness in the intellect, on the ground, that the difference is perceived. For instance if it is said |? By ane this is to he performed ;” the first member of the seatence, © by me," means the per ception of the soul, whieh is without reality, beeause it is the reflection of consciousness (in the intellect) by the clearness of the intellect, asthe reflection of the face in a loohing-glass (iyaithout reality by the clearness of the loohing-glass). The second member: © this” means the pereeption of the object, which by its being moditied, through the channel of the senses, has reality (truth) as the unelearness, produced by [नी upon a looking-glass. The third member: ‘Is to be performed” refers to the performance of business. Hence is mtelleet possessed of three parts. The connection of the soul (Pdrusha) with knowledge, Which is a modification of intellect, is called untrue, ay is the percep-
of sound is derived from egotism, and is therefore a production, but a4 causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtile element of such ५५ generated fiom egotism, is a production, as giving origin to wiry ait ts productive, The aubtile rudunent of smell ix derived from egotisna and therefore a production; it gives origin to carth, andes therefore productXe. The subtle sudfinent of fori isa pro- duction from egotism; as generating light, it is productive, The subtle rudiment of flavour, as derived from cgotism, is a production ; itis productive, as giving Gaga to water. In tins manner the great principle and the yet are produchons and pros ductive. Sixteen are productions; that 1s, the five orginy of Perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the @eventh, and the five ch ments, thea form a class of sixtcea which are productions, the term vikdra being the same an
vihriti, Soul 18 neither a production nur productive.
२4 Division of the Categories
The site” of merit and demerit is perceptible” by its being united with distinguishing qualities.
tion of the face in an unclear looking-glass, What has been said about knowledge, &e., is also true with regard to happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, endeavour, merit and demerit, beeause they are evidently identical as ping effects of intellect ; but intellect is not pos- sessed of causcioustess, because it is a modification,
This doctrine-of the Sdukhya is refuted on the ground, that consci- ousness 1४ dependent on the same substrate, as action, fate and enjoy- ment, betause there is no prgof, that there is another substrate, different from this, 7
If you say, ‘that from such a sentence as: I, who am conscious, am acting, an error of the part of consciousness is possible in consequence of the modification gf intellect,’ we reply by ashing, whether this is not also possible on the part of the agent, Otherwise, if intellect is eternal, there is no liberation, dr, if it is not eternal, there is no transmigration.
Tf you further contend, ‘there is no consciousness of intellect, because it ig an effect of unconscious nature, as elfect and cause are identical,’ we protest, because this hay hot heen shown ; there being no proof, that the agent ig a groduction; for from the text, that it is without pasion, that it has no birtly, it follows, that it iy without beginning, and as such it is also without end, as it is unreasonable, that it should be destroyed, Of what use is therefore the assumption of nature (Praktiti) and similar notions ?
Nor can you say, ‘that our opinion does not agree with the passage ofthe Bhagavadgita saying: “ by the qualities of nature are everywhere actions done ; the soul, blinded by pride, fancies : I am the agent ;” for its real meaning is; by ‘natiire’s,” fate’s, “ qualities,” the qualities, produced by fate, viz. by desire, ete., Tam agent. If this is the case, the intention of the Bhagavadgita is.attained by the words: Te, who believes the soul to be the sole agem, is liberated
24—" The site,” &e., viz. the coul is the site. If the body were the site of them (merit, and demerit, Xc.), the consequences of the works, done in a former body, could not be experienced by a later body. ^ 26." It is perceptible by ‘its being wnited with distinguishing qualities.” The soul becomes perceptible by its being united with its respective special qualities, and uot in wother way by such an observa- tions I know, [ १७. ,
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 25
50. Tt can be deduced from activity” and similar pheno- mena, as the charioteer from the motion of the carriage. It is the site (substrate) of egoity, and perceptible only through the mind. *
91. It is pervading, and the site of intellect and othe qualities. Intellect is two-fold, apprehension and remembrance Apprehension includes four sorts, viz. a
52. Perception, inference, comparison ande verbal know- ledge. Perception comprehends six kinds, in accotdayge with the six organs of perception.
53. The object of the nose is smell and the notion of
१ ग
१1 the sont iyin another body, is inferred from activity, ete. «Activity means here
27.—Comm. ^ It can be deduced trom activity, &e
exertion, As it has been mentioned betore, that knowledge, desire, endeavour, &९, do not exist in the body, and further as exertion implies endeavour, it follows that there is*a soul which has endeavour, on the ground that there is exertion
2%,—Cumm, Perception is the knowledge (apprehension) which y produced by the senses, and the cause of evidence rom perception are the senses. Inference is the apprehension, produced by the huow- ledge of a general proposition (Vyapti) and inferential proof is the ap- prehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition, which is the cause of the conclusion, Comparison is the knowledge, pro- duced by similarity, aud proof by comparison is the knowledge of si- nilarity, which is the cause of comparison, Verbal knowledge is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of words, and proof’ hy verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words, Which is the engise of the former,
29.—&e., means the notion of gogi and bad smell.
i} * Similarly says Kanada: प्रारापानमिमेवाकोषजोदभ्नगतीश्ियानर विकाराः QTE TTA TT मालिनि ty Site. dth +. The vitel airs, which go upwards and downwards, the closing and operfing of the eyes, life, the actions of * the mind, and the modifications of the other senses, happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, and endeavour are proofa of the soul. Ez
26 Division of the Categories
smell, etc.” Thus the object of the tongue is savour,” and sound that of the ear.”
54-55, Object of the eye is proportionate form.” Sub- stances of such kind (of perceptible greatness) individuality, mumber, conjunction and disjunction, priority, posteriority, vis- cidity, fluidity, quantity, action, class, and the relations which are appYpriate to the respective objects are perceived by the eye through the contact of light with proportionate form,
56, , Substances, perceptible of touch, are objects of the akin; the objects of the efe, with the exception of colour, arc also objects of the skin,
57. In the perception of substances is the union of the skin with the mind the cause of knowledge. Through the mind ar perceptible: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and voli- tion. ५
58, A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses.”' Proportionate greatness is the cause as regards the perception of the six classes ; organs (in- atruments) are the different senses.
^ 30.—Further, ss-eetness, &e.
31.—Sound, articulate and non-articulate, &e.
32—Proportionate means fit to be perccived. ‘The same propor- tionate greatness must be admitted also with regard to the objects of the other senses.
33.—Comm. “ A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses,” If (for a man who has not the knowledge of a jar) the contact of the eye ete. (with the jar) has
od
taken place, the defermined kuowledge: This is a jar, viz. determined ,
by the general notion (class) of a jar, docs not exist, because there was not before the knowledge of that, which is determining, viz. the general knowledge of a jar, &c.; tor the cause of'a determined knowledge is ands ther which is‘determihing, For instance at first is produced 8 know- ledge, not determined by the two parts,—>that which is to be determin- ed, and that which is determining,—as a jar and the general notion (class) of the jar. Such a knowledge is without determination, and “no object of perception ; for from perception it is evident that I know
of the Nydya Philosophy. 27
49, The connexion of the senses with their objects is called intercourse ; this is also six-fold. 1, The perception of things takes place by contact.
60. 2. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the things, by intimate relation with that which is jn contact,
61. 3. The perception of what is int fntimate refation with the last mentioned relation, (viz. intimate rejation with that which is in contact,) by she corresponding intithate relation, (in- timate relation of that which is intimately related *with that which is in contact.) 4. The perception of sound, by intimate relation, 5, The perception of what is iptimately related with sound, by the intimate union with that which is intimately relat- ed, and 6. The perception of every negation py particularity.*
62. If it takes place, it is pereeived, at the place where it happens to be. Intimate relation is pereeived by particularity.
63. Transcendent intercourse is three-fold according to its division into intercourse whose gharacter" is general,'*
the jar. In this pereeption is knowledge the deternination of the soul the jar that of knowledge, and the generajnotion of jar the determiya tion of the jar. The determination which is in the fetermination, is call. ed the general notion of determination, The knowledge containing the general notion of determination, is the cause of the knowledge deter- mined by determination. For ingtance in the knowledge without de- termination of a jar is the general notion of a jar not determining, Therefore when there is an undetermined knowledge of a jar, there is not such a knowledge, as: I know the jar under ¢he general notion of the jar, (that is to say, not such a determined knowledge, by which the soulia determined by knowledge? knowledges ky the jar, and the jar by the generaP notion of the jar,)
31.—Comm, “ Transcendent intercourse.” Perception is twofold gommon and transcendent. The intercourse of common perception is of six kinds, which have just been explained. The intercourse of trans. cendent perception is three-fald. e
35.—Comm, If in this definition the term “ character” denotes its
‘ See npte to ५. 11. E,2
28 Division of the Categories
whose character is knowledge, or which is produced by Yoga.
nature (its identity with itself) the meaning is, that the intercourse ig of a general nature, and this must be understood as the determination of a de- terminable knowledge which is in connection with any of the senses. For instance, let sthoke be in cqntact with the eye, Here is smoke the deter- minable knowledge, and the general notion (class) of sinoke, which (gene- ral notion) forms the intercourse, is a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever. If it is then said, that such a knowledge iy in con- tact with a sense, the consequence would be, that, if a cloud of dust by mistake were apprehended under the notion of smoke, there could not arise a knowledge, whose, object is every smoke whatsoever, as in this case with the general notion (class) of smoke no connection of the senses could take place, According to my (the author's) opinion, however, the cloud of dust is in contact with the eye ; the knowledge to be deter- mined is smoke, and the general notion of smoke, which is here the de- termination, the intercourse. Its contact with the sense iy the common one, which takes place on the part of the external sense. On the part of the mind, however, the intercourse is merely general, and determining the knowledge. Henge if by words any kind of perception of a Pisticha,* &ez has been obtained, the apprehension of all Pisichas is produced, Theterm ^ general means Aere rather the state of similar things, and this is sometimes constant, as the general notion of smoke, Kc. some- times not constant, asa jar, Xc. For instance a jar is perceived either in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with its half. Hence arises afterwards the knowledge of all such things, as a jar, either in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with their halves, This must be so understood, that the intercourse of similar things (of things included in the same notion) depends on the same rela- tion, under which the generality itself is comprehended. On the other hand where after the destruction of this jar, Xe. arecollection arises of athing like this jar, there could not, by the intercourse of a general character, take place the perception of all things like this jar, because the generality would at that time be not present. Moreover, Suppose the knowledge of a jar to be determined by the contact with any sense. Here does not exist even the next day a contact with the eye, yet there arises a knowledge of similar things, hecause there is a generality which
* A kind of goblins,
of the Nydya Philosophy. 29
64. The intercourse of things, comprehended ina notion, is called general knowledge. It is required a thing which maui- fests this or that property produced by this or that sense.”
09. The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse, whose character is know ledge’. —The intercourse, produced by*Yoga, is of two hinds,
determines the knowledgy of similar things. ‘Tiferefore the "न know- ledge” of “ gencrality”’ is the intercourse, and not “ genernlity.” With this view it is said in the text: *
36.—Comm. Intercourse, “whose character is general.” The term “character” means object, and the sense is : intercourse is a knowledge whose object is general.
^ But where without the contact of the eye, ६8. the knowledge of the common state of similar things (generality) exists, should there not be
perception through the eye of all jars, Ge, ?
37.—Comm, To remove this objection, the text says: “It is required something which manifest this or that property, produced by thi or that sense.” ;
The meaning of this is: When by ga external sense throug an intercourse of a general character knowledge isto be produced, there is required an object of knowledge, to be produced by one or the other sense, of this or the other generality, with reference to a thing whose generality it ix, This object is the contact (ora similar relation) of the light, further the contact of the eye, Me. Hence such a knowledge ig not produced by the eye for instance, when it is dark.
But if the intercourse whose character is knowledge, is an intercourse, whose nature is knowledge, and if the intercourse whose character 13 general, is defined in the same way,'what diffirepce then is between them? . र
38.—Comm. To show this, it iy gnid in the test: “The intertourse ofany thing, of which there isa knowledge, is called the intercourse whose character is knowledge.
Namely an intercourse ,whose character is general, produces & knowledge of the things upon which it depends; but an intercourse whose character is knowledge, jis intercourse of the knowledge wigh that object to which it refers, (which is comprehe ५१५ by it.) The पलार
30 Division of the Categories
that which belongs to the Yogi who is perfect, and that which belongs to the Yogi, who strives after perfection.” 66, The intercourse of the former is a constant manifestation, that of the latter takes place by the assistance of meditation.*° The intercourse, as regards inference, is consideration,” the (instrumental) cause tlteknowledge of a subject, invariably con-
; ing of this is: A petception does not become manifest without inter- course. First without an intercourse whose character is general, how could there exist by the mere notibn (class) of smoke and fire, an ap- prehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever? For this reason an in- tercourse whose character is general, is necessary. The objection, ‘that it does not matter, whether there is an apprehensionof every smoke and fire whatsoever,’ is not vahid ; for with'the visible smoke the connection of fire is indeed perceived, but no other kind of smoke is included therein, and therefore a doubt, whether smoke is invariably connected with fire or not, could in this case not arise. According to my opinion, however, the doubt, whether smoke, in whatever place or time, is to be predicated of fire or not, takes place through the intercourse of general character, by which every smoke whatsoes cr is comprehended.
The objection, न that on the snpposition of an intercourse of general character man would be omniscient, because in the notion of all objects of knowledge every single object of knowledge is included,’ is also unte- nable ; for although all objects of knowledge may be known by this notion, yet, there is no omniscience, because the differences of all ob- jects are not kuown,
Secondly, if no intercourse whose character is knowledge, were asgum- ed, how could there be in the hnowledge : “ sandalwood is fragrant,” also the perception of a thing, which is fragrant? Be knowledge of fragrant things granted through the intercourse whose characte is general, but the notion of’ fragrancy is only possible by an intercourse whose cha- racter is knowledge.
39.—Comm. "^ Intercourse, produced by Yoga,” that is, a special virtue, produced by the practice of Yoga, (the union of the soul with God by means of abstract contemplation,) in accordance with the evi- dence of the Sruti, the Purdyas and other authorities,
of the Nyéya Philosophy. 31
nected with a predicate in a general proposition. (The know- ledge of the Vyapti.)
67. The reason which is actually known, is not the cause ; in this case, there would be no inference, if the reason had for [~ stance not yet arrived, or had been destroyed,
68. Consideration is the knowledge that a subject in its invariable connection with a predicate is united withthe place of conclusion (Paksha, subject of the conclusion):
The invariable connection of a subject with @ predicate in a general proposition (एकु) is दात्त the non-connesion of the reason (middle term) with any thing different. from the subject of the conclusion, (Paksha, minor term.)
40.— Comm. Manitestation means the pereeption f all things, medi- tation is the thinking of the mind, which is separated from all objects, 41.—Comm. “ The intercourse as regards inference is consideration.” The special cause (instrumental cause) of an inference is the know. ledge of the iuvariable connection of thessubject with the predicate in a general proposition, (याङ्गिकानं, र) and consideration is the intercourse, For instance, let a man who from the smoke ona hearth, ete. has become aware of the invariable connection of smoke with fira, see afterwards affy where on a mountain an uninterrupted line of smoke, He will then re-
* SFR: (रदत). It is difficult to find an adequate word for this term in English. It means hterally, pervading inherence, the inherent and essential presence of any one thing or property in another, (sce Wilson's Dict.) but itis used in the Nydya and other plulosophical systems to denote the logical relatian of one notion to ano. ther ina proposition of such a kiod, that under circumstances an inference may be drawn frumit; or: itis the relation of the subject to the predicate, and vice versa, as the major proposition of a syllogism. The subject of such a proposition is the व्याप्यः the notion, yhich is pervaded by another (hy the Juedicate) that 16 to nay, which is only a part of the predicate, which 16 less extensive than the latter, or included in it. The subject in therefore ingariahly connected with the prececate, and if the former is thought, also the latter is thought. The predicate is the WITH, the pervading notion ; it has a greater extent than the Mibyect,and the lat- ter is only 8 part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, angi if the, predicate is thought, the subject is not necessarily thought with it. The Vyapti is, accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to he connected together, on either part is understood. ° Further, the ॥ | isa proposition, from
32 Division of the Categories
69. Or the perception of the identity of the reason with the conclusion (predicate of) which is not connected with anything incompatible with the subject of the conclu- sion. Subject (of conclusion; minor term,) is the certainty of the conclusion where the intention to conclude is not absent.
we
collect thé general proposition, according to which smoke is invariably connected with fire. Ilence arises the knowledge, this (mountain) is possessed with smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This (the knowledge, that any subject is ‘connected by the middle term with a gencral predicate, or the knowledge of the two premises) is considera- tion. Ilence arises the knowledge, this mountain is ल, which is an inference, The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived, together with the notion, that [नऽ invariably connected with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. This is denied, in the text; for if the reason (लिङ्ग, sign) were the special cause of the conclusion, then inference could not take place, if the reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed, becayse then the reason, the pretended special cause of a conclusion, were not present.
which an inference can be derive, that is to say, it must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a syllogism. The names of Vyapya, Vydpaka are only used with reference to the general proposition ; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, viz., the Vydpya (middle
term) the name of तुः, reason, argument, or लिङ्ग sign, and the Vyépaka (major term) the name of साध्य, conclusion, predicate ofthe conclusion, The minor term
(the subject of the conclusion) is called पच्च: place (minor term, subject of the conclusion), viz. the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major germ, or predicate of the conclusion.—If these names in their literal accepta- tion appear at first curious to a Euronean student and totally deviating from those, used in the logical terininology of the vest, it must be borne in mind, that their literal sense dues not in the least affect their value as logical terms, and also, that the Ruropean names for the same notions are equally figurative, and the names for instance of subordination, co-ordination, subject, predicate, conclusion, &c., but very imperfectly express the logical relation to which they refer, In fact most of these relations are in all languages taken from relations of space, as almost all terms : which are of an abstract nature. As the literal translation of Vyapti, Vydpya, &८, might ‘easily lead to false views, I have preferred to give their equivalents in the tetmmology accepted in Europe,
of the Nydya Philosophy. 33
7(0.—From the knowledge, that with such a place the reason (middle term) is connected, inference is the consequence
42.—Comm. ‘ Consideration is the knowledge, that a subject in a general proposition (the reason, the’ middle term) is united with the subject of conclusion,” (terminus minor.)
The knowledge of the determination of thé reason (middle term) which is determined by a general predicate, (major term) प connee- tion with the place (minor teym) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be comprehended in a double manner, either, it is the hnow- ledge, that the subject of the general ptoposition (the middle term) is connected with the place (Subject of conclusion, minor term) or, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of contlusion) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term.) Accordingly the conclusion takes place cither from the knowledge, thet the subject of the general proposition (middle terin) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from which follows that the conclusion (predicate of the conclusion, major term) is connected with the place, (minor term,) or it takes place from the knowledge, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term) from which follows, that the place (minor term) fs possessed of the conclusion (major term.) + न
Some think: ‘Also from a two-fold consideration ensues the infer- ५१८९, that the place, (subject) is possessed of the conclusion (predicate of.) There ix (according to them) no necessity for the knowledge, that the mountain is possessed with sinoke, which is invariably con- nected with fire. irst there is the perception, that the mountain smokes ; further the recollection arises, that sinoke is the subject, with which fire is invariably connected. In this efse inference evidently takes place from those two acts ofsknowledge, A knowledge of something (of tht Paksha, the minor term) determincd by a notion, which is again determined by the predicate (by a notion, determjued by the Vy4pti,) can never be the cause, but there takes place the cause by the knowledge, that the place is determined hy the general notion of the subject (middle term, for instance a mountain determined by , the general notion of smoke) because this iy necessary, and because the assumption of a knowledge, determined hy what is determined (by the general proposition, by the Vydpti), has the fault complication.
31 Division of the (दग
7\.—There are five semblances of a reason, which are called going astray, contradiction, inconclusiveness, equalization and absurdity.
72.—The fault of going astray is again three-fold, that which is too general, that which is not general enough and non-ex- clusive. ' wt ।
भ.
.
We deny thi8; for even if there is no knowledge of the general no- tion (the class) of the middle term (vydpya, for instance the general notion of fire) the inference takes place from the knowledge, that there is a subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by something (middle term) with which firefor instance is invariably connected, And this agsumption ig also more simple ; for the cause takes place by the know- ledge, that -there dg a determmation of the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by the predicate of the general proposition (deter- mined by the Vyapti),
Moreover according to your opinion from the knowledge: “The mountain is smoking,” the iyference (the mountain is fiery) should ful- low, because there is a knowledge, that the subject of the conclusion (Paksha) is detertnined by the general notion (class) of smoke, which 4 this case is the general notion (class) of the middle term (vydpya) but this of course will not be granted by any one.
And if you further say, ‘the cause is the knowledge that the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) is determined by the general notion of the middie term (vydpya) when perceived together with the predicate of the general proposition’ (Vyapti) the consequence would be, that an inference would ensue, if Chaitra perceived a subject as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition, and Maitra the general notion (attribute, clacs) in connexion with the subject (of conclusion)
If you lastly assume, ‘that the perception of the place, determined by a general notion, by A, in conjunction with the perception of the mniddle term iw its intariable connexion with the major term (the
middle term, determined by the Vyipti,) by the same A, is the cause of the conclusion, made by this A,’ there would appear an infinite series of causes for the same effect. * According to ney opinion, the hnowledge of the attribute (middle
of the Nydya Philosophy. 34
73.—It is too general,” if applied to the subject (of con- clusion) and to an opposite one, not general enough,” if ex- cluded from cither.
term) of the subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate (major term) with which itis invariably connectad, takes plage through intimate relation, and produces the conclusion by the samemelation. Tn this case an infinite series of causes is avoided. On the contrary, if it is said, that the knowledge of the middle term as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition (with the major term, as the Vyapti) and also the knowkdge of the gencral notion (attribute, mid- dle term) of the subject (of conclusion, minor term, Paksha) are causes, independent of each other, there would be a two-fold state of the cause of the same effect, and a conclusion would fujlow from the sen- tences: “There is smoke, which is invariably connected with fire,” and : “The mountain is fiery.’ If this is correct, we niay say, that if there is a double knowledge, there must be also a determined knowledge, and here at the end of the discussion, where its result is given, a complica-
--ू--
tion is no fault
(This is on the whole an evecllent exposition of the logical rela- tion of the cause of the conclusion. It i$ here Ineidly explained? in what manner the three notions of a syllogism are in relation to each other, and also, that the cause of the conclusion is not the middle term, ag separated from the major term, but only in its connexion with it. As this is sometimes not attended to, itis not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the same time it is true, that the lowi- cal form of a syllogisin does not consist of one premise, and the ताना, sion, but of two premises with the conclusion ; for if one reflects as to the form, given by our author, viz. the minor term in connesion with the middle terg, which is itself determined by the’major term, it is evident, that there are two connexions, viz. of the minor termwith the middle, and of this with the major, Tifat is to say, there are two ११५ positions or two premises.) श |
13.—Comm.—Too general is a reason, which abides ay well in the subject of the conclusion as in an opposite one, (Subject of the con- clusion is, where the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountaia or a*hearth ia the subject or the minor, =
36 Dwiston of the Categories
74.—Non-exclusive,” when no other subject (of the conclu:
&e. A subject, opposite to the conclusion, is where it does not abide, for instance, in the example above given, a tank is a subject, opposite to the major term.) ;
That ig to say, the reason is too general, when it abides also in a subjcet, where thé major term is not found. For instance, Iet a hearth
he the subject {minor term), smoke the major term, and fire the reason, the conclusion would be: the hearth smokes, because it is fiery, which would be false, beeanse the regson is too general ; for fire (the reason) is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for instance, with an tron all.
(We would not acknowledge this as a logical fallacy, which takes place, when the conclusion dyes not follow from the premises, but as a fallacy extra dictionem, where the matter of the premises is wrong ; for the conclusion follows here from the premises. In this instance the major proposition is wrong, which is: where there is fire there is smoke. The conclusion, however, is quite right as well in form as in matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The fault would, however, be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been
«‘aken for the minor term!
Asthe Nyaya knows only the two first figures of syllogism, and of them only thetwo moods Barbara and Camestres,* we may say, that the fal- lacy has arisen by the major proposition being special instead of general.)
At—Comm.—Non-general is the reason, whieh has no similar sub- jects of conclusion for the major term+ (that is where the major term has only one subject, or where no similar instances can be adduced for the reason.) (‘Thus says the commentary in explanation of the test,
* In Barbara, itis hardly necessary td say, there are all three propositions generat aftirmatives, in Camestres the firet a general atlirmative, the second a general nega- tive and the third a general negative.
t This is much more clearly stated in the Tarka Sangraha, 1 quote the passage in Dr, Rallentyhe’s translation (Lectures on the Nydya philosophy, p. 41.) “ The pretended reason, which applies neither to gimilar instances nor dissimilar ones, is one devoid of community.’”” As, when one saya: ' Sound is eternal, for it has the nature of sound.” Now the nature of sound resides in sound alone, and is no-
^ thing else, whether qernal or uneternal. '
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 37
sion) is possible. A reason, which docs not abide in the subject (of conclusion) is called contradictory.” 79.—Three kinds of inconclusiveness are enumerated, viz. in-
The latter, however, is here much clearer than the former, because the question is not, whether the major is immediatgly found iv the minor pbut whether it is found there by the means of another term प्रा the first case there would be no necessity for an argument. Thy example given m the commentary is : Sound is not eternal, because belonging to the class of sound. ere is, according to jt, no similar instance? in which the reason (the class of sownd) and by it the major is found, as the class of sound abides only in sonnd, and no where ८, We should reject this argument at once, as having only two terms; but the Nyaya is obliged to look out for some other appliance, beeauge class is something different from the objects comprehended by it.) 15.—Comm.—Non-erclusive, is a reason, witere the पुणा term is the negation of absolute negation (where the major term may be pre- divated of any other notion). Hereby a general negative is impossible, and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.
(The Bengalee translation gives the following explanation :
“A reason, for which there is only an Aftirmative, is non-evclusiyg, that is to say, a reason, whose subject docs not exclude any thing, for instance all, Xe. Let all be the subject, (minor term) obyeet of proot the major, and fit to be named the reason, ‘This argument iy non-ey- clusive ; for here cannot be given a similar instance with regard to the subject (minor term) asit can be given in the argument : The mountain is fiery, because it smokes ;” for here is a similar instance on the part of the subject a hearth, ce. According to the opinion of the modern school a non-exclu-ive reason takes place, where the major admits of only an attirmatiye (that is to say, ५ from any other notion) for instance in the argument: “a jar is an object of proof, because it can be naned.’’) 7 ॥
(We would not consider either of these congusions faulty in form, be, cause the middle term is properly connected with cither of the extremes, A reason then goes astray, to state it briefly, if the reason is tdo wide, further if it does not refer to similar instances, and lastly, if? it does not refer to dissimilar ones.)
vere the tMagor is not cachuded
38 Division of the Categories
conclusiveness on the part of the subject, inconclusivencss from the nature of the reason, and inconclusiveness from limitation, 76.— Where there is a jewel hill, for instance, subject of the conclusion, there is inconclysivencss on the part of the sub- १९८४. Inconclusivencss from the nature of the reason’? takes place, for instance, if the substantiality of a tank be inferred from itsdhaving the quality of smoke. [| 77.—Incontlusiveness from limitation would take place, for
46.—Gomm.—* A contradictgry reason is one which docs uot abide in the subject of conclusion,” (minor term) thet is to say, 8 reason, whose negation is the major term (a reason which is the contrary notion of the major term). Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major, and the notion of horse the middle term, Tere the reason, the notion of horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore docs not admit of an inference.”
(Uere the fault again is not in the reasoning, hut the major premise is wrong ; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictionem.)
47.—Comm.—1, Inconclisiveness on the part of the subject is there, where the nojiou of the subject (the minor term) is impossible, Kor instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill,
(ल also iz the conclusion not wrong, the fault lies in the minor premise, where the subject is a notion, not given by experience; and the fallacy is therefore one extra dictionem.)
A8.—Comm—2. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason (middle term) takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed (if the reason and the subject exclude cach other). Let it for instanee be argued that a tank is a thing, because it smokes, ‘Tank (or water in the tank) and smoke are contrury notions, and smoke canuct therefore be predicated of a tank.
(ण again lies the fault in the minor premise. We observe, that tho second kind of inconclusiveness does not correspond to the first. in the‘first the minor term was contradictéry, and we should therefore have expected, that in the second the reason would have been contra- dictory. )
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 39
instance, if fire should be inferred from blue amoke. Equaliza- tion,"® is called a consideration from contradictory reasons.
वि
19.—Comm.-—3. Inconelusiveness from limitation (on the part of the invariable connexion with the predicate). This can be two-fold, on the part of the subject, and on the part of the pretlicate, =
a. First on the part of the predicate. This takes place, if the pre- dicate is a contradictory notfon, For instance if the inference were made, that the mountain hag a golden Gre, the notion of a golden fire (major term) is contradictory,
(Here the major premise is wrong.) .
¢, Secondly, on the part of the reagon. (‘This takes place, if the reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were, the moun- tain is fiery from golden smoke. ‘The fault is here again in the major premise.) “
Others say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow, as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has blue smoke.
(This division of inconclusiveness is evidently frulty ; for the first hind is inconclusive, because the minor term ix contradictory, the seeond,_. because the middle and पाण terms exclude each other, In the third hind two divisions are mixed, in the first of whieh, both the reason and the major term, are considered as contradictory, in the second the reason and major term are limited in their application by an addition Which they ought not to have (in the example the addition of blue).
There are accordingly three different divisions confounded, The first proceeds from contradiction in cach of the terms, Lu this would be included the first member of the author's division, and a and ¢ of the third, by which it jg complete. Thesecond division proceeds from the contradiction of two of the terms ; of this only one part hag been given in the second member, viz, where thereason and the minor term ex. clude cach other. Of the two other members ofthis division, the first, where the minor and major terms are contradictory, has not been touched upon, and the sceoid, where the reason and the major term are contradictory, has been given in another place, viz. under the head of contradictory reason, The thtrd division proccegls from linitation,
40 Division of the Categories
78.—Absurdity® is called the error of stating a subject in which there is not the conclusion ; as if, for instance, smell would be inferred to be a quality of a jar, because it was ac- cidentally perceived at the time of its production.
79.—If a rustic first sces a Gayal (species of ox), &c. his similar knowledy’ ‘of cows, &c. is the instrument to form his notion of a Gayal.
80.—The recollection of the mevaing of a sentence which had been previously pronounced, is called the intercourse in the comparison. The result of comparison is the knowledge of the force of the word “ छुपः and similar expressions.
५ 4 भं
that is to say, where, instead of the notion परि its whole extent, only a part of it is connceteil with the othcr two notions (in the examples blue smoke, blue fire).
50.—Comm,—" An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons.”
An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the considera-
dion of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclu-
sion (major term) the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connceted ; ag for instance, if at the time of consideration of water, &c. which is invariably connceted with the absence of fire, there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.*
51.—Comm.—" Absurdity is, if a subject is without the conclusion,” (which 18 assigned to it.)
Absurdity takes place, if thg’conclusion does not abide in the subject (minor term) for'instance, if at the time of the production of a jar the
jar is taken as the subject (minor term) and smell as the conclusion,
* The Tarka Sangraha (B. 1, p. 12.) explains this : a counterbalanced reason is that along with Which there exists another reason which establishes the non-exis- tence, of what is to be proved. Av if one should argue, “ Sound is eternal, bee ise it is audible,” as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be) it might be argued with equal force on the other side, that ^ Sound is not eternal, because it is 8 product, as a jar is,’
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 4l
81.—The knowledge of words is the special cause, The knowledge of the meanings of words, is here the intercourse,” and the result is verbal knowledge, The knowledge of the power*’ of words assists in this dct.
there is an absurdity, because at the time of }rroduction’there is no smell in a jar, &c. for all things are at that time without smell. 52.—Comm.—“ The knowledge of words* is the sptcial cause ; the
knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intereourge and the result is verbal knowledge,”” .
The cause of verbal kndledye is not a word, when actually heard ; for though there be no word spoken, yet thove may be verbal know- ledge, for instance, if one who hag made a vow not to speak, writes down a Sloka. , ’ .
53,—Comm.—* The knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse.” Intercourse is the recollection of the meanings of the words, produced by the words. Otherwise a person who had a knowledge of words, (who heard words) yould have verbal knowledge, if he had obtained the meanings of words by pereeption or any other evidenee. (‘That is to say, if he heard words, the*meanings of which were given to him by perecption, inferende, ete. , for instance, if Ire heard the word “tree,” while at the same time the meaning of it were conveyed to him by his actually seeing a tree. There would be two hinds of knowledge, independent of each other, and not verbal knowledge which is produced by words alone.) Here it must also he understood, that the effects of words are produced by special relation (रतिः) otherwise the effect of the word jar” for instance, would be the recollection of ether by intimate relation, and there would be accordingly verbal knowledge of the ether.
Special relation is of two kinds, ¢mplication (ellipsis) and power.
The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary ; for, unless the power of a word is previously apprehended, there cannot be rerbal knowledye from recollection, which depends पमा that gelation (power
* A word is a sound which has 8 power, as for instance, the power of the sound man” refers to an animal which has hands, fect, ९. The meaning of « eord ia the object to which it refers, fore instarfer, the’ meaning मकाल word “tree” is a thing, wh.ch has a trunk, tranches, leaves, &c. ४
42 Division of the Categories
of a word) although there may exist a knowledge of the words (the words may be heard). ‘he recollection of the meaning of the know- ledge ofa word takes place according to the rule of the knowledge of any object which is in relation. ,
Power is the connexion of the meaning of a word with the same word. That by such or such a sound such or such a meaning is un- derstood, depends-upon the will of God. In names, which are at pre- sent given, there is also a power, because the rule: ^ Let the father on the eleventh day (after the birth of a child) give a name to the child,” depends én the will of God. Ina sign, however, given at present, there is no power. Such is the opinion of seme, but the modern school (of the Nydyaikas) maiptain, that the will of God is not the power, but merely will (of man.) Hence is also power in a sign, which may be given at present
The apprehension of power depends upon grammar, comparison, dictionary, the instruction of persons worthy of confidence, actual intercourse, the supplying of the sentence, substitution, and the con- nexion with well-known words.
a, The apprehension of the root, of the inflective base, the deriva- tive affixes, &c. of & word is produced by grammar; it docs not take alace, whenever there is ar obstacle, as there is, if, according to the statement of the grammarians, the power of the grammatical termina- tiong (that is of the verbs and nouns) refers to the agent. In the sentence : “ Chaittra cooks” the termination in cooks’ is inseparably connected with the agent “ Chaittra.”
This connexion, we maintain, does in this case not arise, in ९०18९. quence of its complication ; but in the action (cooks) the power is pro- duced, because this assumption is simple,* for it is manifest, that the action is a determination of Chaittra, .. 1...
6, The power.which takes plece by comparison, has been before described.
९ In the same manner power is also apprehended by the diction- ary; if there is, however, any obstacle, it is not apprehended. Thus according to the dictionaries, the adjective terms of “blue,” &c. have power with reference to blue colour and to a thing which has
क According to the grammarians it must be said: ‘‘ Chaittra, not separated from
what is determined by the action referring to cooking,” while the Nyayaikas say : “ Chaittra, determined by the action, referring to cooking.”
of the 244 Philosophy. 43
blue colour; but it is more simple to say, that this term by its power refers to the quality of bluc, and by implication to a thing which has blue colour.*
d. Or the power is derived from -the word of a person, worthy of confidence, if for instance it is said, that the word “ Pika’’ (a black cuckoo) is the same as ^ Kokila,” the, power of ahe word =" Pika” is apprehended. .
९. Or from actual intercourse. If for instance the master who is a grown up person, orders his servant who is also a grown up person, to bring the jar, and the jar is brought by the latter, a boy who attends to this, hence observes that the action of bringing a jar is comected with those words. If he further hears: “Take away the jar,” “ bring the cow,” he understands the power of the term: “*jar,"” &c., to be brought or to be taken away, with reference to.a jar, &c. in gonnexion with an action.
Some say: ‘ Under this supposition there is 76 verbal knowledge in the sentence: ^ There isa blue jar on the ground ;” for the power of a jar, Xe. is apprehended by a jar, ag connected with an action, and the power of any termination of a verb refers to fhe understanding of an action, but in this ease there 13 no connexion ofp such a kind, aud therefore no verbal knowledge ?”
We do not agree, because, although it is at first necessary for brevity’s sake to admit a power with reference to a jar, ag determined by action, it is right to omit it-afterwards, .. .. ..
J. Or from supplying the sentence. (This takes place, if in a sen- tenee a word has a special meaning, while from other sentences it is known, that the meaning is more general.)
gy Or feom substitution. Substitution means the definition of the sense of a word by another word of the same sense ; thus, if for the word belligerous +" warlike” is substituted, the ‘pdwer refers to the word “ warlike.’+ .. .. ई
A. Or from the connexion with well-known words, for instanée in the sentence: ‘‘In this mango tree the Pika sweetly. siygs,”’ the power of the word ‘ Pika” is apprehended in this manner.
* Ifa word has several ध there is a separate power for each of them.
t In the original the examples are: "न ghata:’” and ‘* kalasa,"’ cither of which meang a jar,
a2
44 Division of the Categories
Some (the Miménsikas) maintain: ‘The power of a word refers to the class (notion) and not to the individual, because in the latter case it would go astray, and require assumptions without end. And on the first supposition there is also a knowledge of the individual, because without individuals the knowledge of a class is impossible.’
We deny this, beoruse withgut assuming a power, the apprehension of an individual does not take place.
Nor does implication (ellipsis) refer to an individual ; for an indivi- dual may be,apprehended, although there is no want of apprehension of the literal meaning of a werd (an implication is dependent on the circumstance, that a word cannot be compréhended in its literal sense.)
Nor need there be any fear, that by assuming a power, referring to au individual, the fault of an infinite number of hypotheses is com- mitted ; for we asgume one and the same power for all individuals.
Nor is there (by the assumption, that power refers to the individual) a want of extension ; ‘for this extension is effected by the class of cow for instance (when a cow is the individual),
Moreover, if the power is apprehended for instance in cow, possessed of power, the force refers to an individual. Lf on the contrary the power is apprehended for instance in the class of cow, then there would be a Zecollection of the meaning of a word, determined by the class of cow, and a verbal knowledge would be impossible, because the knowledge of the power by the same determination would be the cause of the recol- lection of the meaning of a word and of verbal knowledge. Moreover, if the power refers to the class of cow, we must declare, that the class of the class of cow is the determination of what is possessed of the power. But the class of cow, which is nut in intimate relation to any thing that is not cow, is in intimate relation to all cows. ence your assumption of 8 determivation of the notion of any thing, possessed of power, is complicated, because this notion does not refer to individual cows ; therefore in order to comprehend this or that individual, posses- sed of this‘or that class, it is necessary to assume a power, which is founded on individuals, determined by class and form,
A word, possessed of power, is cither Yaugika, or Ridha, or Yoga- riidha, or Yaugiha-ridha, १ »
1. A word is Yaugika, if its meaning is understood by the mean- ing of its parts ; for, iustance [^ the word giver” (in Sanscrit the ea-
of the Nyiya Philosophy 45
82,—Implication, is the relation of a word which has power, and it takes place when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal meaning of a word. The cause of understanding व sentence is contiguity, consistency, construc- tion and intention. TIN npc ote os ee SP a2 an ample ia Pachaka, cook) the root giv (९) expresses thé action yire, and the termination “ er” refers to the agent. And the whole expresses the meanings of the parts, viz. an agent with reference to the action" give.”
2. Rddha is a word, which, independent of the power of its parts, is only understood by the péwer of the whole, as for instance “ go” (cow, for “go” is derived trom ‘ gam,” to go, which does not express the meaning of go,) ^ ghata :’”” (jar) ete.
3. Yogarddha is a word, which, beside the powey of its parts, ex- presses a different meaning as a whole, for instance “ Pankaja” (from “Panka,” mud, and “ja,” born) for the word “ Pankaja” means by the power of its parts ‘an agent, born in mud” (which includes any thing, produced in such a manner) but by its power as a whole a ५ waterlily”” (that is only one of the things, born in mud).,. .. ..
4. Yaugika-ridha is a word, which is understood sither by the mean- ing of its parts, or by Riidha, for instance UAbhid. + The power of there word “ ud’? refers to upwards, the power of the root ^ फक्" to cutting. Therefore by its Yaugika power it refers to tree, and by its power of Riidha it refers to any germ, produced from corn,
3:1.—Comm.—* Implication is the relation of a word, which has power, and it takes place, when the intention of the speuker is not understood by the literal sense of a word.”
For instance, let the sentence be given : “ Ghosha dwells on the Gan-
If in this ease, with reference to the literal incaning of “ Ganga, viz, the current, eyher the connexion of Ghosha, of the intention of the speaker is not obtained, the meaning of “ bank” is understood hy implication. This implication is the relation of a word which has power. Here, from the knowledge of the connexion of the litegal meaning of the current with the bank, a recollection of the bauk is produced, and hence the meaning of the sentence is understood
Moreover if the want of connexion alone were the cause of implica- lon, there would be nu implicatibu in the sentence: ^ Let the staffs
40 Division of the Categories
83.—Contiguity,* is called the proximity of words.
enter,” because there is no want of connexion with reference to the en- tering of the staffs. ‘Therefore, because here the entrance of the staffs has no reference to the intention of the speaker, which is the taking of food, the implication refers to the bearers of staffs. In the same manner, in the séntence : ^ Protect the ghee from the crows” the word “crow” has m implication to any thing which may injure the ghee, because the intention of the speaker refers to the preservation of the ghee generally. In the same@manner, if it is said: ‘The umbrella- bearers are proceeding ;? the word ^ urfibrella-bearers” implies the merchants of a caravae,
This latter is called the implication which docs not lose its own meaning (Ajahatsérthi Lakshani, which keeps its own meaning, beside that which it obtains from implication) because by the term ^ merchants of 8 caravan” the bearers of umbrellas as well as those without um- brellas are understood.
Moreover, if the want of sense in the connexion alone were the cause of implication, sqmetimes the word ‘ Gangi’’ would imply : ५ bank,” sometimes the word : “ Ghosha,” “ fish,” &c. and there would
he accordingly no rule. ‘this, however, must be understood: if the connexion of the meaning of a word, possessed of power, is appre- hended by the notion of bank, bank must be apprehended by the no- tion of bank ; if, on the other hand, it is apprehended by the notion of the bank of the Gangi, it must be recollected by that notion. There- fore there is no implication in the general notion of an implication, be- cause the general notion is understood without implication. Likewise, there is no power in the general notion of what has power, because any word is able to remind of the meaning of its general notion.
But if there is*an implication by: the successive connexion of a word, possessed cof power, it is called an implied implication, as for instance in the word “ Dwirépha” (literally, that which has two wings, figurative, black bee”) he. connexion of : “two-winged,” refers to “ Bhramara”’ (black bee) that of ^ Bhramara” to lack bee; this is an implied implication... .. ..
55.—Comm.—Contiguity means proximity, viz. the uninterrupted succession of two,or more words which have a connexion among each
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 47
other. Therefore there is no verbal knowledge in the words: “ The by inhabited was Dévadatta volcano ;” but if by a mistake in the proximity no mistake in the verbal understanding is the consequence, it does not matter. *
«But in the sentence : ^ With umbrella, earrings and clothes adorned is Dévadatta,” the recollection of the second wovrdsdestroys the recol- lection of the first ; accordingly, as there is an interruption, a recollec- tion of the second word is impossible. :
We do not grant this, as by the impressions of each word until the last an uninterrupted recollection of albobjects is possible ; for as by several kinds of intercourse éne and the same perception arises, so also one and the same recollection arises by several dmpressions, and the knowledge of the last letter together with the impressions of all words brings ail to recollection. Tow could gtherwise exis} the recollection of any word that has many letters ?
Moreover ; some say, that, as in a field all pigeons are caught in the same net, so by the recollection of all the meanings of words does take place the verbal knowledge of all meanings of words, which is corresponds ing to the knowledge of the connexion dependjng upon the object and verb. Others say : if connected with all such words, as are construed, consistent and contiguous, verbal knowledge of all the words (included in. the sentence) takes place ; for, they say, after the meaning of the single sentences has been understood, the meaning of the great sentence will be comprehended by the recollection of the meanings of the words, Hence the assumption of a total impression of a word, manifesting all the letters, has been refuted, because by the apprehension of the last letter, together with the impressions of all the preceding letters which (appre- hension) manifests the word, the word is apprehended. ‘This must he understood, if it is said: ‘the door,” the meaning of the word ig obtained by the knowledge of the werd “ close,” but not by the know- ledge of the meaning of such acts as closing, &c., because the actual presence of the meaning of a word, which is produced by a word is the cause of verbal knowledge. Moreover, as the words dgnoting action and object, are mutually connected, it is impossible, that there is verbal knowledge without a word, denoting averb. In the same mannes, if it issaid: ‘Of the flowers,” it is necessary tu assume: “ he is desirous,” because without this the preposition “ of could nog be applied.
4४ Division of the Categories
Consistency’ is the mutual correspondence of the meanings of the words.
84.—Construction,” is the selection of such terminations, without which the meaning‘of a sentence is unintelligible. In-
tention,” is based on the wish of the speaker. DRTC 1S, eM ice nO a= ee EE ER
56.—Comm.—-Consistency is the connexion of the meaning of one word with thet of another. Accordingly there is no verbal knowledge in such sentences as: “Ile sprinkles with fire,” because there is uo meaning init. If itis objecteds ‘ that previously to the verbal knowledge there is nowhere a knowledge of this conkistency, because there is not before a meaning of the sentence,’ we reply : there is a knowledge of consistency which is sometimes doubtful, sometimes certain, if there is a recollection ofthe meanings of the different words. The modern school, however, says, that the knowledge of consistency is no reason of verbal knowledge, ‘If it is said: “ Ile sprinkles with fire,” there is no verbal knowledge, because the inconsistency, which is that fire cannot he an instrument in the action of sprinkling, is certainly an obstacle. Because the certainty of its absence is an obstacle only in a know- ledge, which is wet produced by common intercourse or by special ralefects, therefore it is prdved, that it is an obstacle with reference to verbal knowledge—although it is not proved, that by the late appear- ance of consistency verbal knowledge iy late. 57.—Comm.—Construction is the connexion of one word with ano, ther, without which the former has no sense. The case, denoting agent, has no connexion without the case, referring to action, and with this the former is construed. In fact, however, the proximity of the cases denoting agent and action, is included in contiguity. Moreover, with reference to the objective cage, for instance of jar, the cause is the knowledge of tht termination of the second case. »'Therefore there is no meaning in such sentences as: ‘The jar is the accusative case,” to bring is an action.” 4 58.—Comm.—Intention is the wish of the speaker. Suppose, inten- tion were not a cause of verbal knowledge, and such a sentence as ; “Bring the Saindhava” (meaning horse and salt) were pronounced, there would sometimes the meaning of “horse,” and sometimes the meaning of “salt,¢ be obtained. Tt cannot be said, that the cireum-
of the Nydya Philosophy. 49
85,—The instrument” in the perception of happiness and other internal qualities is the mind.’ The atomic nature of the mind is inferred from the fact that several objects of know- ledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time.”
stances, Kc. by which the intention is apprehended, are tht cause of verbal knowledge, because they are not included in thedefinition, And if it is said, ‘that they are included as being the cause ofthe knowledge of the intention,’ it is simple to say, that the knowledge ण the in- tention is the cause. In this manner, God is assumed for the knowledge of the intention with referente to the Vedas. Tt must not be said, ‘that the knowledge of the intention of the teacher is hgre the cause,’ because at the commencement of the creation there is no teacher, Nor must it he said: ‘ there is no general conflagration (destruction gf the yorld,) how cau therefore be acommencement of creation’ for a general conflagra- hon is proved by the Sistra., Tn the same manner*is in the sentence of a parrot the knowledge of the intention of God the cause, but ina vile sentence of the parrot the knowledge of the intention of the speaker.
Others say: If there is a word which h ys different meanings, the knowledge of the intention is sometimes the cause > moreover, in the sentence of a parrot 13 also verbal undersfinding without the hnow.,, ledge of the intention, and with reference to the Védas the meaning is apprehended by the discussions, which are purified by the eternal Minansa.
59.—Comm.—Intellect- was divided into two kinds; viz. appre- hension and remembrance (vid. verse 51.) The nature of apprehension has been explained. Remembrance will not be explained, beeanse it is casy to be understood ; tor the cause of it isa former apprehen- sion. Some say, ‘the class (notion) of apprehension iy not causality, but the class (notion) of knowledge म opherwise there woald be no remem- brance after a remembrance, because the former impression would be destroyed by the remembrance of theecommon notion, According to my opinion, however, there is by this remembrance through a new im- pression a new remembrance produced.’ ‘This we cannot grant; where after the remembrance of a perception in its totality the remembrance of
* That is to say, apprehension is not the cause of remembrance, but knowledge
in general.
50 Livision of the Categories
86,—Qualities” abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions.
the single objects (constituting a, totality) as of cloth, jar, &e. is produc. ed, but so that there is no remembrance of all the objects, there it wnust
be suid, that, aa the impression of every single remembrance is not de- stroyed, time, or‘ disease, or the last remembrance is the cause of the destruction of ¢he impression, Accordingly, it cannot be said, ‘that a gradual remembrance is impossible,’ nor, ‘that by repeated remembrance, a stronger impression is imposeible ; for the word “strong” means here what suddenly recalls to mind. It also cafinot be said, ‘that the cause is knowledge, ag therg is no alternative’ for if the special attribute is assigned, there is no going astray ; but knowledge has the fault of su- perfluous causality, as it is a general attribute. [ow could otherwise a stick be the cause ofa jur by being turned round, and not as well by its being a substance or’having colour? Nor must it be said: ¢ There is an apprehension, that the intermediate remembrance will go astray, because the impression is destroyed ;” for by objecting to assuming an infinite number of impressions and hy assuming the destruction of the impres- sion of the last remembrance, a going astray cannot be apprehended.
60.—Comm.—The existence of anind iy proved by the following in- ference. The perception of happiness, Xe. takes place by an instru- ment, because the perception is a production, as for instance is the perception by the eye. This instrument is the mind. It cannot be said ‘that the perceptions of unhappiness, &e. are produced by other instruments,’ because the necessity of only one instrument as cause for all similar perceptions is evident from its simplicity. Thus the mind is proved as being the substrate of contact, which is the nov-intimate cause of unhappiness, &e, ५
61.—Comm.—""The atomic nature of the mind is proved from the fact, that several objects ot knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time.” ‘
It is clear, fram apprehension (perception) that various objects of perception, for instance, objects of the eye, of taste, &e. are not at one and ‘the same time produced’; for although there may exist an inter- course of the several senses with these objects, yet knowledge is pro- duced by oaly ong sense, becuse the mind is in contact with only one
of the Nydya Philosophy. a
Material qualities” are colour, taste, feel, and smell, priority
and posteriority,
sense, and it ig not produced (at that ¢ime) by any other sense, as the mind is not in contact with it. Theretore it the mind were to be comprehended by the notion of a pervading substance, it should be connected with every thing; hence (as this is not the case) it fol- lows, that the mind is not pervading. It must notebe said, ‘ that the knowledge of the mind £ late (successive) because, at that time the special fate (merit or demerit) which reminds of knowledge, is also late ;’ for, if this were te case, there would be no necessity for as suming such Gustruments of knowledge as the eye &e.
Nor imust it be said: ‘Mow can the narrowness of the mind be rea conciled with the fact, that at one ayd the same sime a knowledge trom different senses exists, for instance at the time when one eats a large cake ;’ for the mind is some thing very subfle, and is therefore rapidly in contact with various senses, so that different kinds of know- ledge may arise. wt the same imperceptible succession, as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pierced ; it isa mere qelusion, it several hinds of knowledge appear at the same time. e
Nor must it be said, ‘that both (the atotnic and pervading nature of the mind) is reconciled under the assumption, that the nature of the mind may contract or expand,’ because the assumption of many parts subject to destruction, &c. is complicated, and on the other haud, the assumption of a mind without parts is simple.
62.—Comm.—" Qualities abide in substances, and are without quali- ties and actions.”
If it is asked, what proof is there for a separate class of quality? The answer is: The causality, found in what is possessed of gene- rality, different from that (generality) referring “to substances and actions,* is determined by some attribute, because causality for a thing which is not determined by some attribute, is impossible ; but neither the class of colour, &c. nor the class of existenee is this determination, because in the first ease it would not comprehend enough (all other quali-
9 .
. * To understand this, it must be recollected, that generality (class) abides ¶ sub stances, qualities and actions; the generality therefore, different from the class of 1 substance and action, must be that of quality, n 2°
52 Division of the Categories
87, 88.—Fluidity, gravity, viscidity and velocity. —Merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect and others of similar nature are called immaterial qualities by philosophers.* Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction are con- sidered qualities of either class.
89.—Conjunction and disjunction, the different numbers from two upwards, separatedness found in two things or more, are qualities which abide not in one and the same thing
ties being excluded) and in the sceond it would comprehend too much, (viz., also substances and actions.) ‘Theréfore it is contained in the 2 (qualities) and is the glass of quality.
“Tt abides in substances.” Although it is not its definition : to be dependent,ou sustance, because it would be too wide, as including also action and class, yet it is right to say: it is what is possessed of the class different from existence which class is the determination extending as far as substantiality, because the class of quality is the determination, extending as far as substantiality, and quality is what is possessed of this determination, ‘The clagses of action and substance are not determina- tions, extending ag faras substantiality, because substantiality and action
»do not abide in the sky, दू, and the class of the class of substance, and the clasy of generality (class) are no rea/ classes.
“Without qualities.” Although action, generality, &e. are also without qualities, yet it must be understood as the absence of qualities, found in the eategory which is possessed of generality and different from action ; for class and the subsequent three categories have no ge- nerality (class) ; action is not different from action, and substance is not without qualities. ‘Therefore this definition is not too wide.
Without actions” is only said to deseribe it, not to define it, be- cause it would otherwise be too vide, the ether heing also without action,
63.—Material substances ave: earth, water, light, air and mind (material aceprding todhe Nydya is that the measure of which has a limit, and tor this reason, mind which is an atom, is included in it.) , Gh—Immaterial qualities ‘are: merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, and endeavour (voli- tion), Immateria’ substances are: the sky, time, space and soul.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 33
90.—All the remaining qualities” abide only in one thing. Special qualities are : intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aver- sion, endeavour, touch, viscidity, original fluidity,
OL.—Fate, memory and sound: General qualities are: munber, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, deris ed fluidity. ५
92. 93.—Gravity and velocity. Number, quantity, separa- tedness, conjunction, and disjunction, priority and poste riority, fluidity and viseidity are peyceived by two Senses.
Sound, colour, taste, sell and touch, are respectively per- ceived by one of the external senses,
94.—Gravity, fate and memory, transcend the perception of the senses. ‘The special qualities of the pervading substances™ are not produced by the qualities of any cause.”
63,—-Comm.—The remaining qualities are: colour, taste, touch, measure which is an unit, separatedness, found only in one individual, priority, posteriority, intellect, happiness, unhappingss, desire, aversion, endeavour, gravity, viscidity, faculty, fate e(merit and demerit) and sound, “
G6.—The special qualitics of the earth are: colour, taste, 8710] and feel; of the water: colour, taste, feel, viscidity and natural fluidity ; of the light: colour and feel; of the air: feel; of the sky: sound ; of the soul: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and memory,
67,—Comm.—By two senses, vie by the eye and the shin,
o8.— Conn. —Qualities of the pervading substances are: intellect, happiness, unhapyiness, desire, aversion, cndeavdus, merit, demerit, memory, and sound
69.—Comm.—“ They are not praduced by the qualities of any cause.” Colour, smell, &e. depend upon the guality of the cause (lor instance the colour, taste, smell and feel of a jar depend upon the same qualities of the two halves, of which it is formed) the same ghonot + be admitted with regard to intellect, Sc. because there is no cause of
the soul, the ether, 4८,
54 Division of the Categorres
95, 96.—Natural colour, taste, smell, feel, likewise fluidity, viscidity, velocity, gravity, unity, separatedness found in indi- viduals, quantity and elasticity are produced from the quali- ties of causes. Conjunction, disjunction and velocity are effected by actions.
97.—Colour, faste, smell, touch, quantity, unity, separa- tedness found in individuals, viscidity and sound are non-inti- mate causes, ©
98.—Spécial qualities of the soul have only instrumental causality. Hot feel, gravity, velocity, fluidity, conjunction and disjunction and the other qualities denoting two extremes, are of two fold causality.”
99.--The special qualities of pervading substances, as well ag conjunction and disjunetion and other qualities denoting two extremes,* are linfited,
100.—Colour is perceived by the eye, it manifests substances, qualities and classes, itis the cause of the perception of the eye, and is white, &c., accerding to the variety of colours,
101.—It is eternal in the atoms of water and digA/,” in all
e@vther substances it has a cause. Taste is perceived by the tongue ; it is various, as sweet, bitter etc.
(The special qualities of the soul are only instrumental causes ; for intellect, &c. is not the non-intimate cause of any thing; but the knowledge of what is possible by action is the instrumental cause of the desire of action.)
69.—Comm.—Viz. the instremental and non-intimate causes.
70.—Comm.—* Colour is cternall in the atoms of¢water and light,” because it js there from their nature, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, as by the process of cooking andther colour is produced,
* The second distich of this verse in the former edition has been omitted, the whole context showing thut it is an interpolation. The same has been done with the first distich of verse 68, for the same reason, so that the present edition con- tains one verse less than the former.
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 35
102.—Its instrument (organ) is the tongue ; as regards eterni- ty. Xe. it is like colour.” Smell is perceived by the nose, it is the cause of perception through the nose,
103.—There are two kinds of smell, good and bad.”
Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin. : ४
104.—It is threefold, tepid, cold and warm. Hardness and similar qualities ave in’ the earth; with regard to its eternity, the same holds good as above. + “ *
105.—These™ qualities as abiding in earth, are produced by cooking, while this is not the case as regards the other (८ ments. The change produced by cooking takes place according to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas” ip the single,atoms,
71.—Comm,—Taste is eternal in the atoms of water, all other taste is non-cternal,
72.—Comm.—Smell is non-cternal (because it abides alone in earth, and in the atoms of carth another sinell is producedsby the process of cooking.) ®
3.—Comm.—The feel of earth and air is temperate, of water cold
and of light hot... Feel is eternal in the atoms of water, light and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, (for the same reason as before.)
71.—Comm.—These, viz. colour, taste, sinell and feel. As abiding in earth, they are produced by a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour, taste, smell and feel of earth are changed 5 not so as abide ing in water, &e. for although water, Xe. be ahundred tines boiled, yet no change of its colour, Xe. takes place. ‘Phe smell and heat of water, on the other hand, are artificial, beanuse they are present or absent by
the presence or abscuce of artificial means, like the cold feel of air and
earth.
75.—Comm.—The Vaistshikas say, that agto earth the change by the process of cooking takes place in the atoms. Their view is, 8 follows, As long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of coohing is possible ; but when by the union of fire the com- pound substances have beep destroy cd} that chang: takes place in the
56 Division of the Categories
atoms which have become independent of each other. And again by the union of the atoms which have been changed by the process of cooking, a production is effected from the compound of two, three, Ke. atoms again to a compound of many parts; for by the extraordinary velocity of heat the transition from a. of one compound to the production of another is sudden. YPhen from the destruction of a compound of two atoms by a new production a compound, possessed of shape, &e. is formed ina few moments,
For the instruction of the student an explanation of this topic is here given. * e
The Stitra of the Vaiséshikag is ay follows: © Action isa cause which ig independent of conymetion and disjunction २१ whieh means, that its consequent state is independent of its antecedent. state ; otherwise, as the action also produces the consequent conjunction, there would be the fault of too wide a definition, because the action would depend upon the destruction‘of the antecedent conjunetion.
If here a disjunction, produced by disjunction, is not acknowledged nine moments are required, If it is acknowledged, the disjunction, depending upon something produces disjunction ; dé if the cause is something indepeutent, action takes place, If there is a disjunction
sproduced by disjunction, ‘as depending upon the time, which is de- termined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first ele- ments of a compotnd substance commencing perceptehle substances (for whieh a compound of three atoms is required) ten moments. are neces- sary. If further the disjunetion produced by disjunction depends upon the time or upon part (of a compound) cither of which is determined hy the destruction of a substance, eleven moments are necessary,
1, Nine moments.
From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunctionstrom another atom, hence the destruction of the con- junction, forming the first elements of a compound substance (which consists of three atoms,) henced. the destruction of the compound of two atoms, hepee.2. the destruction of the quality of blue, &e. in the atom, hence 3, the production of the quality of red, &e., hence 1, the actions in accordance with the production of the first elements of things, hence 9. disjunction, hence 6. destruction of the former conjune-
tion, henee 7. the gaujunction,’ by which the first elements of a com-
of the Nydya Philosophy. पा
pound are formed, hence 8. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 9. the production of the quality of red, &e.
If it is objected, ^ that in the moment, when the quality of blue is de- stroyed, or in the moment, when the qudlity of red is produced, there is in the atom the action, in accordgaice with the production of the first clements of a compound substanby > we deny this, beeause in ‘an atom, previous to the destruction of the action which takes place in an atom that is united with fire, and also previous to the production of a quality, there is no other action with regard to the atom possible ; for ige hold the principle, that in a thing where ther€ is an action, no offer action is possible, and also, that in a substance without quality an action, in accordance with production of the first elements 6f substances, cannot take place.
Nor can in an atom at the same time that the quality of blue, Xe. is removed, the quality of red be produced, because the destruction of the antecedent is the cause of the consequent eclour, ete.
2. Ten moments. They take place, if by disjunetion, depending upon a time, determined by the destructionsof the conjunction, form- ing the first elements of a compound substance, another disjunction is effected. न ५
From the conjunction of fire there takes place वन्मा in the atom, which is the element of a compound of two atoms, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, by which the first elements of a compound are formed, hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms and the disjunction, produced by disjunction, hence २, the destruc tion of the quality of blue and the destruction of the furmer conjunction, hence 3, the production of the quality of red and the consequent conjune- tion, hence 4. the destruction of the action, preduced by the conjunction? of the fire, with regard to the atom, henge 5. the action, in accordance With the production’of the first clements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 6, disjunction, heree 7. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence & the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 9. the Production of 8 compound of two atoms, and fence 10. ghe production of the quality of red, &e. :
3. Eleven moments.
~ + ॥,
e * Nodanam means a conjuction, by which no sound is produced. ५८८ १, 119. |
58 Division of the Categories
From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 1. the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 2, disjunctign, produced by disjune- tion, depending upon a time determined by the destruction of a com. pound of*two atonts, hence 3. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 4, the consequent conjunction, hence 5. the destruction of the action with reference to the atom, henee 6. the action, forming the first elements of+n compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 7. disjunctio, hence 8. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 9, the conjunction forming the first elements of a compound substances hence 10. the compound of two atoms, hence 11. the production of the quality of red. One and the same conjunction of fire destroys fot the (८९ volour and produces the red colour, as the intermediate sound destroys the preceding and produces the subsequent sound ; for one and the same fire continues not for the whole time. Moreover, if the cause of the production were also the cause of destruction, then, if by the destruction of the colour &८. the fire were also destroyed, the atom would remain for a long time’ without cofour. If on the other hand, the cause of destruction were also the caus? of production, then, if at the production of the red colour the fire (the cause of the production) were destroyed, there could not be produced the red colour.
Tf in this manner the action is considered in another atom, the quality is produced in five and more moments.
In five moments. The action takes place in one atom, hence dis- junction, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first ele- ments of a compound substance, and action in another atom, hence de- struction of the campound ofttwo atoms, and disjunction, produced by action in another atom. This is onetime. [दात destruction of blue, &, and¢from the disjunction the destruction of the former conjunction. This is the second time. Ifence the production of the red, and the eqnjunction,* forming the first clements of a compound. This is the third time. Hence the production of, the compound of two atoms,
twhich is the fourth time, and hence the production of the red, which is the fifth time.—If one considers the destruction of the substance at the same time with the action in another atom, then the production of
of the 204५ Philosophy. 59
106.—While the Naiyéyikas affirm," that change is effected also in two or more atoms. ‘The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number."
107.—Eternal_ unity is attribufed to eternal substances, transient unity to transient substances.” Numbers from two upwards to an indetinite number are produced by comprehend- ing intellect,
the quality takes place in six moments. Ip this manner. By thé action in one atom disjunction takes place in another atom, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the blue and disjunction, produced by action in another atom, hence production of the red, and destruction of the former conjunction in another atom, hence conjunction in another atom, hence production of the compound of two atoms, then production of the red. In the same manner seven moments are required, if one at the time of the destruction of the blue considers the aétion in another atom, and eight moments, if one considers the production of thg red at the same time with the action in another atom. .
70,—Commi—®* While the Naiydyikas affirm.” It is the opinion of the Naiydyikas, that also in compounds, viz. in compounds of two, three, Ne. atoms, change by the process of cooking takes place. Their view is this, 43 compound substances have pores, the minute parts of fire cuter into the inside, and therefure change by the process of cooking is possible, although the parts be retained in the compound, The opinion of Vais’shikas is complicated, as it assumes the destruction of au infinite number of parts, If this is the case, the recognition: ५ this iy that jar, ts consistent ; but where there is nogrecognition, thre we can admit a destruction of the compound
77.—Comm.—* The cause as regards the operation of cofintings is called number.” The cause, viz., the non intingate cause.
78.—Comm.—* Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, {ransient to transient substancés.” Eterhal substances are the qtoms of material substances, further time, space and soul, transient substances for instance a jar, &८,
12९
60 Division of the Categories
108.—And they are collectively apprehended in their depen. dance upon more than one object.” The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers are also destroyed.”
79.—Comm.— Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are prodjced by comprehending intellect, and they are collectively apprehended in their dependance upon more than one object.”
Numbers from two upwards, depending upon the addition of one to one, are produced by comprehending intellect.
Although the relation, indjcating the class of two, three, &e. abides for instance in each of two, three, &e. jacs &e. yet 98 there is not a knowledge, that one is two, and further as there is the knowledge, that one is not two, it must be assumed a relation, indicating the collective apprehension of two, three, &८, which depends upon more than one object.
80.—Comm.—“ The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers, (from two upwards) are also destroyed.” First there 18 the comprehending intellect, then the production of the class of two, Ke. then the determining knowledge, viz. the determination of the class of class of two, they the perception determined by the class of two. If
, the comprehending intellect is destroyed, also the class of two is destroyed.
Although no other knowledge docs continue for three moments, because the special qualities of the respective pervading substances are destroyed by the qualities succeeding to them,* yet it must be assumed, that the comprehending intellect continues for three moments ; other- wise the comprehending intellect would be destroyed at the time of determination, and thereby also the class of two, three, &e.; for there would be no perception of the class of two, because no object were present, and only When it is present, a knowledge, is produced by the
ye, Ke. Therefore it must be assumed, that the perception of the class of fwo destroys the comprehending intellect,
It must not be askeg, ‘how by the destruction of the comprehending intellect the class of two, Xe. is destroyed,’ because at another time thete is no perception of tht class of‘two; for it is clear, that the 4
क For instance ५ sound by another, which follows it, or a perception, thought, etc. by a succeeding gne.
of the Nyiya Philosophy. Gl
109.—Comprehending intelleet is called the intellect which refers to many unities." Quantity is the cause of the opera- tion of measuring.”
110,.—Point (atom of space) dength, thickness, breadth, are the differences of quantity ; in transient things it 18 tran- sient, in eternal things eternal."
comprehending intellect is the cause of those numbers, and its de- struction destroys also them. Therefore the class of two,’proguced by the comprehending intelleetof A, is comprehended by the same A.
Nor must it be said, “that the comprehending intellect is the cause of the perception of the class of two,” Se., Because it is right for brevity’s sake to assign it as the cause of the class of two, &e.
The comprehending intellect of the* Yogis refers to coinpounds of two atoms, Xc. which transcend the perception, of the senses. The comprehending intellect of God (Iswara) or of the Yogis abiding in the mundane egg, refers to the atoms at the time of the creation of the world.
S1.—Comm.—“ Comprchending intellect ह called the intellect which refers to many unities,”
This is the intellect, which apprehends, that this is one, this is one, Xe, It must be understood, that, where there is a knowledge of undefined unities, there is produced the number, referring to many, different from two, three, &e, as where there is a forest, an army, &e. This iy the opinion of Kandali-kara. The Acharyas, however, think, that the class of many, is the clays of three, &e. Therefore the class of many includes the class of three, &८, Although the class of three, &e. is included in an army, yet the class of the class of three, ete. is not apprehended, because this would be wron Ife this is the case, the notion 13 possible, that this army is greater than that, because if the class of many were without number, there could not exist the notign of क comparative and superlative degree.
2.—Comm.— Quantity is the cause of the operation’ of measuring,” viz. the non-intimate cquse. * ॥
®3.— [प transient things it is transient,” viz. in a compound®*of two atoms, &c. In eternal things 1008 eternal,”* viz. is the sky, &e.
62 Division of the Categories
11 1.—Transient quantity is produced from number, measure, and heaps. Quantity found in two and more atoms arises from number ;"
112.—As met with in a jar and similar extended things it arises from measure ; the conjunction of so called loose things, it isa help. By'this (conjunction)
113.—Measuire is produced in such things for instance as cotton. If tlie place, upon which i (the measure) depends, is destroyed, ‘it is also destroyed. Separateduess which is like number" is the cause of the knowledge of separate things.
114,—It cannot be said, that it is included in. mutual nega- tioh ; forit is not the same to say, “ this is different from that,” and, “ this is tot that.”
115.—Conjunction is called the obtaining of two things un- obtained before. It is threefold, the first kind is produced from the action of one of two 5
81.—Comm.—" Quantity found in two and more atoms.” The mea- sure of one atom is not the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of two Atoms, nor a compound of two atoms the cause with Pregard to the measure of a compound of three atoms, because a mea. sire produces a measure which is greater than its own kind.* But the measure of a compound of two atoms is not greater than one atom, and the measure of a compound of three atoms has nothing of its own hind ; therefore the non-intimate cause of a compound of two atoms is the number of two in an atom, and of a compound of three atoms the number of three ina compound of two atoms. 85,—Comm,.—“ Separateduess which like number,” viz, the non- intimate cause of the knowledge of separatedness is separatedness. It js like number in tts relation to eternal and transieit things ; viz. as the glass of unity ts eternal in eternal things, and transient in transient things, as transient unity is produced in the second moment after the production of the thing upon which it depends, and is destroyed, when this js destroyed, so the sane must be understood with regard to sepatatedness of two, three, &e. # (Vid. pe.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 63
116.—The second from the united action of both, the third from conjunction, Of the first is an instance that of the falcon and the rock.
117.—Of the second, the fighting of two rams ; of the third, the conjunction of the tree and the jar which is produced by the conjunction of the tree with one half of the jar.
118.—The conjunction which is effected by action is again two-fold, the one effected by violent, the other by soft motion $ the first is the cause of sound : .
119.—The second is aot the cause of sound. Disjunction comprehends also three kinds. ‘The one is produced by the action of one, the second by the action of two,
120,—The third by disjunction., ‘This latteg is again of two kinds; the one arives by the disjunction of the cause only, the other by the disjunction of the cause and noh-eause.”®
86.—Comm.—With regard to the two first kinds of disjunction, the same cvainples are to be understood as with regard to the two first hinds of conjunction, The third is again Avo-fold, viz. as produced cither by the disjunction of the cause, or by ghe disjtinction of the cause and non-cause, °
Where there is an action with regard to one half of a jar, there ensues a disjunction of the two halves, hence the destruction of the con- Junction forming the jar, hence destruction of the jar, heuce by the action, which consists in the disjunction of the half, the disjunction of the half of the jar from the other part of space, hence a destruction of the conjunction with the other part of space, hence the conjunetion with another part of space, hence the destruction of the action.......
Where by an action of the hand, a separationeof the tree and the hand takes place, there arises the belief that the tree is also separated from the body. Here in the separation of the body frome the tre is the action of the hand not the cause, because they are not at one and the same place. Again there is no action in the bodg, as the action of a compound is regulated by the actions of each of its parts; there- fore is here produced by the disjunction of cause* snd non-cause ०४० a disjunction of effect and non-effect. +
e * Cwase, as it appears, is here the tree.
64 Division of the Categories
12].—Posteriority and priority are two-fold with regard to time, or to space, and are only applicable to material bodies.
122.—Posteriority of place (distance) is perceived from a greater space intervening between the conjunction of the sun, priority (nearness) by the perception of less space.
123.—The non-intimate cause of them is conjunction of space which is the substrate of them.* Posteriority with regard to time is produced by the knowledg¢ of the anterior existence of the revolutions of the sun,
124.—Priority (recent time) मिण the knowledge of what succeeded the former. ‘The non-intimate cause of them is the conjunction of things which are in time.
126,—If the gomprehendjng intellect were destroyed, pos- teriority and priority would also be destroyed. Intellect has been previously nefrly explained.
126.—What is left, will now be explained. Knowledge is two-fold, wrong notion agd right notion.
127.—A knowledgeg which manifests something where this something is not present, is a wrong notion.” Of this there
are two kinds, mistake and doubt,
128,—The former is the certain knowledge of a thing where such a thing is not present, as for instance, the notion of the soul in the body, or yellow colour in a shell,
129.—Doubt™ is a knowledge in question, whether for in-
87.—Comm.—If a knowledge, which manifests something, 13 trans- ferred to somethitg else, and represents itself at the same time as certain, it is error; for instance, if the knowledge of the soul in such senténces as: “Tam tedilish,” &c., is transferred to the body, or yel- low colour to 4 shell. ¢ —Comm.—Doubt is a knowledge, determined by the contradic- tory absence or presence (of a predicate) in one and the same subject.
* Their substrate 1s: fear or'far with regard to space.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 65
stance a thing is a man or a trunk. A knowledge which does not manifest something, where this something is not present, but, which manifests this something alone, is certitude.
130.—The apprehension of absence and presence in one and the same object is doubt. The cause of doubt js the kyowledge of a general attribute, &e.” 5
e (The Bengalee Translation explains this ay follows: त doubt isa knowledge such as this: [sy this a man ora trunk १ This hind of doubt is called a doubt of four extfemes (चातुष्कीठिक.) because there are four extremes, viz. the notions of a man and non-mgn, and the notions of trunk and non-trunk. ‘The contradictory notions of presence and ab- sence are called extremes. If’ it is questioned, whether the mountain is fiery or not fiery, the doubt is, whether one of the two extremes fiery or not fiery abides in the mountain.) ४ 89.--Comm.—There are three causes of doubt.
1, Cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute which ia found in two extremes, for instance the nogion of height, found in trunk and non-trunk, as if it is doubted, whether éhis isa trunk or not a trunk, ध ;
2. Cause of doubt is a non-general (special) attribute, (Non- general is a predicate, which is not found in the subject of the two extremes ;) for instance, if the notion of sonnd, whieh is separated fiom the notions of eternal and non-eternal, (that is the notion of sound ig not the general notion, under whieh eternal and non-eternmal are com. prehended) is conceived in sonud, the doubt arises, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal,
3. Cause of doubt is contradiction (of two extremes) but not the contradiction, referring to the meré sound alone; 11५0१ a know ledge ot a general predicate of sound ig the cause of certitude only , for in- stance, if it is said: Sound is eternal, sound is not eternal hut ‘the knowledge of the two extremes, which is produced by, sound, The doubt takes place by the mind
Tn the same way, if there is a doubt, that a knowledge is proved there is also a doubt with regard to the object of the hnowledge
In the same way, if therg is a’doubt with regaml to a subject in its
66 Division of the Categories
131.—Defect® produces wrong notion, excellence right no- tion. There are different kinds of defects as bile, distance, &c,
132.—Excellence as regards perception is the intercourse of a sense with what is determinable, determined by its deter- mination, Excellence as regards inference
----------- ---
invariable contiexion with a predicate, there is also a doubt with regard to the predicate. But the cause of doubt is the knowledge of a sub- ject, determined by an attribute, or the intercourse of a sense with such a subject. :
90.—Comm.—Defoct is the cause of wrong notion, and excellence of right notion. Defects as for instance, bile, &c. are only of a con- tingent nature ;efor their causality iy established by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya and Vya- tiréka; if the defect is there, the notion is wrong, if the defect iy not there, the notion is not wrong). ‘That excellence is the cause of right notion, on the other hand, is established by simple inference ; for right notion is produced by cause, different fiom the general cause of knowledge, because it is a knowledge that is produced, as wrong notion is. It cannot be said, ^ thht the absence of defects is the cause.’ In the sentence, “the shell is yellow,” bile is the defect ; from this the right notion of shell is not obtained, because there is no authority to ascribe it more to the one member of the alternative than to the other, and it is right to assume a causality from one excellence in. preference to a causality from the absence of numerous defects,
Nor can it be said: ‘Let excellence even be granted, there is no per- ception of white colour in a shell, as bile is an obstacle to it; therefore the causality of the absence of detects, as for instance of bile, is necessary. Of What use is theif the assumption of a causality of excellence 7’ for in this case the causality of excellence is proved by the argument of a general attirmat&e and negative. In the same way it is well said, that the alsence of excellence is the cause of error
What are those detects? ^ Bile,” &¢. Sometimes bile is a defect, when-a yellow colour is mistaken for a white one (as in jaundice) sometimes distance, for instance if the moon, sun, &c. by their distance are mistaken for शवा bodies.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 67
133,—Is the consideration connected with the place (subject of conclusion) which is determined by the conclusion, [~ cellence, as regards comparison, is the knowledge of similar objects, derived from words possessed of power.
134.—Excellence as regards verbal knowledge is the right notion of consistency or of the intention, Right notion is a knowledge without error.” ;
135.—Or right notion i$ a knowledge which is. of such a kind and accordingly predicated. Aknowledge which 13 unde- termined, is neither right®notion nor error ;
136,—For that which is without determyiation and determi- nability is not comprehended under any relation, Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrenge of doubt.”
91,—Comm.—* Right knowledge is a knowledge without error.” As here the objection might be made, that,—if at the perception of silver and tin, both, silver and tin, are considered as silver,—also on the part of the silver a wrong notion is produced, becauge that knowledge is not fiee from error, a second definition is fiven Right notion is a knowledge which is of such a hind, and accordingly predicated.” Here it must be understood, that, under which relation the right: notion is perceived, under the same relation must be perceived that which is determined, and also the determination, Hence it is not against this definition, if a jar, ६९. is comprehended by the same conjunction as the two halves of which it iy composed, If this 1s the case, any thing without determination is no right notion, as there is no general notion, by which it is determined. A notion which is undetermined, is neither truc, nor false. , ५
92.—Comm.— Right notion is not perceived hy itself, but by the concurrence of doubt.” ,
Namely, the Mimdusakas say, that right notion is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus* a knowledge is aright notion by its
त
* Col. Misc. Essays, Vol. 1. p. 298. Nextto him (दा Kumarilaywami) 1१०४ writer usually cited uuder the title of Guru, more rarely under the designation of Vrabbakara. His work I had no bpportunity of examining with a view to the present
68 Division of the Cateyories
137.—The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition iy the non-apprehension of what gocs astray and the apprehen-
own manifestation. (Bengalee Tr. They state the object of knowledge, for instance of a jar, to be three-fold, viz. the jar, the soul, and the knowledge of a jar &e. in connexion with that which is to be proved, because by the “means of object of the knowledge, for instance of a jar, first the jr, further the soul, und lastly, the knowledge of the jar in connpsion with that which is to be proved, form one and the same knowledge, which may be pfonouneed in the sentence: “I know the jar,” which means, L have a hnowledge, which manifests a jar, &e.)
According to the ofinion of the Bhattas* knowledge is beyond the senses; the notion (class) of huowledge, produced by that knowledge (which is beyond the senses) is pereeptible ; by this (notion) knowledge is inferred (B. T. : According to the Bhattas knowledge, without determination as well as with determination, is beyond the senses ; but alter the knowledge of a jar there arises the notion of what is known with reference to the jar,&c. then the notion of what is known, viz. by me the jar is known,«is perceived, and lastly, “ T have a knowledge of a jar,” Xe. dettrmined by the notion of a jar, &e.)
According to the opinion of the Murdrinisras knowledge is obtained by reflection (B. ‘T. the Murarimisras say, that after the knowledge essay, and he is known to me chiefly from reference and quotations jas in Madhasa's summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Kumiarilas, and in the text and commentary of Sfstra-dipiha, where hiy positions are canvassed with those of numerous other writers,
# Td. p. 207. The annotations (Vartika to the Commentary of the Sutras of the Mimansa, by Subaraywami) are by Bhatt a Kunnirilaswam, who is the great authority of the Mimansaka school, in which he ts gmphatically designated by his title, Bhatta, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Subaia’s gloss, oftea delivers a different interpretation, &e. oo. Id. 298, Kuminia Bhatta figures greatly in the traditionary religious hftory of India. He was predecessor of Sankara Acharya, and equally rigid maintaining the orthodox faith against heretirs, who reyect the authority of the Vedas. He 1s considered to have been the chief antagonist of thé gect of Buddha, and to have instigated an extermmating persecution of that heresy ..... The age of Kumania, anterior to Sanhara, and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the Baudghas, goes back to an antiquity of much
more than a thousand year.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 69
sion of what does not go astray; sometimes doubt is removed by discussion.”
of ajar, Xe. there is the reflection, 1 know the jar, by this there is a knowledge, manifesting the knowledge of a jar, ६९.)
According to the opinion of all of them this or the other knawledge is right notion by a knowledge, manifesting this or the other knowledge ; for hnowledge is to be ascertaingd by its object ; therefore the object is to be known by the knowledge of knowledge, ‘This opinign is blamed inthe text: “ Right notion is not perceived by itself,” ६९. Ir right notion of knowledge were comprehended by itself, there would: be no doubt with regard to knowledge, produced by practice ; for if in this case hnowledge is known, also its right notion (evidence) is known ; hence how could doubt exist! On the other hand, if &nowledge is not hnown, then, in the absence of the knowledge of something determined by an attribute, how can doubt arise? Therefore Tight knowledge is an object of inference ; for instance; This hnowledge is right notion, because it 1s produced by the agreement of those who discuss on it, That, which is not of sucha hind, is not of sucha kind, as wreng notion, For instance : This hnowledge, the general notion of earth, is night Wotion, beeause the notion of knowledge, representing the general notiqn of earth, is found in that which has smell. In the same manner this knowledge of water is right notion, because the general notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of water, is found in that which has viscidity,
13.—Comm.—* The cause of the apprehension of a general propo- sition (Vyapti, the invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate) is the non-apprehension of what goes astray, and the apprehension of what does not go astray ; sometimes a doubt ix removed by discussion.”
The invariable connevion of a subject with a predicate (Vy pti) hus been before explamed, but not the fheaus of its appr®hension. This is now done in the text, viz. “The cause,” Ke. Ist, The non apprehen- sion of what goes astray* is the cause? since, if this apprehension thhes place, the general proposition (Vyapti) cannoPbe apprehended. The Apprehension of what does ngt go astray (of similar instanecs) is the
* Vyabhichdra: a reason goes astray, if it is connected with any subject, whete
the conclusion (major term) cannot ubigle, Sabachara ; a reason dues not go astray, Mit bas similar instances, in whith the couclusiou abides. .
70 Division of the Categories
138,—Specification is an attribute which is contained in the conclusion, but not in the reason.” Its chief points will now be explained. es cause, as proved by the argument from a general affirmative and a ge. neral negative (Ainvaya Vyatiréka, if there are similar instances, there is also the generhl proposition ; if there are no similar instances, there is no general preposition), Repetition (the repetition of similar instances) is no cause, since, although there be not an apprehension of what gocs astray, ‘yet the general proposition (Vyapti) is sometimes at once appre- hended. Sometimes, however, repetition is required to remove a doubt with reference to what goes astray. Where by repetition the doubt docs not disappear, discussion is required to guard against the con- trary supposition, For instance, if there is a donbt, whether smoke be not also found with something, where there is no fire, this doubt is removed by the consideration, that fire and smoke are in the relation of cause and effect. If this mountain is without fire, it must also be without smoke, because an effect is not without its cause. If it is sometimes without canse it is an effect without cause. In this case doubt arises, whick is to be removed from its obstacle, in such a man- ner: If an eflect ig withbut cause, fire is not the invariable means to produce smoke, or food to satisfy hunger. Where doubt does not of itself arise, there discussion is not necessary. With this view it is said in the text: “Sometimes doubt is removed by discussion,” *
94.—Comm.—" Specification is an attribute, which is contained in its conclusion, (major term) but not in its reason.”
“If this definition is correct, then in the inference: This man is black, because he is the son of Mittra,” the notion of the origin of black colour by her eating bad vegetables, would be no specification, because
क The Bengalee Translator says in iNustration of this: For instance if hearth is the subject (minor term), smoke the conclusion (major term), and fire the reason (middle term), then is wot fuel the Gpecification with regard to the faulty reason, viz, fire, because it ig the condition of smoke, but not of fire; for where there is smoke, there is necessarily also wet fuel; but where there is fire, there is not (ue- cessarily) wet fuel, as for instance d fiery iron-ball ; on the other hand, if there is a faultless reason, for instance, if mountain is the subject, fire the conclusion, and
smoke the reason, there is no specifyation, because the attribute, which is a condi- tion of the conclusion, fs also a condition of the reason.
of the Nydya Philosophy. a
139,—All admissible specifications abide in the same place with the conclusion, Those, which abide in the same place with the reason, go astray with regard to the conclusion.
it is not contained in the conclusion ; (black) for blackness is also found in a jar, Xe. :
Further In the inference : ‘ Air is perceptible” because it is the site of touch, the notion of proportionate greatness, would be po specifica- tion, because perception takes place alse with regard to the sdul, &e, where there is no greatness. °
"Nor would the notion of existence (WTaa,) bg a specification in the inference: “Destruction is transient from its being a production,” because the notion of something transient is also in antgecdent negation, and here, without any doubt, is not existence.’
We deny this ; for the meaning is, that the spécification, which is a condition of the conclusion, as determined by this or that attribute, is not a condition of the reason, as determined by the same attribute ; thus for instance the notion of a production hy bad vegetables is the condition of the blackness, which is determined by tke notion of son of Mittra. In the same manner is proportion&e greatness the condition of the perception, determined by the notion of external things. Thus in the inference: ^ Destruction is transient from its being a produc- tion,” is the notion of existence the condition of the conclusion, as de- termined by the notion of production.
In a faultless reason, there is no such attribute, viz. something, be- ing a condition of a determined conclusion (major tern), while it is not a condition of the reason under the same determination, But in a teason which goes astray, one of the two at least takes place, cither that the place of the specification, which is also the place of the con- clusion (major term) is the condition of the conclusion and the non- Condition of the reason, or that the place, where there is not the specitica- tion, which is also the place, determining the descnce of the conclusion, is the condition of the conclusion, and the non-condition of the reason,
.—Comm.— Specification is necessary to judge, where aereason ocs astray.” That is to say, the assumption of specification is neces- Sary to infer, that the conclusion goes astray, whiah takes place by the
72 Division of the Categories
140,—Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray.” It is the opinion of the Vaiséshikas that verbal
specification going astray. ‘Therefore, where there is a specification which is the condition of a conclusion without any further addition, there by the going astray of the specification which has no further addition, may be concluded also the going astray of the conclusion. For instance, where it is concluded that something smokes, from fire, there fite (aa the reason of smoke) goes astray with regard to smoke, because wet fuel gocs astray ; for, if the more comprehensive notion goes astray, it is necessary that also the more narrow notion goes astray. But where the specitication is of such a hind, as to be a condition of the conclusion (षण term) aj determined by any attribute (addition) how insignificant socver, there the inference, that the conclusion gocs astray, follows front the going astray of the specification in a subject, determined by such an attribute (addition,) for instance, if it is infer- red, that this person is black, because he is the son of Mittra, the notion : “a son of Mittra” goes, astray with regard to blackness, because with regard to the son,of Mittra, gocs astray the specification of a product of bad vegetables, #
96.—Comm.—" Verbal knowledge and comparison are not different kinds of proof.”
According to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas there are only two hinds of knowledge, viz. perception and inference, verbal knowledge and com- parison being included in the latter ; for such sentences as : ५ Drive the cow away by the stick,” or Vedaic sentences, depend upon the know- ledge of the connexion of the meanings of the words, which are re- collected by the object the speaker has in view, because all the words, which form a sentence, have intention, consistency, &e., as in the sentence: * Bring the jar,” &c.—Or: These meanings of words are mu- tuiily coitnected, because the words have consistency, &c., like similar meanings of words. ‘Tee same is the case with regard to comparison. When a Gayal has been perceived, the word Gayal is the cause of the powér-with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal, because the old have attached this meaning to it, no other kind of proof being admitte/|, as the word of tow is the cause of the power with
of the Nytya Philosophy. 73
knowledge and comparison, as included in inference, are not different kinds of proof.
141.—This is not correct, as, independent of inference, verbal knowledge and comparison are intolligible,
142.—The connexion of the subject with the predicate is two-fold,” one positive and the other negative; the? first has been explained, the other will now be explained:
------------------------- # - ~--- ~ -- ---- लः
reference to what is determined by the notion of cow, Or: The word Gayal is the cause of the poyer with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal on the ground, that trustworthy people have attached this meaning to it. By this inference the cause of the power ‘with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal is evident, viz. because there is a connexion of a general proposition wilh a minor term. .
This opinion is blamed in the text a the words: “This is not cor tect ;” for without the knowledge of a general proposition (of the Vy pti) an understanding is possible from the mere*words, ‘There is no proof, that after the hearing of words a general prdpositign is always neces. gary. Moreover, if it is assumed, that a general proposition (Vyapti) ig always required with reference to the understatling of words, why then is it not admitted, that it is necessary to assume a verbal huowled ge with reference to the understanding of an inference !
97.—Comm,—" The connerion of the subject with the predicate is twofuld.”
Namely, there are three hinds of inference, viz. ouly aflirmative, only negative, and aflirmative and negative at the same time,
1. The ouly attirmative kind takes place, when there are no dissie milar instances with reyard la the gonclusiaa (रु term, Chat ix to say, when the mayor term iy not exclu d from any other notion) for instance, if it iy argued, that something 13 an object of haowledye, because it can be named ; tor here is adissmmilyg in-tance impossible, aa every thing is an object of knowledge. ‘
If it is eaid, ‘that the only affirmative kind is imposible, beenuge itis separated from all other notions’ (that is to say, such a notion वि aepat rated from all other notions, ands cannot therefore be connected with all.) We deny this; for hat is separated, त दकता to all, and this 1g
74 Division of the Categories
143,—The necessity of the absence of the conclusion where there ia an absence of the reason, is the second.”
merely affirmative. Moreover,, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether,* &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that cther, space, &c. are not found any where, so it cannot be proved with regard to.such notions as knowledge, &c.)
2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar Subjects (of conclusiog) for instance in the inference: Earth is distinguished from all the other elements, because it is possessed of smell ;+ for in this case there is no sinilar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.
२, Affirmative and negative inference take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances (of the conclusion or major term) for instance: This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there are similar instances, ag a hearth, &e., and dissimilar instances, as a lake, Ke.
98.—Comm.—The cause of the negative conclusion is the knowledge of a general negate proposition, (Vyatirékavydpti). For this reason the text defines the notion ofa geucral negative proposition : “A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion” (major term) that is to say, a gcneral nega- tive is the absence of the retson, which (absence) is included in. the absence of the conclusion (major term), Here it must be understood, by what connesion, at what place, and by what notion the more ex- tensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows : by what connexion and notion the more comprehensive notion is compre. hended, bythe same connevion andnotion is also the absence to be deter mined, Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distjnetive relation, ९८, (see p. 7.) there
* Pratiyogi is that of which there isa heg ition (it is the contradictory opposi- tion to its own negation) for instance a jar is the Pratiyoai of the negation of a jar. Apratiyogi is a thing, of which there as no negation, as for instance space, which is every where, and of which it cannot anywhere be said, there is no space.
¶ Here ia earth th minor terut, the aonclusion the distinction from what is different fiom earth, and the reason smell.
of the Nyiya Philosophy. 79
144.—Presumption* is not considered as another proof, be- eause it is included in negative inference. TLappiness, the object of desire of all worlds, is produced by virtue.
1415,—Unhappiness the effect oft vice, is abhorred by all तणा scious beings. The desire of happiness and of freedom from unhappiness arises from the knowledge of either.” *
146.—There is a desire of obtaining the means for those ends (avoiding misery and gaining happiness) if there is hnowledge
: . fullows the absolute negation of the notidn of the other elements by the negation of the negation of smell + but where the more extensive notion of the other elements is comprehended by the retion of identity, there also is the negation of the other elements expressed by the relation of identity, Thiy is reciprocal negation, And lastly, when by the relation of conjyuction for instance the more extensive notion of fire with rezard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, in a tank also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of eonjungtion, Here is the cause of the apprehension of the general negative propmsition the huowledge of what agrees with a general negative. Others sty: ™ By means of the negative the general aflirmative ix understood, bud the hnowlede of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative the general proposition is understood, there it is called a negative inference. ‘The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first evident from single things, asa jar, Sc. and afterwards it is established for the notion of earth” Xe,
99.—Comu.—* The desire of freedom from unhappiness and of obtaining happiness arises from the knowledge of ejther.”
Desire is threefold, vis. the desire whose object [५ the last end, (summum bonum, which is not the means to accomplish ॥ ^; ject,) the desire whose object is a meals (fur १ hing else) aad the
desire of action, 1. The desire whose objedd is the layt end, Tle last end (कजं) 1१ * Vid. Col. भ. £. ४६. p. 303. Presumption (arthap uti, one of the five moda of proof of the Mindusakas) 18 deductyon of @ matter from that whieli could not else be. [tis assumption of a thing not itself pereured, But necessarily 110111८1
by another which is seen, heard, or proven.
26 Division of the Categories
of these means. The wish to act is the desire determined by what may be accomplished by action.
147.—The cause of this is the knowledge of what may be accomplished by acts and what may accomplish the object of a desire. The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle.'?
148.—According to others the canse of the wish to aet is the knowledge of what does not produce that abhorrence. The cause gf awrsion is the knowledge of what accomplishes things that are abhorred. Endeavour is of three kinds according to philosophers, viz. activity, cessation from activity and vital endeavour,
149.—The wish to act, the knowledge of what may be ac-
happiness and freedota from unhappiness. The cause of the desire of the last end is the knowledge of the same ; therefore it is of itself the object of man; for it follows from the definition, that any thing, which, when known, is desired by its own nature, is the object of man, and its full» meaning is, that it iy the object ofa desire, not dependent upon another desire.
2, The desire whose object* is a means (for something ele.) The cause of this is the knowledge of what accomplishes an object of desire.
३ The desire of action is’ the desire, whose object is an effect to be accomplished by action, which (desire) is determined by the notion of what may be accomplished by action, This depends upon an apprehension such as this: L shall accomplish cooking by action, The cause of the desire of action is the knowledge, that an object may be obtained by action, and the knowledge, that the object of desire may be obtained. Therefore there is tio desire of action with reference to rain, because it cannot be obtained by action,
f00.—Comm.—* The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle,”
क The object of a desire, indepepdent of anyrother desire, 18 the last object ; this is happiness and deliverance from unhappiness ; for buth are not desired for the sake of any thing else, but for their own suhe. An object of a desire, depending upon another desire, is a secondary object ; such are for instance, the fruition of love,
, eating, the removal of the unhappiness of another, the iefraining from desires, ०८,
of the Nydya Philosophy. 7
complished by acts and what accomplishes such or such a desire,
and the perception of the material causes produce activity. 150.—Cessation from activity rises from aversion produced
by'” the knowledge of what accomplishes abhorred objects.
101
15].—Vital endeavour is constant,’ it transeends the pers
ception of the senses'™ ; ५ : 152.—It is the cause of the flux and reflux of the vital airs in the body. Gravity abides in earth and water, itis imper- ceptible to the senses ; 90 153,—It is transient in, what is transient, and eternal in what is eternal. It is the non-intimate cause of the action which is called falling, ‘ 154.—Fluidity is twofold, innate and derived | from a cause 5 the first abides in water, the second in earth and light 5 155.—In the atoms of water it is etcral, in every other thing transient. Derived (uidity is produced in clarified butter and similar substances when heated hy the union with fire. 156.—Fluidity is the cause of tricking and instrumental cause in acollection (heap). Viseidity abides in water; it is eternal in atoms, non-eternal in a compound,
For instance, there Is no desire of action with regard to houey, mixed with poison, becuse the strong aversion is an obstacle.
(Material or intimate causes are those substances by means of which a desire is accomplished ; for instance the material causes of a sacrifice are: the presence of ghee, wood, rice, Xe.)
101.—Comm.—" Ig constant ; which means, it lasts ag long ag lite
does. ध ४ दु 102,—Comm.—" It transcends the perception of the senses, for the flux and reflux of the vital airs, whea stronger than usually tis aceon plished by endeavour, for instance a stronger iespiration (this is evident from perception). If this is the case, then from the inference, that the flux of the vital airs is accomplished by endeavour (fur there migtt be a cause of it) and further from the inadmiseibility of au endeavour tha} 15 perceived (for in the ordinary funetfon of tespgration, &c. it is vot perceived) it follows, tat the flux uf vital airs ts accomplished by sn
78 Division of the Categories
157.—By the abundance of this (viscidity) in oil combus- tion is favoured. There are three kinds of faculty, viz. velocity, elasticity and memory,
158.—Velocity abides only in bodies, and is twofold, either produced by action or by velocity.'"' Elasticity is according to some*only found in earth, according to others in the four first elements.
159.—It is imperceptible to the senses, and is sometimes the cause ef vibratory motion." The faculty which has the name of memory, is found only in sentient. beings ; it is impercepti- ble to the senses,
160,—Its cause is certitude without inattention?” Memory
is called also the cause of remembrance and of recognition,
endeavour, which transcends the perception of the senses, ‘This is vital endeavour,
103.—Comm.—" [८ is twofold, either produced by action, or by velocity.” Velocity in an arrow arises from action produced by eon- Junction without noise, (Wd. ४, 118,) henee from the destruction of a former action arises another action. In the same manner all the subsequent actions must be considered. And without velocity, sinee one action is an obstacle to another, the destruetion of a former action, and the production of a subsequent one were impossible, Where velocity is effected by velocity, for instance, where the velocity in a jar is effected by the velocity of its half, there is velocity, produced by velocity.
101.—Comm.— Elasticity is proved tor instance by the faet, that a branch which is attracted, returns to its former position, when released, The opinion of some, that elasticity abides in the four first elements, is not supported by any evidence,
Y03.—Comm.—" [15 cause is certitude without inattention.” If it is snid : ‘Ts certitude, diffrent from inattention, rather not the cause of remembrance?) And if this is the case, let us say, that knowledge in generat is the cause of memory.’
We object ; for १3 there is no authority of assuming an alternative, it is evident, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of
~ memory, Moreover, with reference to inatteittion, the assumption of
of the Nydya Philosophy. 70
161.—Fate is twofold, merit and demerit. Merit is the means by which heaven, &e. is obtained.' [tis a practice of ablutions in the Gangd, &c. and of sacrifices, &e.
162,—It is thought perishable by the contact with the water of the Karmandsé.* Demerit is the cause of hell, & ८. and is produced by blamable works,
163.—It may be destroyed by expiations, &e. ‘Both qualities abide in living creatures," + They are produced by desire and
destroyed likewise by knowledge!” न ध १
memory is complicated (supertluous) and henee it ig proved, that cer- titude, different from inattention, is the eanse ofancmory,
The proof of this is given in the words: © [tig called the cause of remembrance and recognition.” That ia to say, Memory produces re membrance and recognition ; therefore memory is assumed, for it is impossible, that a former pereeption produces, without intercourse, re- membrance, because a cause is Impossible, if it is not in respective ine tercourse with cither of the two (remembiance or reeognition,) Nor can it be said, ‘that, as memory, determiged by the category of identity, is the cause of recognition, remembrance Saoltained, beeauge Tecognition is produced by memory ;’ for there is ng cause for this,
106.—Comu.— Merit is the means by which heaven, Ke. iy ob tained.”
That is to say, it is the means of obtaining the happiness of heaven and all other happiness, and of bodies fit to enjoy the happiness of heaven,
107,.—Comm.—" In living creatures,” beeause merit and demerit cannot be assigned to God.
108.—Comm.—*" They are produced by desire, and destroyed 1116 wise by knowledges”
“ By desire,” that is to say, if good or bad acts are done by one whe has perfect knowledye, they are of na effect. “Likewise by know. ledge.’’ * Likewise” is said to indicate enjoyfient.
१ But how (it may be objected) can the knowledge of truth destroy merit and demerit? for this (the destruction of merit and तनि
* The name of a emall river, whichsscpirates the 1 + +| of Bunsres, Kasi, from Bihar.—Vid, Lassen's Ind. ‘Alterth. Vol. 1. pe 1g, च
80 Division of the Categories
164,—There are two kinds of sound, inarticulate and arti- culate; the first is produced by a drum, &c. and the latter, as ka and other letters, by the contact of the throat with the palate. ५
163,.—Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when iteis produced in the car.” Some say, its production takes place liké a succession of waves.
would be contrary to the passage (of the Yoga-sistra): “An action, of which the fect is not eapcricuced (which has not produced its due consequence in the soul of the agent, viz, happiness, if a good action, and unhappiness, if a bad oue) does not perish even in a hundred crores of Kalpas.” Uf thiy is the case, then the destruction of merit aud demerit takes place in this manner, that a person who knows the truth, experiences the consequences of all Ais works at once by all his bodies.’ (viz. all the bodies which he is to assume in future births.)
There, Aowever, “ to experience the consequences of works,” is only given १8 an example of the varions ways, in which works are destroyed according to the Vedas, Mow could otherwise works be destroyed by expiations? Xe. It is said (in the Bhagavadsita.) + The fire of know- ledge consumes गिण. And in the Srati: “ All his works perish, when the general afd individual souls are known,”
If it is said: ‘Tu this ense there cannot exist for him who knows truth, the state of the body, nor happiness, unhappiness, Xe. as by knowledge all works are destroyed,’ we object ; for only the works dif ferent from those which are commenced, are destroyed ; for only the work which is the cause of the enjoyment of this or that body, has been commenced,
109.—Comn.—" Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear,”
Abiding in the ether, means, that the ether is its ‘utimate cause, As a sound, when distant, is not perceived, it is said, “in the ear.” As it may be doubted, how, a sound, produced in the space determined by adrum, ९९.११३ produced in the ear, itis said: “ Its production takes place like a succession of waves,” its soul produces another, determined bya space, external to the first, and the second produces again a third, and so णा, In this mannen it is, perceived, when it is gradually produced in the car.
of the Nyiya Philosophy. ४1
166.—According to others, like the bud of the Kadamba "From the knowledge,’ that the letter ka is pro- duced, and that it is destroyed, non-eternity of sound would
plant.
follow. : 167.—The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon
Mtg
the perception of general knowledge. Titis is the medicine,”
such and other sentences depend upon general knowledge,
ep hate dn gy 0 Pees
110.—Comm.—"' Like the bud of the Kadamba plant,” In this manner: From the first sound ten sfinds are produced in the ten di- visions of space. Hened ten other sounds are produced, As thig assumption is complicated, it is said in the tert: “according to some.”
111.—Comm.— From the knowledge,” &e. To remave the objec tion, that sound is not produced, because it is eternal, it is said: ५ From the knowledge,” &c. |
112.—Comm.—IFf it be objected ; ‘The eternity of क्तात follows trom the fact, that this Ietter ka is rgcognised ay that letter ka,’ the text gives the answer: The hnowledge, that this hats chat ha, depends upon community of class, Xe. Here is the obfeet of recognition, the community of class of this and that object, but vot the identity of this and that individual; because it is contrary to the knowledge which has been mentioned, If this is the case, there cannot be a mistake with regard to those two perceptions (viz. sound is not eternal, and this is that sound).
CONTENTS.
1.—Division of the cuteyortes (1 to 8.)
1. Enumeration of the categories, 0.0.0... १११०१, vege Page 1 2. Division of तपश, ,१,११११..१.१.१.११०१५....... ५--4 ५, ~ प अ. 4 4. — actiun, ,,,० aieiacgs elvis tole, bisa bres aS ah, 2, Detimtion of generality (class), ,,१,१.१११११११.,१,०,.,....... 4-5 6. ---- particularily, ५०००१ ११११११०११११००१११०००.,....५ 6 7. Division of negation, oo... cece १.१११.१११ १,,...१,.. Pd H.—Common and distinguishing characters of, the categories (8 to 12.) 1. Common notion of the categontes, oc. cece cc ccee as ceee ..... 8 2. Definition of cause,...... ७०.०५ 9
3. Division of cause (into intimate, non-intingte and imstrumental
CAUSES) p00 cece ee ee ११.०.००... Dm lO
५११५५१५०... 12
4. Semblance of cause,.........0006
, II1.—Substunce (12 (० 49.)
A. Substance in general. Detinition of substance, .......- भ 1 wit eo goa eesae a. 12 Its division into material and non-material substances, so... 6.08 16. Common and special qualities of the several substances, ०००१००११ 1.4
B. Special substances,
11 00 14 2, Water, 15 1h,
3. Fire,.
Air, ११११७११ १११११११११११११११.१०१००१०१.००००००३.......... LIANG
4 Go TIME): न 9161 6
SOUL म Vets Nead Gee ५४४५ LT Proofs of ite exietences...s cece ce ceeesens क ११,००१०१०,,, cess Liao ts nature, 2... ..e00- thes 25 Division of intellect (गाल its qualities) into apprehension and,
[| 1 ग the a. Apprehension, (p. 25 to 49.) + Four kinds of apprehengion, perception, inference, @ompatison and tb,
verbal knowledge, ,११११११११११११११५११११११११०००१९ |
५
ee,
dd
Contents.
aa, Perception (25 to 30.)
Perception by common intercourse, Its division into six kinds,., 25—2 Perception by transcendent intercourse. Its division into three
1. eer er seer rere r Ce rrr eer ry er re rrr omens ser |
bb, Inference (p. 30 to 40.)
a, Regular syllogism, (p. 30 to 31.) Thtercourse ‘in inference,.. +. 30--31 . ५1 ------ of the invariable connevion of the subject with the pre-
^ ००५०१
finitio’ ; \ Definition of connideration,....cesscecececeseeece
dicate in a general proposition (Wyapti, major proposition), .. 31 © ——— of the minor term in a syllogism (Paksha),....0. 0006 २२ of the conclusion, ११११०१०१ ५५११००१५१००००,०१९ 33
8. Fallacy (p. 31—30.) Division of falldey, 2 4 ५।
Going astray, ११११११११ ११०१११०११११११११०१०१०१,,....०.३--5
११०००००००००९ 37
Contradi€tion, os secseree
eee eee eee ern en)
Inconclusiveness,..«
Eequalication, se ccse cess cece seen ne ce cece eens ents ee eeen ee 39 AbsUriily, च न ee ee erence een ee eae teens 10 . Comparison (p. 40.)
Nature of cOMparisony. cece ११११११११ ०१ १०११०११००११११११००१०० 40 . Verbal knowledge, (p. 11 to 48.)
Cause of ष्ण huowledge,.. मन जज ०6 41
Power of a छता, ११११११५०१०१११०१०१०१०१०००००१०.००........--11
Implication,.. 15-16
Coutiguity, ११११११११ बब १११००११ eee ee ssececcren ce ss MGA] Consisteneyycccecees ce cese cece ene nee ee tt ee cece ee ee eees 18
Construction, ०९११११११ १११११ ०१११११११११०५०००१,१०००.. ib,
Intentions... cccece ce ७००००० १५ ०१००१११११११११११११११०० ९५
Mind, (1. 19.)
न्व
Its description, | ११११११११ १५११ ब१ गब ११ ११ ११०१११०११११११०१११००. 49 Its atomic nature, ०००५७ ०७०५०० ७०७५१ ०१००००००००००१ ab, ४, Recollection, १११११०११ ०११५ ११ ००११०१०१११११११११५१०१००००००.. 1.
LV.—Quality, (50 ८० 81.) |
A. Quality in general, (p. 50 to 54.)
Nature of quality, ११११११११ seca ०१११११०००.१ 50 Material qualities ,११११११०१५१००००००००१ concen eee DIO Immaterial qualities, . . ५५५ 92
Special qualities, १११७१ समब ११११११११ 53 General qualities... cc seer cece ee eee ee ne en eee ee ee renee SBE B. Special qualities, (p. 54 to 81.) 1. Colour,....' 2. Taste, ..
००११५११५ १५११११० १००१०१५०००००९०
Contents. iii
3. Smell, ११०११११११०१०१११००१११११५११०१०१११०११०००१११००००००००१, a5 AEST OUCH 4 i cec see side ce be Cia 111 99 Qualities 86 effects, १११०१११ ११ ११००११०१ ०११००१०००००००००..००२ 55
Opinion of the Vaiséshikas thereon, १११११११११०१००१....१..,..५5--59
Nydyathas thereon, 5४ 59
1,111.11 11101171, (1 . व 6, Measure, ,,१११५१००० ००११००११ ११०००१० ११०१०११००११०.०००००५, ,.(1--62
o
7, Separatedness, ११५११०११ १११०११ ११ १११११११११०००.१.,........ 62 8, Conjunctiony.. ११११११५१०१११११११०११०१००१००१०१०००.००००.......२- (6)
॥ वि 9, Disyunction, १११११११ ११ १११११०१ ११०११११००१००००१०१००० Os G4
10. Postertorityyes oececeseoee
11. Priority, cose १११११११० erence se nc १११११११११११११११००१००० 10. 12, Intellect, (p. 01 to 71.) a, Wrong notion, (p. 61 to 66.) Mistake, .. Doubt, .
eer ere ee eer eee ee ere eer ee 61
णव 0 दन र 0.10.)
ove
Cause of doubt, ११११११०१ १११११ ११११ ११११११११०१११०.०००. 171 ,
Cause of wrong NOtion, ११११०१११ १११०११११ ०ब बद ००११११०१००.०१९ 66
b. Right Notion, (p. 66 to 74.) Cause of right notiony.e ce cece cece ec ee ence sence sentence ee OG O27 Denmition of right notion, ११११११११ ce Meee cose noes seeeaece 67 Apprehension of a general proposition (Vydpt,) oo... eee ee G8 69 -
Specitication, co cece ce cece cece cece ee en ens sete ster cece ce dl -72
Division of inference into affirmative and negatyye. Nature of
negative inference, र ८५... ,.74-7।
13. Happiness, ० ०००९ 75 14. Unhappiness, th 13. 1८.1९, ce ee ee a bate 177 11) 76 16, Averstotiee ०११११११ ०११११०११११ seer ae ११११११५०१११११११००.१. th.
17. Endeavour, cccocscecccccccccetrceceseeeserres १,५००.०. ~ oH nee 76
BL 1 cece ce en cee en ence ee coat en aan ane e es en eens
Db. cessation from activity, १५११११११ ११११५०० ११११११०११०१००५ 77 ००००० oe wh,
९. vital endeavour, ,,,५.११११११११११११११० ००००५५५
18. Gravity, ११०११ १०००००००१ इ 1८, 19. Fluidity, ,,..१ ११००० 1.7 oth,
20. Viseudity, 2... 21. Faculty, . a. Velocity,
Serre fied 7
^ 2#
०१११ ०११११११११५१११११११११५११ ११११११११ ११५०५०००
४. Elasticity, ,११०१११५१११११ १११११११ १११११०५ + tb Ce MeinOryyse ce cece cane cone ११११ बब ११११५ १५१११०१११११०१००१० Fit th
22—23, Fate (merit and demerit,) १,०१.१, QO es 71
24, Sound, कम ५.०.,...8--४।
CORRECTIONS AND EMENDATIONS.
—_
for in read of.
for with read to.
Sor with read to.
Sor faculties read modifications.
for drishtanta read drishtanta.
for negation read attirmation.
for समब read समव
Jor individuality real separatedness,
Jor priority and posteriority regd posteriority and priority. Jor volition read endeavour.
for संयोगविभागेश्च read संयागविभागेषव
for with read to,
for with read ८०,
for after earth add and mind.
Sor Wea real AEA
for individuality read separatedness.
for priority, posteriority read posteriority, privity.
for volition read endeavour.
Jor volition read endeavour
Jor priority and posteriority read posteriosity and priority. Jor is read in ’
for priority and posteriority read postertority and priority. Jor priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority. Sor लान read लात् ^
for such read touch,
Jor individuality read separatedness.
for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority.
for with read to.
Jor Mimausikas read Mimansakas,
for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority,
=
for > ditto * read Uitto. for ditto read ditto, for ditto read ditto,
for natural read innate.
N.B. The translation courts one verse more than the original, as the invocation, forming the first verse of the furmer, has nov been | taken into the text of the latter.
अय सिद्वानमुक्तावलीसदितभाषापरिचछेदः।
भाषापरिच्छेदः ॥
ayaa ॥ ॐ नमो गणेशाय ॥ नूतनजलधररचयै गोपवधूरोदकूलोराय |
भिद्धान्तमृक्राक्ली॥ AFMALT | ॐ नमे TINTS ॥ चूडामणीहतविपुवलवीरतवा सुः \ , भवा भवतु भयाय लोलाताण्डधपणिटितिः ॥ प्रतिज्ञा ॥ निजनिभ्िंतकारिकावलोमतिसंरिप्रविरन्तमोकरिभिः । विषदीकरवाणि कीतुकान्नन् राजवद् यावश्रम्बदः॥ यन्धप्रं सनेन तक्मतिपाद्यकथयनं ॥ UA गणगम्फिता सुहृतिनां सत्ककणं ज्ञापिका सक्छामान्यविशेषनिद्यमिलिता भावप्रकं ज्वला | विष्णोवक्तसि विश्वनायहृतिना शद्धानमूक्रावलो विन्यस्ता ara मदः वितनता सथक्रिरेषा चिर ॥ , विघ्नविघाताय हतं मङ्गलं faufwere निबभ्राति। नतनेत्यादि | मैन मङ्गलं न fame ufa a ar
९ a संसारमरर्दस्य भाषा० AH नमः HUY संसारमरीरदस्य वोजाय ॥
fagre समाधिं प्रति कारणं विनापि aye नासिकादीनां aa भिविवत्रपरिममा-तनिदेनादिति चेत् । न। श्रविगीतिष्टा चारविषयतेन मङ्गलस्य सफलत्वे सिद्ध तपर च फलजिज्नामार्या स्वति दृष्टफलकतवऽदृ ट फलकन्पनाया अ्रन्यायतात् ‘sufaaare । समाः रेव fe ae कल्प्यते । दूत्यश्च यत्र मङ्गलं न दृश्यति तत्राधि जन्मान्तरीयं तत् कस्ते । यतर च सत्यपि aye समा्धिनं दृश्यते तच बलवत्तरो तरित्री विघ्र प्राचे वा वेध्यं । wecerea बलवन्तरविप्रनिरा- करणकार णवं 1 विघ्र्व॑सस्तु area aicfaars: | न्या , मङ्गलस्य fame एव फलं । मभात्िस्त वुद्धि- प्रतिभादिकारणकलापात्। न च खतःसिद्धविश्नविर्द- वता कतमङ्गलस्य निष्फललापत्तिरिति वाचं दष्टा पत्तेः विप्नाश्डया तदाचरणात्। तथैव भिष्टाचर- णाच । न च तस्य निष्फलले तद्ाधकशिष्टाचारान्- मितवेद प्रामाश्छा पक्तिरिति वाश्यं। सति विन्न तन्ना- wea वेदभोधितलात्। wa एव पापभमेण छतप्राय- fawe निफशवेऽपि म तद्धाधक्वेदाप्रामाणं । मङ्ग- wy ब्रविप्ध्यंसविभेषे कारणं । विग्नध्नंसविगेषे च विनाथकल्वपाटठारि। afee विप्रात्यन्ताभाव एव समाभिसाधनं | परतिबन्धकसंमनौमावसेव कार्णजनक-
भाषा fagte
र्यं गुणसथा कमम सामान्यं सविशेषं |
लात्। इत्यञ्च मारिकादिकतगरन्येषु अन्मानरोयम- क्गलजन्यद्रि तध्वंसः खतः सिद्ध विप्नात्यन्ताभावे वा- रोति न व्यभिचार cars: संसारेति । dare va मरोर TIVE वीजाय | एतेन Sq? प्रमाणमपि afad भवति। तथादि। यथा घटादिकं acne तथा चित्यङ्ुरादिकमपि। न waa कटठ॑लमस्मदा- दीनां सम्भवतील्यतस्तत्कदरवेनेश्वरसिहिः ।. न ख शरोराजन्यलेन कक्तजन्यलमाधकन. सप्मतिपक्त दृति वायं । ्रप्रयोजकलात् । मम तु कर्टलेन कार्यमेम काणकारएभाव एव श्रनकूलतकं; । द्ावाभूमो जन- यन्देव एक We विश्वस as भुवन गोप्ता इत्या दयश्रागमा श्रणनुसन्पेयाः॥
पदा्ानामुरेशमाद | ea गृणा इत्यादि । मप्र मख्ाभावलकथयनादेव षां भावं प्रापनं तेन WIAA प्रथ गपन्यामा न हृतः । एते च Ize वगशपिकप्र सिद्धा नेयायिकानामण्यविर्द्धाः । प्रतिपादतघवम Bra) श्रत एष उपमानचिन्तामणा सप्तपदायभिन्न तया शरक्रिसादृ योारतिरिक्रपदूार्थवमाण्रड्धितं। नन् कथमेत एष पदाचा; इक्रिमादृश्रादीनामणतिरिक्र पदायल्वात्। aufe, मण्यादिममवहितिन afeat दाहा न जनते ET तु जन्यते तत्र मण्यादिना
४
भाषा समवायसथाऽभावः पदाथः TA कीर्तिताः॥ १॥ Freda मरदरोमकाला दिग्देदिनो At | fagre तै दा्ानुकरूला शक्तिनौ शते उन्तेजकेन AUTEN सरणेन च जन्यत दति कर्ते । एवं सादृ खमणति- , fem: पदार्थः, afg a षट्पदार्थषवन्त॑वति सामान्ये ऽपि wera यथा गेलं fray तथा श्रश्ववमपीति सादृश्यप्रतीतेः । नाभावे | स्वेन प्रतीयमानवा- दितिन्चेत्। न । "मणयाच्भावविशिष्टवद्चादेदहादिकं प्रति aaa मण्छभावादेरेव वा हेतुलकन्यनेन सा- HTS ्रनन्त्क्रितदमा गभावध्व॑सकल्यनानेचित्यात्। a चोन्तेजको.सति मरिप्रतिबयकसद्ापेऽपि कथं दाह fa वां । उण्तेजकाभावविश्िष्टमणिसामान्याभावस्य Yaar । षादृश्रमपि न पदाथोन्रं किन्तुतद्धि- aa सति agauaradad । यथा चन्रभिन्नते सति चेश्रगताहादकलादिमच्वं मुखे TRI TR- मिति॥ ९॥ द्रव्याणि विभजते fearfafa 1 एतानि नव द्र व्याणि cau: । नन द्रवयलवजाति fa arts नदि तजर प्रत्यकं परमाणं धृतजतुप्र्टतिषु द्र यलायरहादिति चेत् । म। कार्यंखमवाचिकारणएतावच्छेदकतया संयो- गख विभाग वा समवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया तद्सिद्धिरिति ॥ नम् द्रम TAMA: BAT नोक ।
१
MMe RAN ऽथ गुण SG रसे गन्धस्ततः परं ॥ २॥ खशः संख्या परिमितिः प्रथक्ताच्च ततः परं । संयोगश्च विभागश्च RATATAT ॥ ३॥ द्धिः ae दुःखमिच्छ देभा यल TRA | द्रवत्वं सेदसंस्कारावदैषटं शब्द एव च ॥ ४॥ SHAT तताऽवक्तेपनमाकुष्चनं तथा । प्रसारणश्च गमनं HATTA पच्च च ॥ ५॥ भ्रमणं रेचनं स्यन्दनो ईनज्वलनमेव च।
fagte तद्धि प्रतयचेण Twa | तस्य च EVITA कमवव च दर यलं। तश्च गन्धभरन्यलात् न weal नीलद्टपव्लाख न जलादिकं | amas चालाकनिरपच चचुः कारणं दूति चेत् ।न। चरावष्ठकतेजाऽभाविनोपपन्नै दर यान्तर्- HMA RABAT | पवन्ताप्रतीतिग्ठ BAH | कश्मव्लप्रतोतिरपि श्रालोकापसाररपाधिकी भानि- रेव । तमसेऽतिरिकवेऽनन्तावयवादिकम्यमागारवश्च स्यात | खलस्य यथा तेजसखन्तभीा वस्तथा वच्यते ॥
गणान विभजते । श्रथ गणा इति । एते गृणखतु- fanfaagat: कणादेन कण्ठतद्यश्ष्टेन च दर्शिताः aa गणलादिकजातिसिद्धिरये वच्छत ॥ ९॥२॥४॥
कमणि विभजते । उत्सेपणमिति | कमलजांतिमु, प्रत्य्मिद्धा | एवमुक्तेपणलादिकमपि । नन्यत्र wa
९
भाषा” MANTA गमनादेव लभ्यते ॥ ६ ॥ सामान्यं द्विविधं प्राक्त परश्ापरमेव च। ्रवयादितिकवृत्तिसु सत्ता परतयोच्यते ॥ ७॥ परभिन्ना च या जातिः सैवापरतयोच्यम ।
सिद्धा णादिकमपि पचकराधिकतया कुतो नोक्रमत we भमणमिद्यादि ॥ ५॥६॥ सामान्यं frevafa । खामान्यमिति | तक्ञचणन् fama सत्यमेकषमवेतलं । श्रनेकषमवेततं संयागादी- माम्यस््त उक्तं faa सतीति । निल्यते सति समवेतत्वं गगशपरिमाणादीनामयस्यत उक्तं । Wa केति, faga सत्यनेकट्िवमद्यनाभावे ऽथस्यते इत्तिलसामान्यं विहाय समवेतलमिलयुक्ं । एकमात- afmefad न जातिः । तथाचेोक्रं। यक्तेरभेद स्तुल्यं शद्रा ऽथानवस्यितिः। रूपहानिरसम्नन्धा जाति- वाधकसङ्गुदः ॥ एकवयक्तिकलादाकाश्रलं न जातिः । तुस्ययक्निकलात् टलं Read न जातिदयं । TET ward, भूतलं मूर्तं ग जातिः । श्रनवस्याभयात् सा- “ मान्यल न जातिः । विशेषस्य व्याटखभावस्य रूप- डानि स्याता faded a जातिः। समवायषब्ब- नभाभा्वीत् उमवायो न आतिः ॥ इव्यादीति । परल अधिकरेशरटृन्तिले । श्रपरलं अन्परग्ररल्िलं ।
9
माषा० द्रव्यतवादि कजातिखु परापरतयोच्यते ॥ ८॥ व्यापकत्वात् परापि स्थाद्माप्यलादपरापि | अन्तो नित्यद्रवयवतति्व्वशेषः परिकीर्तितः ॥ ९ ॥ घटादीनां कपालादे AIT गुणकरः । '
सिद्धा ° षकलजात्यपेचयाऽधिकरेगरटत्तिवात् सत्तायाः परल |
एतद्वोधनायैव द्र वयादिचिकटत्तिरिल्युक्ं । तदपेक्या चान्यां जातीनामपरलं | परभिक्ना बत्ताजिन्ना । व्यापकल्ादिति॥७॥८॥
प्रथिवीलाद्यपेचया व्यापकलादधिकरेश्रटृत्तिवात् RMA: परलं | षन्नापेच्चथा Baa अ्न्पदेभ- इत्तिलाच द्र यवसयापरवं । तथाच "धम्मंदयममावे- शरादुभयमविरदधं ॥ | ।
fay निरूपयति । wa tial अन्ते श्रवलानं वर्तत Tard: । यद पेत्तया विशेषा नासतोत्यथः | एक- माचटृन्तिरिति फलितार्थः । घटादीनां द्णुकपग न्तानां तत्तदवयवभेदात् परस्परं भेदः | परमाणुनां परस्थरमेदकेा विशेष एव । सतु खत Ua याटन्तः। तेन तच विग्रेषान्तरापे्ता माखौति भावः॥९॥
waara दशर॑यति। घटादीनामिति । श्रवयवाव- यविनाजातिया्ोर्ुणगुणिनोः करियाक्रियावतेनिं्यद्र, व्यविगरेषयोख्च यः waa: ख समवायः । समवायं
[4
भाषा" Ay जातेश्च स्नन्धः समवायः परकीर्तितः ॥ १० ॥ अभावस्तु दिधा संसगोन्योन्याभावमेदतः।
fagt ° निह्यसमरभले | तच परमाणन्त॒ गृएक्रियादिविशिषटव्- द्विविगेषण्विगेग्यसम्बन्धविषया विभिष्बुद्धिवात् दण्डो परुष इति विभिषटबद्धिवत् त्यनुमानं । तच der गादिवाधात् समवायसिद्धिः। न च खरूपसम्बन्धेन fagarest श्रथान्तरं वा । श्रनन्तखदूपाणां waa mama ओरवात्। लाघवादेकममवायसिद्धिः। न च समवायेकले वायौ रुपवत्ताबुद्धिपरसङ्गः । तच रूपसमवा यसन्येऽपि रूपाभावात् । न तेवं WATTS वैशिष्ै सेनन्ध्ान्तरं सिध्येदिति वाद्यं । तस्य नित्यते भूतले घटानयनानन्तरमपि घराभावनद्धिप्रसङ्गात् | चटाभावषब्बन्ख्य' तत्र स्वात् aw नित्यलात् | saat देशामरोऽपि त्मतीतिनं war वैग््छस्य च तत्र स्वात् | मम तु मते घटे पाकरक्रतादश्रायां WIAEIS नष्टवान्न तदत्ताबद्धिः । पैशिश्चस्यानिव्यते तल्ननप्ैशिश्यकस्पने तवेव गारवं। tery तत्तत्का- “ लीमतन्तद्रूतलारिकं तन्तदभावानां सम्बन्धः Le अभावं विभजते । अ्रभावस्िति । श्रभावलं द्रया रिषटकान्योन्याभावलं । संसर्गेति | ससगाभावान्यान्या- भावमेदादरिव्यथंः ॥ अन्योन्य भावखेकविधला नदि-
(4
भाषा० प्रागभावस्तथा ध्वंसोऽप्यल्यन्ताभाव एव च ॥ ११॥
fagte भागाभावात् संसगोभावं विभजते । प्रागभाव दति । संसगभावलं श्रन्योन्याभावभिन्नाभावलं'। अन्यान्या waa ताद् क्यमन्बन्धावद्धिननप्रतियागिताकाभावलं | विना खभावलं प्रागभाववं । जन्याभा वलं ध्वंसं । नि- त्यसंसगाभाववं श्रव्यन्ताभावलतवं। थत्र तु भूतलादौ चटादिकमपसारितं पुनरानीतञ्च तत्र, घटकालस्य सम्नन्धाघटकतया श्रल्यन्ताभावस्य .नित्यलेऽपि az- काले न घटाल्यन्ताभावबुद्धिः | तच उत्पारविनाश्- शालो चतुथोऽयमभाव दूति केचित् । wa ध्वंम- मागभाकयोरधिकरणे ना्यन्ताभाव ईति माचोन- मतं प्रामघरे रक्ता नासीति THES श्यामा ना- सीति wry प्रागभावं घ्वंष॑ञ्चावगारतेन तु तदद्यि- माभावं। नव्यास्तु ae विरो मानाभावात् ष्वंमा- दिकालावष्छेदेनाणव्यन्ताभावे aia एति wre: wae श्रभावामामधिकरणत्मकलं लाघवादिति चेत्। म । अनेन्ताधिकरणात्मकलकम्पमा मपेच्छानिरिक्रक- पनाया एव लधोयसषात्। UTE ्राधाराधैवभा- वाशणपपश्चते । एवश्च तत्तच्छब्दगन्धरसाद्यभावारनां प्रत्यलत्वमपपद्यते। waar तत्तदधिकरणा्नां aa दिष्टिवाणामग्राह्यलादप्रत्यचलं Bla | एतेन ज्ञान-
१ 0 भाषा० एवं बेविध्यमापन्नः संसर्गाभाव TAA ।
सप्तानामपि साधम्य भनेयत्वादिकमुच्यते ॥ १९॥ द्रव्यादयः पञ्च भावा अने समवायिनः।
fegr विगरेषकालविभरेषा्यात्मकलमल्यन्लाभावस्येति WEN । श्रप्र्ललापत्तेः॥ ९९ ॥ इदानीं पदानां साधम प्म वक्त प्रक्रमः | शप्तामामिण्यादि । समाना walt येषां ते aya. , सोषा भावः साधये । समाने wal दति afeara: | एवं faggr wat येषां ते विधश्मीणक्तेषां भाते प्रधम । विरुद्ध wa दति फलितार्थः । Hae ज्ञान. विषयता ।. षा च wae) रश्वरादिन्नानवि षथताथाः केवलाग्वयिलात् । एवं अभिपेयलप्रमेव- त्वादिकं Arq ae tl cafe) xe एकर्मंसामान्यविशेषाणां साधम मनेकलं *भावत्वं खमवायिलश्च । यथ््यनेकलं श्रभावे ऽसि तयाणयभेकल्मे ति भावलं पञ्चानां साधम्य । तथाच अनेकभावटृ्रिपद्ाथेविभाजकोापाधिमत्वं फ- feard: । तेन घटादौ waa नोव्यातनिः । श्म- वाथिलं षमवाथसम्बन्पेन cafe ग तु समवा यवचचं | खामान्यादाबभावात्। तथाच षमवेतटक्िपदाथविभा- अको पाधिमस्व फलिताः । तेन जिच्यङ्गयेषु avert:
* wqeryfra tag \
११
भाषा सकतावन्तसछयस्त्वाद्या गुशादिर्निगुणक्रियः ॥ १३॥ सामान्यपरिरीनासु TH जात्यादयो मताः |
मिद्धा amram दति द्रष्यगुकग्मणां सप्ावत्वमि्य्धः । गृणादिरिति। यद्यपि गृणक्रिया ्एुन्वमा धकशषणे घटा दावतिगयाप्तं क्रियाग्रुन्यवश्च गगणादा वतियतं नथापि गुणवद टत्तिध्ोवंलं कमंवद टत्तिपद्ायैविभाजकोपा- विमलं acd: । नहि घटनादिकं cad षा गृणव- दटत्ति aaaqefa वा किन्तु गुणलारिकं । तथा आकाश्लादिकन्त् न पदार्थविभाजकोपाधिः*॥९२॥ सामान्येति । सामान्यानधिकृरणवं सामान्यादोना- मित्यर्थः ॥ पारिमाण्डल्येति । पाठिमृाण्डल्यं णप रिमाणं। कारणव तद्धिन्रानामित्यगयेः । ्रणपरि- माणं नतु कस्यापि कारणं । तद्धि SAAT: परिमाणारम्नकं भवेत् । तख न सम्मतति । परिमा- णस्य खसमामजातीयाक्छषटपरिमाणजनकलात् | मद- दारस्य ALATA | श्रणजन्यस्याणएलगलप्रमक्गाच | एवं परुममरत्परिमाणं श्रतीद्धियसामान्यं विगरेषा-
‘ag avefua सति ametue सति वा ठतदव्यन्नार्विद्ठन्बाना wa विवचितं 1 गल्कमोपाराभिवारशौीय सना यापति। बाति मदमा fafa CAA न देषः । eT CRATE TG Aaa arfaarceary आतीति। qurasfaaniaarona urratafes aw, agin सलायाप्यातिद्रयलं ae cera । yaaa पाठः प्र्टतानपयागिन्वात् पकाकराह्हिकितारौधामनिनिः।
१९
भाषा पारिमाण्डल्यमिन्नानां कारणत्वमुदाहतं ॥ १४ ॥
4
अन्धथासिषटिशल्यस नियता पव्वव्तिता। कारणत्वं भवेत्तस्य वैविध्यं परिकीर्तितं | १५॥ `समवायिकारणत्व ज्नेयमथाप्यसमवायिरेतुतवं | एवं न्यायनयश्चैसुतीयमुततं निमित्तरेतुलं ॥ ९९ ॥
fagre सखेति Ara. इदमपि airfares विषयस्य न का-
Twa | ज्नौयमानसामान्यं न प्रत्यासत्तिः । ज्ञायमानं fag नानुभितिकारणं cafe arena WHATS कारणलात् मरत्परिमाएं काणा- Zire तथापि न कारणवमित्याचाय्ीणामाश्य cma) तन्न । ज्ञानातिरिकं प्रति कारणताया एव आचाभैरक्ला .॥ ९४॥
ननु कारणववं किमत श्रा । अन्यथेति । तख कारणवस्य ॥ ९५ ॥
तज्र समवायिकारणे | श्रासन्नं प्रत्यासन्नं कारणं दितीयमसमवायिकारणमित्यथः 1 ws यथपि तु- रौतन्तुमेयो गानां पटासमवायिकारणलं स्यात् एवं वेगादीगामपि शरभिघाताद्यसमवायिकारणलं खात् `एवं ्ानारिकमिच्छा समवायिकारणं खात् तथापि पटासमवायिकारएलरणे तुरीतमुसंयोगमिक्षलं Ta ठरीतनु्योगस्त॒ तुरीपटसंयोागं म्र्यसमवायिकारणं भवल्येव ¦ एवं वेगादिकं वेगखन्दाशखमवायिकारणं
R
MMe यत् समेतं काय्यं भवति Say समवायिजनक तम्। तचासन्नं जनकं हितीयमाभ्यां परं ठतीयं स्यात् ॥१७॥ येन सद THATS: कारणमादाय बा यद्य |
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fagre भवद्येवेति तत्तत्काग्योसमवायिकारणलचणे तत्तद्धि भिन्नं न रेयं आमविेषगुणानाक् हचराणषम- वाथिकारणलवं नासि । तेन तद्धिन्नलं सामान्यलक्षणे देयमेव । wa समवायिकारणप्र्यासननं दिविधं का- यकार्प्र्यासत्या ATTRA wT च । चाद्यं यथा चटादिकं प्रति कपालसंभागादिकं । तत्र HAT टेम VE कारणस्य कपालसंयागस एक- सिन् कपाले प्रत्यामन्निरस्ि |, दितीयं यथा घटरूपं मरति कपालरूपमषमवायिकारूणं | तंत्र घटरूपं प्रति कारणं घटः । तेन स कपालरूपस्य Vasa कपाले परत्यासतन्तिरस्ि । तथा ध कथित् समवायसम्बन्मेन कचित् खसमवायिसमवायसम्नन्धेनेति फलितार्थः । इत्यञ्च कायं काय्यकाररेकाथान्यतरप्रल्यामस्या का- रणं श्ञानादिभिनश्नमसमवायिकारणमिति सामान्यल- wy Wages | anal समवायिकारणाषमवायिका- Tenet भिन्नं कारणं wate व्रिमि्नकारणमिन्यः। १९६५॥९७॥ , । द रागोमन्बथामिङ्धवमेव कियतां पदाथानां तं दाइ । येन सरेत्यादिना | यत्काय प्रति कारणस्य
१४
भाषा अन्य परत पुव्वभावे काते यन् परव्वभावविक्षानं ॥१८॥ जनकं प्ति aaah ATTACHE न य्य TEA |
fagre पूव्ववन्तिता Gy ete wea तत्का प्रति तदुप मल्ययासिद्धमिति भावः । यथा घटं प्रति cwa- भिति ॥ हितीयमन्यथाधिङ्खमाह 1 "कारणमिति | यस खातच्येणाच्यनव्यतिरेकोा न सः fr खकारण- Agia अन्वयव्यतिरेक WHA तदन्यथासिद्ध। यथा दण्डरूपं ।\ दतीयमाइ । wa प्रतीति! wa प्रति qeafis एतैव we यत्काय प्रति पुर्न awa तद्य ततृक्रायै म्र्यन्यथासिद्धवं। चथा घटा- रिकं भत्याकम्थस । ware fe घटादिकं प्रति आकाशलेन कारणवं स्यात् । Warns श्रब्दसमवायि- कारणत्वं Wa: wed प्रति जनकलं WHA घटादिकं प्रति जनकलं ग्राद्यमतसदन्यथासिद्धं। शब्दाश्रयलेन कारणले कान्यथासिद्धिरिति चेत् पञ्चमीति Tere । श्रयाकाश्रसय अं प्रति wane किमवद्धेदकमिति चेत्। कवलादिकं विशेषपदाथौ वेति ॥९८॥ चतुचमन्यद्यासिद्धमा र । जनकं प्रतीति । यत्का- जनकं प्रति qafia छरीकरव ae यत्काय प्रति afta श्यते aw ama परव्यन्यथासिद्धलं । यथा कुश्षालपितुषंटं प्रति। ae कुलालपिदटलेन
१५ भाषा श्रतिरिक्तमथापि यद्धमेन्नियतावश्छकपून्यभाविनः।॥९९॥ एते Tafa दण्डत्बादिकमादिमं। घटादौ दण्डङ्पादि दितीयमपि दर्शितं ॥ २०॥ मीयन्त HARA ुलालजनकाऽपरः |
fagre घरं प्रति जगकलेऽन्ययापिद्धिः । कुलालवेन जनकत्वे विष्टापत्निः | कुलालमाच्रम्य घरं" प्रति जनकलात् ॥ पञ्चममन्यथासिद्धमाह i अतिरिक्रमिति,॥ भियताव- श्यकपूष्वभाविनः । श्रवश्छक्ुप्रनियतपूलववक्िन एव का- सम्भवे तद्धिन्नमन्यथासिद्धमिव्यर्थः । अरत एव प्रव्यक्त aw कारणममेकद् वयव्वमन्यद्चासिद्धं । तच fe AMMAR क्तं । तेनानेकद्र ववत्नमन्यधामिद्धं | न च परपरील्ये किं विनिगमकमिति ares मर्व आते: कारणएतावच्छेदकवे लाघवात् ॥ १९. ॥ ~ राश्भादिरिति। यदहटव्यक्निप्रति trae नियप- qaafiaafe तत्रापि घटजातीयं प्रति मिद्कारण- भव्ररण्डादिभिरेव agate समवे राषभाऽन्यया- fag इति भावः॥ एतैथ्विति। एतेषु पञ्चखन्यथा- सिद्धेषु ae पञ्चमेोऽन्यथादिद्ध् waws: | तेनेव परेषां चरितार्थत्यात् । तथा हि दण्डादिभिरवष्व- कुप्तगियतपुन्ववक्तिभिरव का यसव दण्डलारिकम+ न्यथाभिद्। न च श्रेपरोत्ये fa’ विनिगमकमिति
१६ भाषा" पश्चमे रासभादिः ख्ादेतेषवाव्यकस्लसो ॥ २१। समवायिकारणत्वं. व्यस्त विज्ञेय गुणकममंमात्तइत्ति ्ेयमथाप्यसमवायिदेतुतं ॥ २९॥ अन्यन Pree PHATE | ,हिल्यादोनां नवानान्तु द्रव्त्गुणएयोगिता ॥ रर ॥
शिद्धा° वाच्यं | दण्डलस्य कारणतरे दण्डघरटितपरम्परायाः सम्बन्धलकन्पने ओारवात् । एवमन्येषामणनेम «afr ता्थ॑लसम्भवात् ॥ २० ॥ २९ ॥ समवायिकारणमिति । गृणक्ति । च्रसमवा- यिकारणलं शणंकमभिन्नानां वधम नतु गणकाः साधर द्यापि तात्प | अथवा असमवायिका- रणटतन्तिसत्ताभिन्नजातिमच्वं तदथैः। तेन श्नानादी- नामपि श्रसमवायिकारणत्वविरदेऽपि a aia: ne ei श्रन्यतेति । faexerfe परमाषठाकाश्रादीनि favrarfaad साधम्यनित्ययैः । wire सम- वायसम्ब्पेन faa । विशेषणतया जिद्यानामपि कालाद SH: । कालिकसम्बम्भान्यंसमन्पेन तेषा- ‘aefwafafa परमाः । तेन समवाया*भावयेोः समवायेनाटृस्ञावपि न रतिः॥ इदानीं दरयदेव वि- fra area व्ुमारभते । किल्यादोनामिति ॥२२॥
-+------------ व ~
* नाङ्ितपुष्वीमति ।
१७
arate कितिर्जलं तथा As: पवना मन एव च। परापरत्वमूत्तलक्रियावेगाश्नय। FAN ॥ २४ ॥ कालखात्मदिशं सर्व्वगतत्वं परमं मदत् |
मिद्धा चितिजंलमिति | एथियप्ेजावायुमनशां परला- परलवल्ं मत्तं लं क्रियावन्तं वगवच्श्च साधम्य । नच यतर घटादौ परवमपरतं वा बात्यन्नं तचायाति- रिति वाच्यं। परलादिममानाधिकरणट्रयवयाण- जातिम्तख faaferara । ain अ्रपष्टपरिमा- वन्तं | तच तेषामेव गगणादि परिमाण्ख कुतेाऽणय- पहृष्टलाभावात् Yaa कर्व | वेगवते क्॑समाना- पधिकरणद्रयत्यायजातिमचे वेग्वदृन्निद्र यलयाण- जातिम्वश्च a ९४॥ , ` कालेति । कालाकाश्रात्मदि्रां मर्ग्बगतवं मरवमू- ्ंसंयेागिलं परममदत्रञ्च | परममरत्नवं जाति. विग्रषोऽपकपानाश्रयपरिमाएवं वा । सित्यादीति । एथियमरेजवायाकाशानां तलं । तख afefcfra- ग्रा्मविभ्ेषगृणवक्ं | भ्रं arma लोकिकप्र्रखषट- पयेग्यलं बधं । तेन ज्ञाता घट् दव्यादिप्रत्यक्ते ज्रा- मद्ाणुपनोतभानविषिवलात् तदति श्रात्मनि नाति-
Wey: । न वा प्रत्यल्षाविपयरूपादिमति परमौष्वा-, ~~~ ~~
* wqanfrafig 1
qa
rote त्िल्यादिपश्च भूतानि चतवारि सशंवन्ति दि ॥ २५॥ दवयारमरशवतुषु स्यादथाकाशशतीरिणं |
fagre दाक्थासिः | तस्यापि खरूपयोग्यलात् area. कारणान्तरासन्तधिना्च ग प्रत्य । अथवा ATT उल्तिविेषगणव्वं तल्लं ॥ .खलारीति । एथियेज- वायुनां war ॥ २५ ॥ द्वयारम्म इति । एथियतरेजवायुषु चतुषुंद्रगा रमकलं.। न च द्यानारभरके घटाद्ावव्यात्निः। द्र यसमवायिकारणटत्तिद्र यवव्याणजातिम्ख fa- वशितलात् ॥ ` ्राकाग्रश्रौरिणामिति । भ्राकाश्रात्मः नामयाथदन्नि्णिकविग्रेषगु एवल ॥ श्राकाश्रसख वि- ame: शब्दः । स चावयाणटत्तिः। यदा fate: TATA शष्ट VATA तदन्यावदेरेन तदभावस्यापि ewig | कसषणिकतञ्च ठतीयचणटसिष्नंसप्रतिया- fad । येोग्यविभुविवगृणानां खा त्तरवत्तिगुणनाश्व- ald प्रथमग्रब्दख्य दितोयशब्देम नाशः ॥ एवं ज्ञा- मारीमामपि। ज्ञानादिकं fe आत्मनि विभौ श्रो- राश्वषेदनेत्पते । चटाचवङेदन तद भावेोऽस्येव | एवं श्ानादिकमपि चणडयावद्धायि | repgrary- उत्तिविभेवगणवतं शणिकविगेवगुणवलश्चाथैः ॥ एयि- व्यार एपारिर्विनेषगशिऽशीक्ठताऽयाणदकिरिणयुक् |
मषाः
fagte
१९
अर्याणवृत्तिः रुणिको विशेषगुण दृष्यते ॥ २९॥ रपद्रव्यलप्र्यकषयोगि स्यात् प्रथमजिकं | एथिष्यादावव्याणदत्तिसंयोगादिररीत्यते विगरेषगृण
TER न च रूपादीनामपि कदाचित्.टतीयशणे माश्रसम्मवात् रणिकविशेषगएवचं चिव्यादावतिव्याप्त- मिति वाच्यं। चतुःचणटत्तिजन्याटसिजातिमद्धिेष- गृणवत्वस्य विवक्तितवात् । -पेकाबुद्धिः" चणत्रयं ति- एति । चणएचतुषटयकु किमपि ज्ञागारिकं न तिष्ठति। रूपतवादिकन्त॒ चणएचतुषटयस्यायिन्यंपि रूपादौ atin दति gare: bec चतुःचणट्षिवाञ् जनय तयक्तं । यद्याकाश्जीवा्मनोाः arya तदा अन्येति न देयं देषलादिकमादाव शक्षणसमनवयात् परम- awe aguas) चतुयचणे दिलादीना- मपि नाश्ाभ्युपगमाद् द्विलादीनामपि तथालात् तदा- रणाय विशेषेति विच्षणटृच्यटृ्तिलवं वा are । देष- त्वादिकमादायात्मनि लचणण्मववयात्॥ २६॥ रूपेति । एयियरजर्षां र्पवचवं द्र यववल्तं प्र्च- विषयववश्चव्यथः | ग च चच्रादीनां भजंनकपाणब्व- वक्गरुद्मणञ्च sua किंमानमिति वाचं । तत्रापि AMSA रूपाममागात् | एवं वाख्वानोतषए्टयिवोजल- तेभेभागानुामपि ए्थिवीलादिना रूपानमानं are,
Re भाषा" गुरुणो ई THAN दयोनमिन्निकी द्रवः ॥ 9 आत्मानो भूतवगो्च विशेषगुणयोगिनः। यदुक्तं यस्य साधम वेभम्धमितरस्य तत् RE ॥
fagre a. च पटादौ द्ुतसुव्ादिभिनने तेजमि च द्रवः व्वमव्याप्तमिति are । ' द्रवतल्वदुत्तिद्रयवयाण जातिमच्चस्य विवकतितलात् । घुततलप्रष्ठतिषु शयि- वीषु * जलेषु द्रुतसुवषीरौ तेजसि च द्रवलमललात् | तच च थिवोलादिमच्ात्तदादाय aaa wa मन्यः | न च प्रत्यच्तविषयलवं परमाण्वादावयाप्त अतिवाप्तश्च . रूपादाविति वाच्यं । चाच्तषप्रत्यक्षवि षय टन्तिद्र् यघ्व्यायजातिमत्वस्य faafaaara । श्रा- त्मन्यतिव्याश्निवारणाय ergata ॥ गुरुणी दति । गुर्- wa रसवच्वं एथिवीजलयोरित्यथैः । न च प्राणे- द्ियादीनां वायानीतपार्थिवादिभागानाश्च रसा- feas किं माममिति वायं तचरापि एथिवोवा- दिना तदनमुम्प्रनात्। इयोरिति श्यिवीतेजसरि- व्यथः । म च afafmagaaad घटारा वद्यादा साव्याप्तमिति, are मेमित्तिकद्र वलषमामाधिकरण- casera feaferara ॥ ९७ ॥ आत्मान दति । एचियजावाखाकाशरात्मनां विशषगंव्षमितयथेः | यदुक्रभिति । शरेयलादिकं fa
९१
भाषा" TAGE FTTH मरने गुणाः। अटा खादयो पं द्रवो तेग जसि ॥ ९९ ॥ खशादयोो वेगश्च YRS RITA | पं रसस्तथा SU HCA WTS ॥ २०॥ लेदरना गन्धयुताः fest चतुदश । . , बुद्यादिषरकं संश्यादिपच्चकं भावना तथा ॥ २९ ॥ WAT गुण एते आत्मनः खुशचतु्दश | स्यादि पञ्चकं कालदिशाः शब्दश्च ते च खे॥२९॥ संख्यादयः पच्च वुदधिरिच्छा यन्नोऽपि चरे । ORCA RNR: प्च वेग मानसे ॥ २९॥ तच रितिग॑न्धदेतुननाङपवतीं AA |
fagre दाच दृति are । तत्तुन कष्यापि Fue) केक्ना- afaara | ते च सद्यादयः पञ्चे WATT RTH
९९ RTM AUN ATU RRM aurdaues fey सम्प्रति aaa एथिया- दिकं निंपयति । ततर चितिरि्यादिना । गन्त रिति चन्धखमवायिकारणमिल्यथः। यद्यपि "गन्धैः ward equated तथापि एयिवीवजाते प्रमाणा- पन्यासाय कारणलमपन्यसतं । तथाहि एथिवीनं छि गन्धसमवायिकार एताकेर कतया भिष्यति । श्रन्यया
R भाषा" GF CRT गन्धलु ELT HA ॥ २४॥
fagte गन्भलावकिनरखाकसिकलापक्तेः । न च पाषाणादौ गन्धाभावाद्रन्धवत्वमव्याप्नमिति वाद्यं । तत्रापि गन्ध- RTT wyrafars शर॑मुत्क टलेनाणुपपश्चते। कथ- मन्यथा agefa गन्ध उपषभ्यते । भरना हि पाषा- UVa | पाषाणापादानापादेयवं सिध्यति | यद्र agawes तत्तदुपादनेपादेयमिति MU) FORA खण्डपटे महापटध्वंसजन्य | way पाषाणपरमाणेः एथिवीलात्तव्नन्यस्य पाषाणस्यापि fate । तथाच त्यपि waa बाधकाभावः ॥ नानार्टैपेति ¦ प्एक्तनोलादिमेदेन नानाजातीयं रूपं sfaaraa ada न तु जलादौ । तत्र प्रैव स- ara | faery एकस्सिन्नपि ufiife पाकवशेन AAT RITA | न च यतर नानारूपं नोत्पन्नं तजा- व्यिः । रूपदयवदुल्तिद्र यवया्यजातिमच्वस्य रूप- माशवदुन्तिद्रयवव्यायजातिमत्तसख वा वाच्यलात् | रेषिकमये एथिवीपरमार avai रूपान्तरस्य "च सत्वात् । न्यायनये घटादावपि त्वा लणमम- न्वयः ॥ षड्विध इति । मश्ुरकटुकषायारिभेदेन यः afar रसः a एथिगामेव । अले च मुर एव TE: | चापि पवद यवर न्त्र यलव्यायजानिमलं र-
R
भाषा खर लस्यासु TTA ्ानुष्णीनपाकजः। - निल्याऽनिल्या च सा देषा fren स्यादणुलक्षणा ॥२५॥
सिद्धा ° नाशवदुत्नियाणजातिमनल्लं वा ल्तणाचाऽवसेयः । गन्धस्लिति ॥ दिविध दति । व्हसितिमात्रं नतु दि- विधगन्धवच्वं age । दिविधस्य यथ॑लात् | ईविधश्च वीरभातरभमेरेन बाथं॥२४॥ aa tf तस्याः एथिवयाः। अनुशराशोतस्पशरवतव वायोरपि वत्त capi ॥ पाकज दृति । rare vfa- व्याः खशाऽनुश्नाज्नोतताज्ञापनाथं ATH aA पाकजस्शंवत्चमात्ं लक्षणं | ufuae Fauiray । य- चपि पाकजसपभा पटादौ arf तयापि पाकस्य वदुत्तिद्र यलव्या्जातिमल्लमथै ara: निद्येति । सा एथिवो दिविध frat अनित्या Sara: । -श्ण- wear परमाणुलच्षणा एथिवो नित्या । तदन्या पर- माणुभिन्रा एयथिवौ द्एकादिरूपा सम्वाऽणयनित्येत्यथः। चैव अनित्या एथिव्येव श्रवयववतील्धथः | गम् श्रवय- विनि fe ara) परमौणुपुश्ेरवापपन्तेः। ग चपर माशूगामतीद्धियलाद् घटादेः wae न सखवारिति वां । एकख परमाणोारप्र्शमेऽपि AHA पर्य BATA] यथा URS केरा दूरेप्र्य चते तमू WAG । म च एकः met महान् षट via बुद्धे
९४ भाषा अनिल्या तु तदन्या स्यात् सेवावयवयागिनी |
सिद्धा ° रनुपपत्तिरिति वायं । एका महान् धान्यरागिरितिः agama: । मैवं । परमारोरतीद्धियतेन TEAS स्यापि प्रत्यचायाग्यवात्: दू रखकेगसतु ATA: | सन्निधाने aad ्त्यक्तलात् | न च तदानीं श्रद्ृण WATT TAT दृ पर माएुपुञ्र सेात्यन्नलात् न WE चवे fatra दति वां । AEVY दृष्ानुपादान- लात् । श्रन्यथा चचुरप्रादिषन्तति कदाविदुश्ठलपर- agiq | न चातितप्रतैलादौ कथमदृ श्चद दनमन्तते- बृ प्द हनोत्पम्तिरिति वाद्यं । तत्र तदमतःपातिभि- Guana: सयूलद दने त्पन्ेरपगमात् Rat BTR कथं चषरेणारत्प्तिरिति वाच्यं । यता न वयं बृश्यवमदु लं वा कवित् खभावाद्ाचच्छमरे परन्तु AVA तरूपादिकारणशममुदायवश्ाद् FWA | तथाच सरणात् WAT न ठ TUR TAT- भावात् । न हि तद्मतेऽपीदं सम्भवति परमार मह- त्वाभावात् दृत्यं चाक॑विसिद्ध तेषामत्पाद्विनाग्याः wearing तेषां चावयवावयवधाराया श्रन- मतले मेरर्षप्यारपि aang: । va: कविदधि- आरामे are: | यंत्र च विश्रामलसयानित्यले लसमवेत- भावकारत्पत्नि प्रसङ्गः खात् | श्रतजख fra मह-
RH
भाषा सा च त्रिधा भवेह eae विषयसथा ॥ Be II योनिजादिभ॑वेदेद cea ara |
Se a ae Sg °
fagre त्यरिमाणतारतम्यसख गगणाच विश्रान्तलमिवाणप- रिमाणतारतम्यस्यापिं कषिद्धिश्रान्तवमसीति तस्य परमाणुलसिद्धिः न च चसरेणावेव विश्रामाऽस्िति TS WIT: सावयवश्चाश्षद्रव्यलाद् घटवरित्य- wary तदवथवसिद्धौ चसरोणारवयवःः सावयवा महद वयवत्वात् कपालवदित्यनुमानेन तद वयवसिद्िः। म चेदमप्रयोजकं। Ga प्रति श्रनेकद्रयवत्वस्य प्रयोजकलात्। न चैवं क्रमेण तदद्यवधारापि भरणे दिति वाच्यं ्रगवद्ाभयेन azfeg: सौ च तिधेति, खा कायरूपा एथिवो जिविधा अ्ररोरेन्धियविषयभे- दादिव्यर्थः ॥ २६॥ wa देहमुदा हरति। योमिजादीति। योजिजमयेा- निजश्चेत्यथेः। यो निजमपि जरायुजमण्डजञ्च। जरायजं मानुषादीनां । ्रष्डजं खपादीगां । भ्रयामिजं सेदजा- ्विदादिर्क। खेदजाः wfacara: | उद्धिरखरग्- सपा्याः। नारकिणा ्रीरमपि श्रयोनिजं। ग च भानु वादिग्ररीरा्णां पाथिवले किं मानमिति aren गग्धा- रि म्वदयव प्रमाणलात्।गच क्ेरडभ्रारेदपलभार ण त्वादिकमपि स्यादिति are । तथा eft जखलषटयिवी -
९९
भाषा विषयो इयणुकादिश ब्रह्माण्डान्त उदाहतः ॥ २७॥
सिद्धा० लादिनासङ्करप्रसङ्गात्। नच तदि जललादिकमेवासु
a ठु wfdaafafa वाच्यं क्ेदादोनां विनाऽपि पररीरतेन प्रत्यभिन्नं । गन्धायुपलभे्च एथिवील- सिद्धेः । एतेन पार्थिवादिश्रोरे जलादीनां निमित्त- aad are) श्ररौरलन्त् न जातिः एथिवीलादिना
, साइणौत् किन्तु चेष्टाश्रयलं | टक्तादीनामपि च््टास-
लान्नायात्तिः। न च टृक्लादीनां शरोरले fa मानमिति ae) श्राधयाद्धिकवायुमम्नन्ख प्रमाणात् | ततैव किं मानमिति'चेत्। भग्रचतसंरोदणादिना तदनुमा- नात् यद्. wearer शरोरव्यवहारो न भवति तदा- varqafada विगेषलोयं । न च यतर शरीरे ar a जाता तचरायारहविरिति वाच्यं । एतादृशे प्रमाणभा- वात् । Waal चेष्टावदन््यावयविमाचदटत्तिद्रयलव्याय शातिमन्तं तत्" मानुषलचे्रलजातिमादाच लक्षणखम- AU न ख arene कथं लत्तणएसमन्ययः | तत्र भिंहतलरोकव्यक्गिटृत्तितया जातिलाभावात् । जलो- यतेजसश्ररोर टृन्तितया देवलस्यापि जातिलाभावा- दिति वाच्यं । कल्पभेदम नमिंधररोरस्य aaa मुमिंहत्जात्या लक्णममन्थात् । इड्धियमिति। wt
५४ अकादवमिधाचचेदःव दुग जतिम Sra |:
२७ भाषा० TE: LA रसे जले मधुरशोतलेो |
सिद्धा ° Ufa पारथिंवमिद्य्थैः | पाथिवलं कथमिति चेत् tat घ्रारेड्धियं पार्थिवं रूपादिषु मघे गन्धव वश्चक- त्वात् कुङमगन्धादिव्यै्ञकधृतवत्। मचदृषट्ानेख- कोयरूपादिव्यज्नञकल्ादसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं। परकोय- खूपाद्यव्यश्न कलस्य तदर्थलात्। न न नवशरावगन्ध्य- शकजलेनानैकान्तभिति वाद्यं । तस्य शक्रुरमाभिय- Waa! यद्वा परकीयेति न देयं ब्रायूपनीतसुरभि- भागस्य दृष्टान्तत्वसमवात्। न च घ्राणेद्धियसन्निकषंख गन्धमाचव्यश्चकलान्तच यभिचौरद्तिवाच्यं। rare सतिदति विगरेषणात्। विषय vial §पभेगसाधनं विषयः । सममेव हि कार्यजातं श्रदृष्टाधोनं । यत् कायै चददृष्टाधोनं तत्तदुपभागं' सा्तात् परम्परया-वा जगयल्येव । म fe वीजप्रयोजनाग्यां विमा wafe- दुत्य्निरस्ि । तेन द्मणकादिब्रह्माण्डं सव्व॑मेव faq- या भवति | शरौरेद्धिययोविंषयवेऽपि प्रकारान्तरोप- are: गरिथमुद्धवशद्याथैः ॥ २७॥ अलं निरूपयति। ae: wom दूति । लेहममवायिः कारणतावच्छेदकतया sea जातिः सिध्यति । यद्यपि खेरलं॑नि्यानित्यदट्लितया म कार्यतावच्छेदकं, सथापि saraead तथा भां । अर ्परमारी अलं
रट MMe SRG द्रवलन्तु सासिद्रिकमुदाइतं ॥ हैट ॥
सिद्धा०म स्यात्। तत्र जन्यक्लेहाभावात् | नित्यस खरूपयोग्यते फलावश्समावनियमादिति चेत्। न । जन्यस्ेहजनकता- वेदकतथा जन्यअललणातेः सिद्धौ तदवच्छििजन- कतावच्छेद कतया जललजातिसिद्धः ॥ शुकरूपव्तमेव दशेयतुमुक्ं । ad: शुक इति । वस्तख्धितिमावं नतु TARVIN Tae । श्रथवा नेमित्तिकद्र बलवद टन्ति- quae yg यलसाला्नायजातिमनं अरभाखरणक्ेत- रर्ूपासमानाधिकरणरूपवदुन्तिद्र UAT ITAA - frat तदथ ॥ रसरश्राविति | जलस्य मधुर एव रसः ।* त एव सः । तिक्ताटत्तिमधुरटत्तिद्र यल- साक्तद्या्यजातिमच्वं । ननु शुक्रूपवच्वमेतेति कुतः कालिन्दीजलारै. नीसेपलसेरिति चेत्। न । नीलञ- मकतावद्धेदिकायाः एथिवीवजातेरभावात् जले नी- लषूपासम्वात्। कालिन्दोजले नोलप्रतोतिः wer ापाधिको। श्रत एव वियति विके धवलिमापलमेः। अथ जलमाधुयं कि"मानं। म fe marae काऽपि रससतत्रानुभूयते । न च नारिकेलजलारोा माधुयंमुप- खभ्यत एवेति वश्यं । तस्छाअ्रयोपाधिकलात् | अन्यया जग्नोररसादावन्लाथुपलमेर SARA खादिति चेत्। ग इरीतक्थारिभकणस जल र्द कायात् |
९९ भाषा निल्यतादि प्रथमवत् किन्तु देदमयोनिजं।
fagre न च इरीतक्यामेव जलाष्णसंयागाद्रमान्तरोत्पमि- रिति वाद्यं । कल्यनागारवात् । एथिवो्सालादिज- ARATSTHATS | जले नान्नादिकं जभ्नोररसारा त आञरयैपाधिको तथा प्र॑तीतिः। एवं waa स्पजनकतावच्छेदकं जललवं WAIN वा Fry । चृष्टषन्दमादा त॒ भे्योपलयिखन्दनानतम॑त्तिभीतत- रसलिलसय तेजः संयोगाल्लले ब्रोष्णप्रतीतिरोपाधिकी स्युरेव । तत्र पाकामम्मवात्॥ हतेति । चृतादा- वपि तदम्तर्व्॑तिंजलस्येव केष! । जलस्य केहममवा- चिकारणलात् | तेन जल एव at via मन्तयं ॥ xaatafa शांषिद्धिकद्रवलतं जातिविगेषः प्रत्यक्ष सिद्धः तद वच्छिन्नजमकतावण्चछेदकमपि तदेवेति wa: | नैलादावपि wre द्रवलं सेषप्रकर्पेण च दहनानृकृ- खमिति वच्यति nasi प्रथमव्रदिति। एथिया दवेत्यर्थः । तथारि जवं fafa नि्यमनित्यञ्च। परमाणकूपं fray se कादिकं waft श्रवयवसमबेतश्च । भ्रनिग्धमपि जिविधं श्रोरेन्धियविषयभेदात् । किमु एथिवीत यो fairway) किज्िति । अयोनिजमिति sir. निजमेवेद्य्यः । जनोयं शरीरमयोनिणं वदणकाकं
8 9 भाषा° द्रिं रसनं सिन्भुदिमादिरविषयो मलः ॥ ३९ ॥ सथं उष्णलेजससु AT TART |
सिद्धा° प्रसिद्धमिति । द्धियं रसनं जलोयमित्यथैः । तथाहि रसने जलोयं गन्धाद्यश्चकले रति रषयश्च कलात् | अ्हरसाभियञ्जकोारकवत् रसनसननिकं यभिचार- वारणाय gad देयं ॥ विषयं द् श्रयति । भिन्युदिमा- दिरिति। सिन्धुः wax: । हिमं तुषारः । श्रादिषदात् सरित् कासारकरकादिः wat arg: |e fea करकाः कटिनलात् पाथिंवलमिति वाच्यं । उश्रण विलोनस्य त्य भलवस्य प्रत्यकच्सिद्धलात्। WZ यद्रू ्यधनेसणन्यमिति व्यापेजलेपादानेनेपादे यवषिद्धेः। अदृष्टविगेषेरीवाद्र वलविरोाधात् करकादीनां काठि- AMAA भ्रान्तलात् ॥ २९ Ul तेजा निरूपयति । खश उष्ण दत्यादिना । उष्णं स्यनिषठा जातिविशेषः प्रत्य सिद्धं । इत्यश्च भन्याष्ण- स्यश्ैषमवायिकारणएतावच्छेदकं ane जातिविग्रेषः। we पर माणष्न्तिलं ' त॒ जलवरोवानुशन्धेयं । न A "ष्णस्य वत्वं चद्रकिरणादा व्याप्तमिति are: तत्रापि arya स्तात् । किन्तु तदन्तःपातिजलसभर॑नाभिभ- ` वादयः । एवं रबरकिरणारै पाथिवसपंनाभिभ- WUT चानुञ्ूततादयहः ॥ रूपमित्यादि ।
Rt
भाषाः नेमित्तिकं दरवलन्तु निलयतादि २ पर्ववत् ॥ ४०॥ दन्य नयनं वङ्किखघ्ादिविषये मतः।
सिद्धा णप्रश्वानरे मरकतकिरणादा च पार्थिवदूपेणाभिभवात् THATS: ॥ मनु तद्रपारहे धरिणाऽपि चाचषलं न सादिति चेत्। न, भ्रनयदीयद्ह्पेणापि धरिण qT बात् wee पित्तपोतिषा । ase शुक्रं नाभिश्ठतं किन्त तदीयं शक्रवमभिभूतमित्यनय |, नेमित्तिक- fafa: खवीदिरूपे तेजसि त्सृलात् । न च मै- मि्तिकट्र वत्वं न WaT द हनाद्ावव्यापरधुतादा- afaaraata वाद्यं । एयिधदृत्तिनेमित्िकद् वन वदृत्तिजाति मचय विवक्षितात् ॥ पष्थवदिति । जल- waa: | तथा fe तद्दि विधं नि्यमनित्यञच | निदं परमाणरूपं। तदन्यद नित्यं श्रवयवि। तख faut श्नोर द्ियविषयभेदात्। श्ररोरमये निजमवेत्ययैः। तख खय साकारा wag ve i wa at विगरेष्माह tixafafa । चतुमोजमं परकोयसभरादयव्यश्चकले' सति परकोयद्ूपव्यञ्नकवात् प्रदीपवत् । प्रदीप्य सखीयं यञ्चकलादा्यं पर कीयेति। घटादेः सोयरूपयश्रकलात् व्यभिषारावा- रणाय faire परकोयेति । श्रथवा HATA’ Yate कल्पवत् परकीयदयं नं रेयं। णषुः रसिकं यभि-
RR भाषा" श्रपाकजोऽनुष्णाशीतः शंसतु पवने मतः॥ ४९॥
fagre चारवारणाय gaa देयं ।। विषयं दशर॑यति। वङ्कीति। मनु नुव awed किं मानमिति चेत् । न । Bed तेजसं अरति प्रतिबन्धके शरतयन्तानलमंधोगे ` ऽ्नच्छि्यमानद्र वलात् aaa aad यथा एथिवी । न चाप्रयोजक, पएथिवीद्र् वलस्य जन्यजलद्र ववस्य चाग्रिमं- यागनाश्ववात् ॥ नन् पीतिमगृरुलाश्रयस्य पार्थिवस्यापि तदानीं guards यभिचार दति सेत्। न। जलमध्यख- मसोचोदवत् AVIA | WITT पीतिमगृरला- mae अल्यन्ताभ्निसंयोगेऽपि रूपापराटत्तिदशेनात् त- प्रतिबश्धकविज्ञा तीयं द्र वद्र यं कस्ते । तथाहि भ्रग्नि- संयोगे पौतिमगुरुलाश्रयः विजातोयरूपप्रतिबन्धक- द्रवद्र यसंयुक्तः । ्रव्यन्ताभ्भिमंये गेऽपि पू्व॑रूपविजा- तीयर्ूपानधिकरणएपाथिववात् जलमध्यखपोतपटवत् तस च एथिवीजलभिन्नसखय तेजस्बनियमात् ॥ वायुं निरूपयति । अपाकज दूति । भ्रनुष्णाशोतसथंख एथि्यामपि स्वादुक्ं wore इति. ्रपाकज्य- कख जलादावपि ergy अमुष्णाप्रीत एति । तेन बायवोयो विजातीय ofa: तव्लगकताषच्छेदकं " वायुलमिति भावः ॥ ४९ ॥
भकाः
fagte
२९ तिग्यौगमनवानेष ज्ञेयः सयशादिलिङ्गकः। पूर्व्ववन्निदयतायुक्तं दृदव्यापि लगिद्धियं ॥ ve i पराणादिसु मदावायुपययनता विषये मतः।
एष वायुः सशादिलिङ्गकः | वायुरं स्यशंग्द एतिकन्पैरनुमोये । विजातीयस्पभन विल्तफशरम्दन दणादीनां श्त्या शाखादीनां कम्बल च वायागनुमा नात् । यथा च alert प्रतय तथा वच्यते ॥ aA वदिति ॥ arafefadr नि्योऽनिव्यञ्च । warmed नित्यस्तदन्याऽनित्यः ममवेतश्च । माऽपि त्रिविध. शगो रेद्धियविषयमेदात् | तत्र शरररमयानिजं पिग्राचा दीनां । परन्तु जलो यतेजमवायवीदररौराणां पाथिव- भागेपष्टमादुपमागमाधनलं जलादीनां प्राधान्या ष्नलोयत्वमिति ow ar विगषस्तमाद । दधया पीति । शगीरव्धापकं स्पं्रारक्मिन्रियं लक तथ वायवीयं) रूपादिषु मध्ये ies यज्नकलात् ॥४२॥
श्र्गमङ्गिसलिलगत्ययञ्जकयजनवातवर् विषयं दपं यति। प्रा्ादिरिति। यथ्चपि अरनिया वायु्चतुविध. ae चतुर्थो विधा प्राणादिगि्युक्रमाकरे तथापि ay पादच त्रैविष्यमुक्रं | प्राणस्लेक एव इदादिनानाम्या नवशानमलनिगं मादिनानाक्िावका नानामंञ्त्रा'
waa इति ॥
भाषा”
fagre
३४ RTI तु िननयः शन्दो वैशेषिको गुणः॥ Be इद्धियन्ु भमेत् श्राचमेकः सन्नपुपाधितः।
आकाशं निरूपयति । श्राकाश्खेति। च्राकाशकालः दिामेकेकयक्तिलाद् श्ाकीग्रलादिकं न जातिः किन् ward शब्दा यलं | RFs दइतिकथनन्तु किगे- षरगृणाग्तरव्यवच्छेदाय | एतेन प्रमाणमपि दितं | तथा हि | शब्दो गृणएख्चचुयेदणायेग्यरवाहिरिद्धियग्राद्य- जातिमल्नात् ख्व् | न्दे दर यसमवेता गृणलात् मं॑- योगवर् Taras शब्दस्य द्र समवेत सिद्धे weal म स्शंवदधिशेषगुणः। श्रभिसंयो गासमवायिकारणएकला- भावे सति श्रकारणगुणपूव्वकम्रत्यचलात् सुखवत्। पा- कशर्पाद वयभिचदारवारणाय सत्यनं wedi व्यभिचारवारणायक्षारणगृणपूव्वकेति | जलपरमाणए- wearer यभिचारवारणाय प्रत्यकेति। wear न दिक्षा- शलमनेगुणा विगेषगुणएलात् | नात्मविगेषगृणः । वदि- frfeaarmarg रूपवत् द्यश्च ण्ब्दाधिकरणं नव- ara गगणनामकं सिष्यतीति। न "च वाख्वयवेषु खष्द्ष्दक्रमेण, TAT कार ण गुणपून्यकः wey उत्या्- तामिति वाचं। श्रयावद्र यभाविलेन वायुविेषगुणवा- भावात् तत्र WTS विषयख शाभावात्॥ ४३॥ द्वै दशंयति। दक्छरियमिति।नाकाञं खाघवा-
RY
HUN जन्यानां जनकः काला जगतमाग्रयो मतः ॥ ४४॥ परापरत्वधतः als: स्यादुपाधितः।
fagte देकं fag रात्रं परुषभेदेन भिन्नं कथमाकाशं खादत Me) एकः सन्नपोल्यादि । sara एक एव सन्नपि उपाधेः क्लं्ष्कुल्योदेभेदाद्धिननं rare aa त्यर्थः ॥ ॥ कालं निरूपयति । जन्यानाभिति॥ तच प्रमाणं दर्शयितुमाह । जगतामिति तथारि+ददानीं घट दृत्यादि प्रतीतिः सखयपरिखन्दादि कं यदि विषयीक- राति तदा खर्यपरिस्यन्दादिना घटादेः मम्बनसावाच्यः स च मंयागादिनं संभवतीति काल एव ततृमम्बधघ- टकः कर्ते ॥ ४४ ॥ " इत्यश्च तस्याश्रयल्मपि सम्यक् प्रमाणान्तरं दशं यति । परापरलेति । परलापरतवबद्धेरमाधागणं नि- भित्तं काल एव । परव्वापरत्येारममवायिकारणमं- यागाञ्रयो खाघवादतिरिक्रः sega एति ara: ॥ नन्वेकस्य कालस्य fagr क्षणदिनमामवषौदिममयभेदा नस्यादतश्राद। लतादिरिति । कालस्वेकाऽपि उपा- पिमेदात सणादिव्यवहारविषय; । safes BIA
विभागप्रागभावावख्छिच्नं कर परववमंयोगागवचख्छिम्न- विभागा वा चत्वमंयागनान्नावच्छिम उरमवागप्राग-
भावा वा खश्लरमंयोागावरख्छिनं कम्म वा। A STAT
BR
भाषा" दूरानिकादि षीदेतुरोका निलया दिगु्यने ॥ vy A उपाधिभेदादेकापि प्रा्यादिव्यपदेश्भाक्।
fagre सृंयोगानन्तरं चणववयदारो न खादिति वाचं कशा न्तरमत्वादिति | महाप्रलये क्षणादि यवहारो यद्यपि , तद नायल्या ध्व॑रेनापपाद नीयः। दिनादियवदारम् तत्ततक्तणकूरैरेवेति ॥ ` fod निरूपयति । दूरान्तिकंति । दूरे श्रन्ति aay fra परवमपरववं बाध्ये | तदुदधेरमाधारण वीजं दिगेव । दैभिकपरलापरत्रयोारममवायिकारण मंयोगाश्रयतया दिक् मिष्यतोति ara: ti gy tl नन्वेकव fen यदि azt प्राचोप्रतीच्ादिव्यव हारः कथम्पफ्षद्यतामित्यत We: उपाधीति । यत्प रुषस्य उद यगिरिमन्निरदिता या दिक् सा aw ara उदयगिरियवहिता च प्रतीचो | एवं तत्पुरषीयसमे- cafafeat दिगृदीचो तद्र वहिता लवाचो। स्यैवा- मेव वषाणां मेररुत्तरतः faa इति नियमात्॥ श्रात्मानं निरूपयति । ्रात्मद्धियेति i श्रात्मत- जातिस् सखदुःखादिममवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया सिथ्यति। ईशरेऽपि सा जातिरस्येव । श्रदृष्टादिरूप- कारणएभावाच न, सुखदुः डा दय॒त्यत्निः | नित्यस खद्- Tare फलावश्यम्नाव दूति नियमस्याप्रयोजकलात् ॥ पर लोर शा जातिनोस्येव प्रमाणाभावात् | न च
३७
भाषाः आत्मद्ियाद्िष्ठाता करणं हि ARTA ॥ ४६ ॥
fagte
TOTS न WA BAG व्यभिचारतः।
द शमद्र यत्वा पत्तिज्ञौनवक्वेन विभजनार्दिति वदन्ति॥ दृद्दियादीति । दरदधियाणां शरीरस्य च पर्यया नैतन्यमम्पाद कः + यद्यणात्मनि WE जाने AY सुस्व त्यादि प्रत्य्व्रिषयलमस्येव तथापि विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति प्रथमत एव शरीरादिभिन्नस्तत््रतोतिफाचर, दति प्रतिपादयितुं न शक्यत द्यतः प्रमाणं द्रयति। करणमिति । कुटारादीनां ङिद्ादिकग्णानां क्ता रमनतरेण फलानुपधानं TF एवं, चचृरादौनां ान- करणानां फलपधानमपि कन्तीरमन्तरेण नापप्चत दत्यतिरिक्रः कन्ता कर्ष्यते ॥ ४६॥
ननु शरीरस्यैव Heady ्रत श्राह । शरौर- सेति ॥ नन् चैतन्ये ज्ञानादि कमेव । मुक्तात्मनां वन्त द्व द्टतश्ररीराणामपि तदभात्रे का सतिः प्राणा- भावेन ज्ञानाभावस्य सिद्धेरिति चेत् । न। श्रीः te चैतन्ये बाल्ये विलाकितस्य, खाविरे खरणानुप. पत्तेः । भरोराणामवयपापचयपचयेरत्यादरविना्- शालिलात ॥ न च.पर्््ररीगात्यन्नमंखारण feat awd संस्कार उपपद्यत इति वाच्यं । भ्रगनाम स्कारकन्पने गोरवात् । एवं wire चेतन्ये बालकस्य
ac
भाषाः तथालन्चदिद्धियाणामुपवाते कथं सुतिः ॥४७॥ मनोऽपि न तथा ज्ञानाद्यनध्यक्तं तद्] भेत् |
fagte wayratat प्रटृ्तिनं सात् । दृष्टवाधनतान्नानख तृद्धेतलात् | तदानीमिष्टसाधनतास्नारकाभावात् | मन्मते जना नरानुमेतष्टसाधनलसख तदानों खर णारेव प्रन्तिः॥ म च जन््ान्तरामुभूतमन्यदपि सयं alfefa वाच्यं. उद्वोधकाभावात्। श्र बनायत्या जीवाद TANS कल्यते | TAY संमारस्याना- दितया श्रा्मनोाऽपि ्रनादिलसिद्धौ श्रनादिभावस्य माग्रासम्भवात् frat सिद्यतीति बोधं ॥ नन् weer दीनां ज्ञानदा करणलं कर्टलवञ्चासु विराधे साध- काभावादत we । तथावमिति। चेतन्यमित्य्ः। उपघाते नारे सति श्रथालुरादीनामेव | कथमिति। पं Wea साचात् तानां चचुषाऽभावे सरणं न wal श्रनुभवितु रभावात् । भन्यदृष्टख अन्येन सर- USHA | अनुभवसारण्याः सामानाधिकरण्येन कांकारणभावादिति भावः ॥ ४७'॥
मभु चचुदादीनां चैतन्यं माऽस्तु मनसस नि-
we Raa स्यादत we. मने ऽपीति ॥ न तथा । न चेतमं । ज्नागादीति । मगसाऽणुवात् । प्रत्यत च awe रेतुलात्। मनमि ज्ञानसृखादिमल्ने तत्-
३९
माषा ध्माधग्रीश्रयोऽध्यकतो विरेषगुणयोगतः ॥ ४८ ॥
सिद्धा° प्र्यक्तानुपपन्तेरि्यथः | यथा मनमेाऽणलं तथा व- waa मनस्तु विज्ञानमेव श्रात्मा तस्य खतः प्रका- weary Yard ्ौनसुखादिकनु तद्थैवाकारवि शेषः । तस्यापि भावलादेव चणिकलं पु्वपतवेवजना- नसो्तरविज्ञाने हेतुलात् | सुषुप्तावपि श्रालयविन्ना- नधारा निरावारभृव स्टगमदवासनाया वमग दृव पतव ; पुव्वैविज्नानजनितमंस्काराणामुत्तरोत्तरविश्नाने मड ्तवात्रानुपपत्तिः सरणादेरिति चेत् न। तस्य जग- दिषयते सार्वज्ञापत्तेः। यत्किञ्चिदधिप्रयते विनिगमना- भावः ॥ सुषुप्तावपि विषवावभाशप्रमङ्गः । तदानीं निराकारा चित्सन्ततिरनुवत्तत एति चेत् । न। तस्य सखप्रकाश्ले प्रमाणाभावात् | अन्यया घटादीनामपि शज्ञानलापत्तिः ।॥ न चेष्टापत्तिविंज्ञागव्यतिरिक्रवमुना ऽभावादिति षां । घटादेरनुश्यमानव्यापलपित्- मश्कयलात् ॥ आाकारविशेष एवायं विश्नानद्धेति चत्। किमयमाकारोऽतिरिच्यते विज्ञानात् तं ममायातं विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्रेन । नातिरिश्यते चेत् तरि ममूनान- waa नीशाकारोऽपि ¶ीताकारः wT! BEIT ति wererfatera ware Aearfefanraya षति चेत्। न। नीणलादीनां facgraraafmasaar
Ro
fagte aura. दतरा fatruea दुर्पपन्नलात् ॥ न चवाम् नामद्धुमः सम्भवति । मादपृचयारपि वासनामद्ुमप्रम ङ्गात्॥नचडपादानापादेयभावेानियामकद्ूतिवादयं। वासनायाः सद्धुमासम्नवात् i उन्तरस्मिनुत्यत्तिरेवम द्म दति चेत्। न। तदुत्धाद् काभावात्। उन्तरविन्ना नसेवेात्यादकले तदानन्त्यप्रसङ्ः।॥ चणिकविज्ञानेऽति शयविगेषः कसयत दति चेत्। न । मानाभावात्। कन्य . नाशिरवाच्च । एतेन त्णिकशरीरण्येव चेतन्यमपि प्र त्यक्तं । गारवादतिश्रये मानाभावाच्। वीजाद्ावपिम कारिसमवधानादेवापपन्तेः | कुबद्रपत्वाकन्यनाच्च । ag तदि दणिकविज्नाने गोरवान्नित्यविज्ञानमेवात्मा विनाशौवाश्ररे ्रयमात्मा सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं AWAIT अरदिश्रुतेरिति Sq itive सविषयलासम्भवस्य दि तलात् निविवंष्यसख ज्ञानले मानाभावात् मविषयल स्यायनुभवात्। रते ज्ञानभिनता नित्य श्रा्रोति षिद्ध ॥ सत्यं ज्ञानमिति ब्रह्मपरं Nay नोपयुज्यते ज्ञानाज्ञा नसुखिलदुःखिलादिभिर्जीवानां मेदसिद्धौ स॒तरामो रामेदः। श्रन्यया बन्धमेचानुपपन्े :। योाऽपोश्रम दबाधकोा वेदः माऽपि तदभेदेन तदौयलं प्रतिपाद यन् Gla श्रभेदभावरे च यतित्यमिति बदति । श्रत एव सव्वं एव, आत्मनि समर्पिताः यन्ते | माच दभ्ायामज्ञाननिदटनै शरदा जायत cata न।
४१
fagte Hee नित्येन नाशायोगात् मेदनारेऽपि य्गिदयं स्थास्यत्येव।। न च दिवमपि नश्यतोति वाच्यं। तजर निर्ध मके ब्रह्मणि सत्यलाभावेऽपि weed तदितिवर् दिलामावेऽपि इयाक्मक ताविति । सृक्रवलान् मिष्या त्वाभावेऽधिकरणाद्मकः ॥ तत्र सव्यसमिति चेद् एक त्वाभावे यक्रिद्धयात्मका दिनमु ता अर्येकमेकत ऽपि एथिवौजलयानं गन्धे इतिबदभयं नेकमित्यम्य सव्यैजनसिद्धवात् | arty तदानौमस्दप्रतिषादक श्रागमः शाऽपि निदुःखलादिना are प्रतिपादयति। सम्पदाधिक्ये प॒रोहिताऽ्यं राजा मंद्रत्त एतिवत्। श्रत एव faces: परमं सास्यमूपेतोति श्रूयते ॥ ईरा न क्ञानसुखात्मा किन्तु ज्ञानाद्यखयः।निल्यं fara मानन्दं बरहम Laat विज्ञानपदेन ज्ञानाख्रय णाकरः। Bway इत्यनुरोधात् । श्रागन्द दव्यम्यापिश्रान न्दवरित्यर्थः । श्रशंश्रादिलान्मलर्थीयाच्प्रद्ययात्। श्र. न्यथा पुश्ङ्गलापन्नेः । श्रानन्दोऽपि दुःखाभाव उप aaa भाराद्यपगमे सुखो मंटत्ताऽहमितिवद् दूःषा- भावेन खुखिवप्र्ययात् || WS वा तद्धिकरागन्दा न त्वसावानन्द मित्यत्र मलवर्थी यप्रत्ृयविरोधात् | श्रानन्दं ब्रह्मणे विध्यान्न बमिति कदाचनेत्यतर Ta Azar चेति Ha: i एतेन nefa: कर्व परुषः पृष्कर्पलाग्वन्नि
४९
शिद्धा° Ga: किन्तु चेतनः । कायंकारणयोरभेदात् कायं मारे काङूपतया नाशः स्यादित्यकारणएलं तख । बुद्धिगतचेतन्याभिमानान्यथाऽनुपपत्या तत्कस्नं | बु- द्भिख “प्रकते; प्रथमः परिणामः | शेव महत्तचमनः- करणंमणुच्यते । तत्सष्वासच्वाभ्यां पुर्वस्य संमा- ‘saat, wer एवेद्धियप्र्रालिकया परिएतिश्जी- मूपा । प्रटादिना सम्बन्धः पुरुषे कटलाभिमानेा agi ठेतन्याभिमानख | भेदाग्रहात् । ममेदं कन्त वयमिति मुदंएः पृरषोपरागे ब॒द्धः खच्छतया चेत- मप्रतिभिम्नादतालिका द्पंणरोव मुखोपरागः। TZ मिति विषयापराग दृद्धियप्रणलिकया परिएतिभे- carfear . निश्वासाभिरतदपंणस्येव मलिजिमा | कन्तयमिति व्यापारावेशः।तेगां ्रचयवती बुद्धिः। तत्- परिणामेन नानेन पुरुषख्याताचिकः सम्बन्धो दप॑ण- मशिन्ेव मृखलापलथिरुच्यते । ्ञानादिवत् सुखदुः खेच्छारेषप्रयल्घध्मौ aft बुदधैरोव | रतिषामा- माधिकरण्ठेन प्रतीतेः । न च बुद्धिखेतना परिणामि- arfefa साष्चमतम्पासतं ॥ “ हृद्यदृष्टभगानाभिव सेतन्यश्यापि सामानाधिक- TAMAS मानाभावात् चेतनोऽहं करोमीति रतीति द्धिपरिणा मिलात्॥ केतन्या रे भम इति चेत् ठ- watt किं नेयते । अन्यथा बृदधेनित्यले मेा्ठाभावोऽनि-
BR भाषा प्वत्याद्नुमेयोऽयं रथगल्यव सारथिः।
सिद्धा ° wa तत्पलवेममंमा रापत्तिः ॥ श्रचेतनायाः wee:
Haare वृदधेरचेतन्य कार्यकारणयाादात्यादिति चेत्। न। भ्रमिद्धेः । कश्तुजंन्यते मानाभावात् वीतराग- अन्म्रादग्रंनादनादितं | अनादेनाभामभरवाचनि्यलं । तत् fa प्रत्यादिकन्यनेन ॥ न चत
प्रतेः क्रियमाणानि गुफैःक्मापि api: |
अरहङ्कारविमृढात्मा कन्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥ दल्यनेन विरोध दति वाचयं । ्रषटतेरदृष्टसय | गुषेर- gamed: दच्छादिभिः । "कक्तं कन्ताहमेव । इत्यस्य तद य॑वात् ॥
aaa सति कन्तारमात्मानं कवलन्त्यः। carte वदता भगवता प्रकटीरृताऽयमृपरिष्टादौश्रय दृति wea:
ध््ाधक्नाञ्रय Tra) आ्ादमोव्यनृषल्यते । धरीरस् तदाश्रये रेहान्तरकतकणणां दे हान्तरेण भो गानुप- पन्नः ॥ "विेषगण्योगत' इति । योाग्यविगेषगणषम्- न्येनाद्ममः प्रत्यस्तं भवति न वन्दा । TE जामे WT इरामि दव्यादिप्रतीतेः॥ ४८॥
पररकौति | wear परदेहादो प्रश्यादिना ऽनमीयते। परह्तिर च चेष्टा । आआनेच्छाप्रयलादीना
४४
भाषा अदद्ारस्याश्रयऽयं AATATA गोचरः ॥ ४९ ॥ विमह्यादिगुणवान्वुदर् दिविधा मता | अनुभूतिः कृतिश स्यादनुभूनिखतुन्िधा ॥ ५०॥
््क्मणनुमितिसधोपभितिशष्दजे।
सिद्धा * देर अभावसेाक्रप्रायलात् । बेषटायाखच यननमाध्यवात्। चेष्टया प्र्न्नवानात्माणनुमीयत इति भावः ॥ तच Tamar Tafa । यद्यपि रथकरमाचष्टा न भ- वति तथापि तेन कर्णा मारचिवंधाऽनुमीयते तथा चेष्टात्मकंन कर्णा पराद्मापोति भावः ॥ अद्र स्येति । श्रद्ध रोऽहमिति प्रत्ययः तस्याञ्रयेा विषय sata शेडोरादिरिति॥ मन इति) मनोाभिन्नेद्धि- यजन्पप्र्यक्षादिषये मानसप्रत्य्षविषयसेव्यथेः | रूपा- ्भावेनेद्ियान्तराचाग्यलात् ॥ ४९ ॥ विभुरिति । विभुत्वं परममदत्वं तख पुब्वाकमपि सष्टार्थमकं । बद्यादीति । बुद्धि षुखद्ः वेच्छादि चतुद waar: aire वेदितव्या । waa प्रसङ्गादु देः कति- पयप्रपञ्ं द णंयति । बुद्धिस्लिति। विधय यत्पाद यति । अरनञ्तिरिति। अनुभ्तिखतुविधेति। एतामाञ्चत- But करणानि प्र्यलानुमानेापमानष्रन्दाः प्रमाणा- मीति खजाक्राभि वेदितव्यामि॥५०॥ प्रह्य॑ल्षमिति । ददधिथजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यकं । यद्यपि
४५ माषा" प्राणजादि प्रभेदेन प्रतं षडधं मतं ॥ ५१९ ॥
सिद्धा ° मनेोरूपेद्धि यजन्यं aka ज्ञानं तथापि इद्ियवेन रूपेण tart यत्र ज्ञाने कारणं anqs- मिति faafed | ैशवरप्र्यचन्त् न wel दृद्ियां सन्निकपं त्पन्नं ज्ानमयपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि दयध्रमाया- त्मकं प्रत्यक्षमिति सवर तथत्राक्रलात् | WA AT ज्ञाना करणएकं Hie HIG | ददं TIT दैश्रप्रत्पत्तमाधारणं इत्यनुमितौ याभिज्ञानस vufadt aya WAY पदज्ञानस्य स्मरणेऽनुभवस्य च VIA तत्र तत्रातिव्या्भिः॥ otras श्वानमनुमितिः। यद्यपि परामश॑प्रत्यचादिकं परामभजन्यं षथापि मरामंजन्ं रलविषयकं asad तदेवानुमितिः।[न च कादाचित्क- रेत्विषयकानुमितावव्याश्रिति वां । तादृ गर्नानः स्यनु भवलव्या यजा तिमल्वसख विवनितलात् । श्रय वा व्यािज्ञानकरणएकं ज्ञानमनुमितिः | एवं ary WaT करणकं ज्ञानमुपमितिः। पदज्ञानकरणकं ज्ञानं गाब्द- बधः pagar यतकिधिदनुमितियक्रिमादाय नश्च fafa सति यत्कि्चित्प्र्यचयक्रिमादाय.तदष्ट famfane ्रनुमितिलं | एवं यत्कि्ितप्र्यत्तारि- मादाय तद्वक्निटन्तिते बति यत्किञ्चिदनुमितियक्नि' माराय तद हक्तिजातिमष EATS वा अमिति॥
४९ भाषा HUT MLR गन्धो गन्धलादिरपि सृतः ।
तथा रसो रसन्नायालथा शब्दोऽपि च AA ॥५९॥ उदभूतरूपं नयनस्य गोचरो द्रव्याणि तदन्त्थक्घसङ्ो विभागसंयोगपरापरललेदद्रवल परिमाणयुक्त।५२॥
क्रियां जातिं योग्यदृततिं समवायच्च तादशं | सिद्धा प्राणजादौति । प्राणजं रासनं wee anit भरोत मानसमिति ष्च प्रत्यकं । न चेश्वर परत्यचस्याविभज- नाद्यूनलं | जन्यप्द्यचरैव निरूपणोयलात् eRe
नुघारात् ॥५९.॥ भराणखेति गाचर दति ग्राह्य card: | मन्धवा- दिरिति। पादिषदात् सुरभिला सुरभिलपरिग्रहः | mare प्रव्यचला त्तु ्िजातिरपि प्रद्यक्ा । ware ग्रो तु WWE न साम्थ॑मिति Arey तथा रस दरति। रसलादि सहित card: | गन्धो रसश ogar बोध्यः । तथा श्रब्दलादिसहितः॥ ५२९॥ उद्भतरूपमिति। यभन प्रादावनृूतरूपमिति न age Ware) तदि उदू तर्ूपवन्ति"॥ ५२ ॥
योग्येति । एचक्घादिकमपि येग्यटन्नितया arg | तादृशं येग्यटक्िमिन्यर्थः, ॥ चच्ाग्यलमेव कथं त- दाइ । गृहातीति | आराललाकसंयोग षद्भूतरूपच चाश षप्रयं फति कारणं । तज Teed प्रति तथाः
४७
° UMA चलतः संयोगादारोकोहूनरपयोः ॥ ५४॥
SAAR द्वयं गोचरः सोऽपि चत्वचः।
fagre शमवायसम्बस्ेन कारणलं | द्र ्यसमवेतपरत्य वं प्रति सखा यसमवायसम्नन्धेन द्रव्यसमवेतममवेतस्य रूपादेः wwe खाञरयसम्मेतसमवायसम्न्येनेति | ५४ ॥
BAIA Ta । ATA गाचरः। मोऽपि
TRAMs स्भलादि सददितः॥ रूपान्यदिति। रूप- भिन्नं रूपलादिभिन्नश्च waar यद् योग्यं तत् लगि- द्ियस्यापि are तथा चष्यक्तादिमद्यादयो ये चल् गाद्या गृणा उक्ता एवं क्रिया "ए जातये योग्यद- weg ते ae aren दूति, wufe लगिद्धियञन्ये ऽपि रूपं camera कारणं | तथा च वहिरिद्धियजन्य- TUT रूपं कारणमिति ॥ नवीनाम्हु वदिद्रं यप्र्यच Be कारणं प्रमाणाभावात् किन् चाकठषप्रत्यल्रूपं स्पाशंनप्रत्यक्े Uae अग्ययतिरेकात् i afe- रिद्धि यजन्यद्र यप्रत्यलमातरे किं कारणमिति चेत्। न। किद्थिदाक्माटत्तिशरन्दमिन्नविधेषगृणवल्ं वा प्रयाजक- मस्त ॥ रूपस्य कारणएते लाघवमिति चेत्। न ।वायान्ल- गिदधियेणायणप्रसङ्कात्॥ इष्टापन्तिरिति चत्। पर्श एव खाघवात् कारणमस्तु | प्रभाया श्रप्र्यचवे विष्टपि रिष्येव fa ष्यात् । तस्मात् प्रभां पश्रौमोतिवद् वायुं
शट
भाषा० STATA योग्यं रूपमन्रापि कारणं ॥ ५५॥ द्रव्या्यक्े लर रोगे मनसा ज्ञानकारणं |
सिद्धा रूशामोति प्रत्यस्य स्वाद् वायारपि ware waaay वद्िद्रं यमत्यक्तमाते तु ग BIA a Ute रतु
। वायुपभयेोरेकलं waa एत्र कचित् द्वित्वादिक्मपि कचित् सद्यापरिमाणादयग्रदे दोषादिल्या़ः॥ yy
, BRT ara मनसा श्नानकारणएमिति।लद्मनःसंया- गे ज्ञानसामान्ये कारणमित्यर्थः किं तत्र प्रमाणं सुषु- faare वच wat पुरौततिवत्तमानेन मनसा ज्ञाना- जनममिति॥. नन सुपुत्तिकाले किं ज्ञानं भविग्यतिश्रन- Weed सरगरूपं वा । नाद्यः ्रनुभवसामग्यभावात्। तथा दि। चाचुषादिप्रत्यचे चक्रादिना मह मनःमंयो- we हेतुलात्। तदभावादेव न चाचृषादि प्रकतं w- नादेरभावादेव न arenas ज्ञानाद्भावेनाद्मनो ऽपि प्रत्यक्षमिति व्याततिक्नानाभावान् नानुमिति। ।सादृ- श्क्चामाभावात् नोापमितिः। पदज्ञानाभावात् नथा- weary दति। श्रनुभवसामग्यभावान् नानुभवः। उद्धाध-
' काभावाश्च न सरणं । मेवे सुपुपिप्रा्ालोत्पने च्छादि- व्यक्तं लसम्बन्धेनात्मनञ प्र्यचप्रसङ्गाद् तदतोद्धियले मानाभावात् ayfanrare नि्विकन्पयकमेव जायत craft परमाणाभावात्। अरय ज्नानमाज वद्मनःमया-
४८
भाषाः AAA सुखं दुःखमिक्छा रेषा मनिः छनिः॥ \ ९॥
"gle
जञानं fain दनी द्दिथमिष्ये।
we यदि कारणं तदा रामनचात्तषाद्वप्रद्यचक्ाने WITTY स्यात् | विषयवक्रमंयागस्य ayaa Way मच्वात् | पैरस्यरप्रतिनन्धादेकमपिवानम्या- fafa wa केचित् पू्ोक्रयुत्या लदूनायागस्य TAA मिद्धे चाक्तषादिमामग्याः सपाशरनादिप्रलिबेन्धकावमन- भवामुराधात् Heya इति। we तुं Agata WaT dare ज्ञानरहेतुवं कल्प्यं चाच्तपादिप्र्य्- कालं वकूमनःमंयोगाभावान्नस्याशनप्रत्य्तमिति az fa wae सुखं दुःखमिच्छादेषा मतिः हतिरिति। मनो जन्य प्रलविषय दृत्ययः। मतिज्गानं ।क्रनिः प्रयन्नः। एवं सुखवादिकमपि मनेग्राद्यं। ण्वमात्मापि मना ore: | किन्तु मनोमात्रस्य गाचर दृत्यनेन oda खाद् रच नाक्रः ॥ ५६॥
wit यत्रिर्विकश्पास्यं तदतीद्धियमिष्यत दति,। स्ःमंयोगाद्यननतरं चट rarer घटवादििशिष ज्ञानं न सम्भवति | प fanaa घटलादेङ्गाना- भावात् | तरििष्टबुदधो विरष्ठक्ानव्य कारणात् तथा च प्रमनाः घटघटलयेर्विभिष्ागवरगाहि रां जायते तदेव निव्विकम्पका्मकं aw न प्रत्य तचा
Uo
भाषा० HV OY रेतुरिन्भिथं करणं मतं ॥ ५७॥
सिद्धा दि विषयानवगादिन्नानस्य way न भवति। घटम "जानामोति waa) तवात्मनि ज्ञानं परकारोभूय भासते | ज्ञाने घटम्तव घटलं यः प्रकारः सएव कि पणमि्युच्यते | fiat यद्विशेषणं तदिशेषणताव- च्छेदकमित्युच्यते | विगेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकं wt विशिष्वयिष्यज्ञानकारपं । निष्विकल्पकं च घटत्वादिकं न प्रकारः | तेनं घरलादिविशिष्टषटादिप्शिष्चभानं ज्ञानेन सम्भवति । *जात्यतिरिक्रपदाथज्ञानस्य किञ्चि इषप्रकारकलृनियमात् ॥ awd‘ षड्डुधि टेतुरिति। cava मदत समवायमम्ब्धेन कारणं | द्र व्यममवेतानां जातिगृणक- मणां way खाश्रयसमवायसन्नन्धेन कारणं | दय समवेतसमवेतानां गृणएलक््मवरूपतादीनां प्रत्ये साश्रयसमवेतसमवायसम्बन्येन कारणमिति ॥ दद्धि यमिति । warfa षड्धिध टृत्यनषज्यते। दृद्धियलन मन जातिः ए्थिवीलादिना साद्ध्॑प्रसङ्गात। किन्त शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगणानाश्रयते सति ज्ञानकारणम- मःसंयागाश्र्यत्ं श्रात्मादिवारणायसत्यन्त्। उद्भूतविशे- WATE Wz न् तरेत [४ AUS सलात्}न्देतरेति fare we
* चरलाश्प्रकारक षटादि्ग््डिद्न्ञानं न सकावति। दति पूवम् द्वित पाठाऽनाकरः।
भाषा
fagte
५१ विषयेद््ियसमनन्धो व्यापारः सोऽपि afew: |
पारेखच्तपि waa उद्भूतेति उद्भूततं न जानि परक्तलादिनासङ्रात्॥ न च ग्ुक्रलादियाणं नापे वेद्धुतलमिति वाचं उद्भूतरूपलादिनौ चात्तषादी जनकतानुपपत्ते; । किन्तु ' कलादि ायर्म नदं नाना ATHTARSY Bas | तच्च मंयागादावपि। तया च शन्देतरेाद्तगृणः संयागादिखचुरादूरक्यता fa. wafat कालादिवारणायं विगग्यद् लं | दृद्धियात्रयव- विषयसंयागस्यापि प्राचां मतेप्र्य्तजनकलात् (दृद यावयववारणाय कालादोा खूपाभाव्रप्रतयक्ते मत्रिकषं घटकतया कार्णोभेतञ्चचःमंयानादयाश्रयम्य काना दश्च वारणाय aque ज्ञानकरणमिद्यपि तद्रार- णाय कारणमिति ।श्रमाध्रणं कारणं करणं ।नथरमा- धारणववं Bata Wyo विषयेदख्धियसम्बस्ा यापारः मोऽपि षडडिधद्ति। व्यापारः सन्निकषंः॥ पड मन्निकर्षमुदाहरणदारा दभ्यति। द्रव्यय tia द्रयप्रत्यच्तमिद्ियम॑यागभैनय। द्रवयममवेतप्रव्यचं दृद्धियमंयुक्तममवायजन्य | ang $पि॥ वस्हुतस्तु LUAU परति चचुःमंयागः कारणं। द्र व्यसमवेत चाषं प्रति वचचःमंयुक्रममवायः। रयम" मवेतस मवेतचा जघ प्रति मंयुक्समदतसमवायः। एवम-
४९ भाषा FATTY संयोगात् संयुक्तसमवायतः ॥ ५८॥
सिद्धाण न्यत्रापि विभेव काणकारणभावः | पनु परमा- णनो नीलत्वं एथिवीपर माणे एथिवीलञ्च wee aye Twa | तत्र परम्परया उद्धुतरूपसमबन्भगय ' महत्वमम्बन्धस्य च fagaraara । तथा हि नोत जातिगेकेव् घटनीले परमाएनोले च वर्त॑ते । तथा च मदत्सब्बन्धाः घटनीलमादाय aa |, रुपमम्बन्धर-
। भयमादा्रैव वर्तते, एवं एथिवीवे घटादिकमादाय मरत्वसम्न्धो FT: | एवं वायै तदीयस्पशादौ च SATAN AAAS स्यात् | तसप्रादुद्रूलरूपावच्छिन- मरत्वावच्ि चलः संयुक्रसमवायख दर यममत्रेतचाचृष- WAS तादृ ग्रचचुःसंयुक्रसमत्रेतसमवायस्य द्र समवेत समवे तचाचषे कारणत वाच्यं । इत्यश्च परमाएनो- लादो न नोलवादिग्रहः । परमाणचक्तुःमंयागस्य मद्वावश्छिस्नवाभावात्। एवं वाखादौ म सचारि- WEE । तज WHATS रूपावच्छिन्नलाभावात् | एवं यत्र घटस्य HASTA AAT STAG बाद्यावच्छेदेन तज घरप्रल्यक्ञाभावादालाकमयोगाव- fend रशुःसंयागे विशेषणं देयं ॥ एवं द्रवयसणा्न- WAS ARIAT: कारणं | द्र्यसमवेतस्याथंनप्रत्यके लक् संथुश्रषमवा्ः । द्र ्खमवेतमवितसाभ्नम्रत्यसे
भाषा”
fagte
48
TAY समवेतानां शब्दस्य समवायतः ॥ ५९ ॥ तदृक्तीनां समवेनसमवायेन तु We | त्वक् संयक्रसमवेतममवायः कारणं | अ्रधरापि AEA च्छिन्नं उद्वतस्पभावच्छिन्रलश्च पृष्वेवदेव any iva WAITS घ्राएसंयक्रममवायः। गन्धममवतम्य प्राण WAITS प्राणसंयुक्तसमवेतममवायः कारणं ॥ एव TAS रसनामंयुक्तममवायः | रममम्वेतस्य रामन Waa रमनामेयुक्रममवेतममवायः कारणं। WV ग्राचावचख्छिन्नममवायः। शब्दममवेतग्रावणप्रत्यक्त भ्रा. चावङ्िन्नसमवेतसमवायः कारष़।। च्च मर्व प्रत्यत लोकिकं बाधं । वच्यमाणममे$्ककं wad दिय संयोगादि विनापि भ्वति॥ एवमात्मनः प्रयत मनः. संयोगः ।ग्रा्मषमवेतमानभमप्रत्यचे मनःमंयुक्रममेवायः। ्राक्मममवेतममवेतमानमप्रतयच मनःमंयुक्तममवतम मवायः कारणं | श्रभावप्रत्यत्ते ममवायग्रत्य्तच ददि यसम्बन्धविषेषणता दतु: ॥
बैणपिकमते तु न समवायः yaa: रत्र यद्यपि विगरेषणता नानाविधा तथा fe भूतलादौ षटामावः संयक्रविगरेषणतया , wa । मह्यादौ रूपाद्यभाव मंयुक्तसमवेतविगेषणतया । मंस्यालादा रूपाद्यभाव संयुक्ममवेतममवेतव्िरषणतया | श्रब्दाभावः Bam
५४
भाषा० विशेषणतया तद्दभावानां TAT भवत् ॥ ९०॥
यदि स्यादुपलभ्यतेत्येवं यच प्रसज्यते |
fagre भरोचावंच्छिनविगेषणतया । कादौ खलाद्यभावः
ओ जावच्छिननममवेतविगेषणतया । एवं aarafear- भावे खलाभावादिकं विशेषणविशरेषणएतया | एवं घरा- भावादौ पटाभावः मंयुक्रविेषएत्िशेषणतया | एवमन्यद णद्ध तथापि विग्ेषणतालरूपेरीकैव सा गण्यते अन्यथा ढा afaad दति प्राचां प्रवादो ares. तेति॥ ५८॥ ५८. ॥ ६० ॥ यदि स्यादुपलभ्येतेति । श्रभावप्रत्यचते याग्ान्- पलयिः कारणं । तथाहि भूतलादेः घटादिज्ञाने जाते चरामावादिकं न ज्ञायत तेनाभावेापत्तम प्रतियोग्ुपलम्भाभाषः कारणं | तत्रापि येग्यताणपे- चिता। माद प्रतियागिस्लप्रसञ्जनप्रमञिजितप्रतियो- गिकलकूपा। तदश्च प्रतियोगिन घटादेः स्लप्रस्या प्रसञ्जित उपलमरूपः प्रतियोगी यस्य स उपलमा- भावोाऽभावग्रतयकते रेतुः । तथा हि । यच्रालाकमंयोगा- “दिकं ata तत्र यद्यत्र घटः स्यात् afe उपलभ्येत इत्यापादयितुं शक्यते तच घटाभावादिप्रयत् भवति श्रन्धकारे तु नापादयितुं श्रयत इति । तेन चटाभा- वारेरन्धकारे TSTMS न स्पाशरनप्रत्यचन्तु भवत्येव
भाषाः
सिद्धा
५५
प्रततं समवायस्य विशेषणतया भेत् ॥ ६१९ ॥ अनोकिकाः सन्निकर्सििविधः परिकीर्तितः |
श्रालाकसंयोगं विनापि स्पाग्र॑नप्रत्यत्तम्यापादयितु अ्रकयलात्। गुरुवादि्ं यदयं तदभावसत न.अ्यचः। तत्र ग॒रुलादिग्र्यक्तखापादयितुमगरक्यवात् | वायो रूपाभावः | पाषाणे मोरभाभावः। गृडे तिक्राभावः। ओते शन्दाभावः। श्रात्मूनि सुस्वाभावः। एवमादय- सतत्तरिद्दियैगद्यना। तत्तम्रत्यक्स्यापाद्यतुं णक्य- ala मंसमाभावप्रत्यच्च प्रतियोागिनेा याग्यता। अन्या- न्याभावप्रत्यक्ते afuarwanaarsafaat । aa मादौ पिश्ाचादिमेराऽपि चलषा गद्यत णव ॥६१॥
wad लो(किकालाकिकभेदेन दिविध । aa लो किकप्रत्यक्ते षाढा मिक वर्णिताः । witha सन्निकषौनिदानीं वदति। ्रलाकिक thal ara: सन्निकर्षः । सामान्यलनच्षति | मामान्यं लक्षणं यस्या cad: | तच wanes यदि स्वल्पम् तदा सामान्यखर्पं परत्यामतिरित्य्यी लभ्यते । तचद्ि- यसम्बद्धविगे्यकश्नाने प्रकाजभूतं माणं । aur fe aa टृद्धियसंयक्ताःधृमादिस्तदिशेयक धुम tfa ज्ञानं आतं | तत्र जञाने धूमलं प्रका गः | भूमन Raa धम tad रूपं सकलधुमविषयकं WIA जाचत |
५९
भाषा सामान्यलक्षणा क्ञानलक्षणा योगजसथा ॥ ९९ ॥ आसन्िरांश्रयाणान्त् सामान्यन्ञानमिष्यते ।
सिद्धा रच यदि एृद्धियसम्बडूमिल्येवोच्यते तदा धूली- wa धूमलभमानन्तरं पकलधूमविषयकं ज्ञानं न सात् । तच धूमलेन स दरन्धियसम्न्धाभावात्। मदति तु इद्धियमष्बद्धं धूलीपटलं तदिगेग्यकधूम दति sa तच श्रकारीभूतं wae प्रत्यासत्तिः ॥ दद्धिवमब्बनभा लोकिको any: इदञ्च वदिरिद्धियस्थले। मानमम्यले त॒ ज्ञानप्रकारोभूतसामान्यमाजं प्रत्यासत्तिः । श्रत शब्दादिना यत्किधित् पिशाचाद्युपखित मानः सक- लपिशाचास्थिध उपपद्यते ॥ परन्तु समानानां भावः सामान्यं । तच क्चिन्नित्यं धूमलादि कचिकशानिल्यं घ- टादि। यत्रैका घटः संयोगेन भूतले समवायेन कपाले शातस्तदमन्तरं सर्वेषामेव तहटवतां भूतलादीनां कपालादीनां वा ज्ञानं भवति । wag Fre eraral येन सम्बन्धेन waa तेन सम्बन्पेन ्रधिकरणानां प्र व्यास््तिः । किन्त चत्र तहटनाश्ानन्तरं तहटवतः समरणं जातं तन्न सामान्यलच्णया weal तहर वर्ता भानेन स्यात् | सामान्यस्य ` तदानीमभावात्॥ ६२॥ । किञ्च sfeuemgfated चट दति ज्ञानं | लज "परदिने दृद्धियसम्न्यं विनापि तादृशा
मषा
fagte
४७ तदि न्ियजतद्रमगोधसामग्यपेच्यते ॥ ९२॥
प्रकारौभूतसामान्यस्य स्वात् तादृशज्ञानं कुतोनजा- aa । तस्मात् etary प्रत्यासज्तिने तु सामायमि- wre श्राखक्िरित्यादि॥ श्रासल्तिः प्रया सश्िरि व्यथः तथा च सामान्यलचपेशय ज लघणबनषद स्य विषयाऽर्यः। तेन सामान्यविषयकं ज्ञानं प्रद्यासन्निरित्यया ad ॥ मन् चचुःसंयागादिकं विगापरि सामान्यजनां चच वर्तत तच एकखचटादीगां चाचृषादि प्रद्यचं wea श्रार। तदिद्धिवज दति ॥ श्रस्याथेः ur वहिरिद्धियेणमा मान्यलक्षणया ज्ञानं जननीं तद यत्किञ्चिदधग्िणि लतसामान्यद्ध तदि द्धि यजन्यज्ञागन्नामम्ो रपिता | aly ara चलुःसंयोगाखाकमंयागादिमं | Aare कारादो चच्रादिना ATE ABTA न जायते॥*६>॥ मनु छागल प्रद्यासत्तियंदि श्ञागरूपा मामा न्यशकणापि Wrrear तदा तयेा्भदोनस्ादतश्राद। विषयी यज्ज तष्टेव यापार ज्ञागलचणा दति। मामा न्यललणा प्रत्यासन्तिहिं तदाश्रयस्य ज्ञानं जनयति | ज्ानख्णाप्रव्यासन्तिस्त् यदिषृयकं wet तस्यैव प लाशन्तिरिति। waraad: । प्रलये सश्जिकपै विना भानं न शद्यदति। तथा च सामान्य्चशां बिनां ya.’ लेग सकलधूमानां तद्धितेन सकशेवङ्गीनाश्च भानं
yo भाषा विषयो BE तरीव व्यापारो श्ञानलक्षणा | योगजे दिविध प्रोक्त युक्तयुञ्जानभेदतः॥ ६४ ॥
fagre कथं भवतु तदथ सामान्यलचणा सीक्रियेत॥ न च सक- लवद्धिधूमभानाभावे क ्तिरिति वाद्यं ्रत्यचधुमे वह्िखबरन्धख गरहोतलात् | अन्यधूमख्य चानुपस्ित- लाद्धुमे afearar न वेति संशयानुपपत्निः। मन्मते त॒ , सामान्यलक्षणया, सकलधूमेपथित कालान्तरीय- देणानरीचरधूमे aware: स्वति ॥ न च शामान्यलक्तणासीकारे प्रमेयलेन सकलप्रमेये wa सार्वज्ञापत्चिरिति वाश्थं | प्रमेयलेन कलप्रमेये ज्ञा- तेऽपि विश्य सकलपदाचानामश्ञातलेन सौर्गव्ञाभा- वात् ॥ एवं ज्रागलकचणाया ्रस्ोकारे सुरभिचन्दन- मिति ज्ञाने Sree भानं कथं ख्यात् यद्यपि सा- मान्यलकण्यापि सैरभभानं समवति तथापि चीर भलस् भानं ज्ानललणया | एवं यत्र YHA धूलीप- टलं शातं तत्र धूलोपटलख्यानु्वशाये भागं WTA WT | raat द्विषिष इति। यागान्याशजनिते wafa- शेषः युतिपुराणादिप्रमाणक Lat: | युक्रयुञ्जानभेदत दति) युयुश्चागरूपयोगिदेविध्वाङूष्ापि दैविध्य- मिति भोवः ) ६४ ॥
Ye
भाषा युक्तस्य VHT भानं चिन्तासशछृतोऽपरः | व्यापारस्तु परामशः करणं व्यानिधो्ममेत् ॥ ६५॥ अनुमायां ज्ञायमानं लिङ्गन्तु करणं न दि |
fagre ame सववेदा भाभमिति | चोागाग्यासवग्ीरतमा- ae: समाधिसमासादितविविधमिद्धियक्रदव्यच्यते | अयमेव विगिष्टये गवच्वार् fronted | सब्वदेति। चिन्तासषकारिणं विनेत्यथेः. । " भानं स्नेविषयाणां णल्यचं | अपरो GATT विषया दरन्तमा ममः। चिन्ता ध्यानं मनसस्तरेकाग्रोकरणं | AT मकारात् IMG च््माव्यवहितविप्ररृष्टानथान प्रत्य्लोकरातोग्यथैः ॥ safafa व्यत्पादयति॥ वयामरस्िति। श्रन् मायां wafaar व्यातिज्नानं करणं । पराम या पारः। तथाहि येन पुरुषेण महानमादा धुम वकः व्यिरंहीता पञ्चात् म एव gem: कचित् Taare अविच्छिन्रधूमां धूमलेखां पष्यति तदननतरं भूमा afeara द्येवेूपं व्यासिखमरणं भवति । तस्माच वद्धिव्याण॑धमवामयमिति ज्ञानं भवति म एव परा- मननं इत्यच्यते। agate पव्बताऽप्रं व्किमानिति भाग जायते । तदेवान्मितिः। wa प्राचौनाम्त् यानन ज्ञायमानं धमादिकमनमितिकरणं । तदू षयति भाय मानमिति ॥
६० भाषा अनागतादिलिङ्गेन न स्यादनुमितिखद। ॥ ee व्यप्र THAT: परामशं उच्यते |
सिद्धा शलिङ्गष्यानुमित्यकरणवे युक्तिमाह ॥ भ्रनागता- दीति । थथ्चनुमिते fey करणं श्यात् तदा अना- गतेन विग्न वा लिङ्गेन अनुमितिं स्यात् । अन्- fafaacwa लिङ्गस्य तदानो मभावात् ॥ ६५॥ ९६॥ ग्रयाप्तस्य पचधम््रवधौरिति | वया्चिविशिष्टस परेण ay ेिश्चावगादिशचागमनुमितिजनकं । तश्च याणः परे एति wre "पका व्याणवानिति ज्ञानं वा। waft fas ve श्याण इति weg परे साधं carat fran) war व्याण्वानिति ज्ञानात् पकः साध्यवानि- श्याकारिका i दिविधादपि परामभात् we: साध्य वानिल्येवामुमितिरिक्यन्ये । ननु वद्कियाणधूमवान् पवेत इति शानं विनापि ज्र caine धूमवानिति wed तते yar afeara इति सरणं भवति | लज शजागदयादनुमितिरन्ननात् 1 व्याश्भिविभिष्ठेभि- श्वावमाहिशागं सवम न कारणं किण व्ाणताव- च्छेदकप्रकषारकपचधवताज्ञागलेन कारणत्वे भावश्ठ- कलात्) विभिष्ेभि्यज्ानकश्पने गारवाचेति चे । STATE TAT NTA SY वद्किथाष्यवानिति ज्ञाना- दमुमिदयुत्पकेः । लाघवाच व्यािपरकारकपरधरता-
भाषण
fagte
९९ व्यानः साध्यवदन्यसिन्नसम्बन्धे TTA: ॥ ९७ ॥
श्ागलेमैव aces | किञ्च धूमवान् पवत एति ज्ना- भाद नुमिन्यापत्तिः। व्यायतावच्छेदकीभतधुमलप्रका- रकपकलधषमताशागस्य THT ॥ ग च तरानीं एषठ माणवयाणयतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपकलषध््मताशजानस्य रेतु- तमिति वाश्यं । Sve anfane Ave पलधर्माता- ज्ञानादनुमितिः स्यादिति । च॑रि तु तत्पुरषीयग्र माणयाप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकतत्णरषोयपधर्ता- wrt सतुपुरुषोयाममिते रेतैरच्यते तदा भ्रनमका- य॑कारणमावः।॥ मन्मते तु समवायेन बयार्िप्रकारक- पलधद्यतान्नानं समवायेनानुमिदिं, जनयतीत्यये मा- नभशकार्कारणभावः। चरि ठत वयाभ्भिप्रकारकंश्नानं पलधन्मताजागश्च aad कारणमिन्युव्यते तदा का- यकारणभावदयं वद्धियाथे धूम आलोकवान् THA दति ज्ञानादप्यनुमितिः स्यादिति । इत्यञ्च यत्र भानः इथं तथापि वि्िषटज्ानं sete | फलमुखगिरव- ष्ादाषलात् इति ॥
gran नाम argrra: aa का वयातिरित्यत आह ॥ व्याभिरिति,। साध्यवदन्येति | वह्िमान् धूमा- feat eran वद्धिः साध्यवान् महागमारिः।तद- न्यो जलष्दादिः। तरदं धूमखेति छसणषमन्यः
९९ भाषा अथवा रेतुमन्निष्ठविरदप्रतियोगिना |
सिद्धा ° धूमवान् वङकेरिद्यारा साध्यवदन्यक्ित्रयःपिष्डादी वङ्धिस्लान्नातिव्यानिः | श्च येन सम्ब्धेन सा तेव aaa साध्यवान् वेध्य; । अन्यथा समवायसम्बन्धेन afar वहटेरवयवसदन्यो अहानसादिः। तच धुमख विश्चमानलादव्या्षिप्रसङ्गात् | साध्यवदन्यञ्च साध्यव- त्वावच्छिन्प्रतिये.गिताकभेदवाम् बध्यः। तेन यत्- किञ्चिदश्धिमान् महानसादिः तद्धने प्बतादा yaa aaa न कतिः ।येम सम्बन्धेन Caer सम्बन्धेन षाध- वदन्याटृत्तिषं बोध्यं । तेन साध्यवदन्यस्िन् धूमावयवे धूमश्च समङायसम्बन्धेन erste न क्तिः | साश्यवद- arefad साथवदन्यडन्तिललावच्छिल्नाभावः । तेन धूमवान् वकरित्य॑व्र साध्यवदन्यष्दारिटन्निवाभा- वेऽपि arfaanfa: । अच यद्यपि xa गणक्मान्य- लविभिष्टसच्वादिल्यादौ विशिष्टषन्लाचाः सन्नायास- क्यात् साध्यवदन्यस्िम् गृणादावटृन्निलं नास्तीति तथापि ₹हेततावच्छेदकरूपेणाटृन्तिलं are । रेतुता- " वच्छेदकं तादूढमटस्तितानवच्छेदकमिति फलिताः | गमु कवलान्यिजनेयवादो. साध्ये साथवदन्याप्रसिदध- arcana: ॥ aol किञ्च सत्नावान् आतेरिल्यादो माथवदन्यखिन्
९२ भाषा" साध्येन रेनोरिकाधिकरण्य व्ापिरुयते ॥ १८ ॥
षिद्धा० सामान्यादौ रेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्पेन समवायेन टे रप्रसिदूलादव्या्भिश्चात we ॥ श्रथवा रतुमन्नि्टेति। डेत॒मति निष्ठा टरिर्चंस्य ष तथा। विरकतोऽभावः । तथा च रेवधिकरणटत्तियाऽभावः तद प्रतियोगिना साध्येन ay ar: षामामाधिकरण्यं anfa: | यद्यपि afeary धूमादित्यादौ रेलधिकरणपन्ेतादि दत्य भावप्रतियोगिवं तत्तदद्यादेरलील्यया्िः ॥ न च समानाधिकरणवङ्किघूमयारोवं arfaftfa वाच्यं | तदक्केर्भयाभावसच्वादेकम्तेऽमि दयं नालीतिप्र तीतेः । गुणवान् द्रवयलादि्याद याने । तथापि साध्यतावच्छेदकं प्रतियोगितामवच्छेदकं तदवच्छित्र- सामानाधिकरणं वयाप्निरिति वायं ॥ गमु रूुपवया- जातिमान् एथिवोलारिल्यारो माध्यतावच्छदक- erage ्क्रवारिखष्टपाणं नीलघ- डादिष्त्यमावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकलमणीत्यथा्िगि- ति ta) तच परम्परया रूपलव्याप्यजातिमल्वस्यव साध्यतावच्छेदकलात् । नि तानुशधश्नावच्छिस्नभिव कापि ofaarafe.) रूपलव्यायजातिमान् arentta बद्यापक्तेः | साध्यादिमेदेन वयाप्तभदात्। तादृ ब्रम्यन
ाष्यतावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकं प्रतियानगितावच्छद्कता-
९९
सिद्धा ° मवच्छेदकमिन्येव सकचएघट कमिल्यपिवदन्ति । एं TROIS साधे परग्परासम्बदधं दषडलादिकमेव साथ- तावण्डछेद कं प्रतियागितामवच्छदकमिति वायं | रेल- धिकरणश्च रेत॒तावष्टेरकवििष्टाधिकरणं वाच्यं | तेन xa मणकश्ौन्यलविभिषटस्वादि्यादे wget करणगुणादिनिष्टाभावप्रतिभागिषेऽपि eT ना- arf: | रेहुतावदधेद कसम्बन्धेन हेलधिकर णां बधय! तेन समवायेन धूमाधिकरणतदवयवनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगिः लेऽपि वक्गोव्याक्निः । अभावचच प्रतिधोगियधिकरणे Gra: । तेम कपिरंधोगी एतद्ललादिव्याद मूलाय देरेभैव 'एतदृषटृन्तिकपिसंयागाभावप्रतिवेगिलेऽपि संयोगस्य warfare प्रतियेामिव्यधिकरणलं प्रति याग्यनधिकरश टत्तिलं | तदा तथेवावया्िः । प्रतिये- गिनः कपिसंयोगष्यागधिकरणमगृणादौ atid याऽभा' वव मूलावङ्ेदेन सनात् । यदि प्रतिबग्यधिकर- wafer तदा संयागिषलारित्यादावतिव्यासिः | सवाभिकरणे ware यः संयागाभावखष् प्रतियो- ग्यभिकरणद्र्यटन्तिलादिति wei रेखधिकरणे प्रतियोम्यनधिकर शटृत्तिलविषिष्टस् विवङितिलात् | खप्रतियोग्धनधिकरणीभूतहेलधिकरणटत्यमाव «fa fred: । प्रतियोगनयिकरएं खप्रतिधोमितावच्छे- दकश्बन्धेय प्रतियोागिताबच्छेदकावङिखचागधिकरणं
९५
fagte ang तेन विशरष्टषन्लावाम् जातेरि्यादे। जात्यभिक- रणगणादै विभिष्टसन्ताभावप्रतियेो गिसमानाधिकर- wasfa न क्षतिः | एवं साध्यतावङ्केद् कषम्बन्ेम प्रति- योग्यनधिकरणलवं are) तेन ज्ञानवान् द्र्यलादि- व्यार द्र्यलाधिकरणएघटादेविंषयतामम्बन्सन ज्ञाना- धिकरणलेऽपि न, चति: । दत्यञ्च वह्िमाम् पुमारि- त्यादौ धूमाधिकरणे समवायेन वह्हिविर दमच्चऽपि न चतिः॥ ननु प्रतियागितावदेदकावङ्कन्नष्र यस्य कम्य: चित् तत्मामान्यस्य वा श्रमधिकरणवं । यत् किञ्चित्. प्रतियोगितावङ्केदकावदिन्नस्यः वानधिकरणवमुक्त । आये कपिसंथामी एतदुकवारिल्यादावया्निः | कपि संयोगाभावस्य fe प्रतियोगिताव्नैदकावद्धन्न टका afacta कपिभयोगे भवति तदनधिकरणश्च za दति । दितीये प्रतियोगिश्चधिकरणाभावाप्र्िद्िः | सर््मरोवाभावस्य पूर््व्णट तिल विण्िष्टसखभावात्मकपर ` तिथयागिषमामाधिकरणलात्॥ न च वङ्िमान् धूमा feandt चराभावादेः पूर्नवचणद्रत्निलविश्िषटखभा वाद्मकनतियाग्यधिकरणंलं यद्यपि पव्वतादमचापि साथ्तावङ्दकसमनन्भेन तत्परवियाग्यनधिक णर wawafa कथमप्रजिद्धिरिति are! घटाभावया वद्यभावस घटाभावात्मकतया घटाभावस्य वन्धि- रपि प्रतियोगी तदधिकरणञ्च पर्थ॑तादीति क्रमण
६९
विद्धा प्रतियोगि्यधिकरणदयाप्रसिद्धलात् | यदि च षटा- भावाद वद्भावादिभिच cea तथापि धुमा- भाववान् बह्भावादिद्यादावष्याप्तिः। तत्र सा्ताव- Seema: खरूपसम्बन्धः | तेन सम्बन्धेन Tea भाव्य च पूव्॑शणटन्तिलविशिषटखभावा्मकम्रतिये- ‘fated रेवधिकरण्खेति। दतीये त कपिसं योागाभावशन् आत्मलादित्यादावयया्भिः। तत्राद्म- दृकिकपिमेयोगाभावाभावः कपिसंयोगस्य च गुण- लात् तद्मतियोगितावक्ेदकं गुणषामान्याभावलमपि तदवङ्िन्नागधि्करणलं रेवधिकरणस्यात्मन दति | मैवं । यादृशप्रतियोागितावङ्ेदकावि्नानधिकरणं हेतुमत श प्रतियोगितानवदेद कलस विवषित- गवात् ॥ गभ काला घटवाम् कालपरिमाणद् दद्य ererfa: | प्रतियोगियधिकरणभावाप्रसिद्धेव- शिकरणष्छ महाकाशस्य जगदाधारतया स्वेषाम- भावानां साध्यतावरेदकसम्बन्धेन कालिकविरेषणएतया अतिबग्यधिकरण्लात् ॥ अच केचित् महाकालमे- दवििष्टघटाभावशंच प्रतियोगियधिकरणमहाका- . we घटाधारवनेऽपि महाकाणमेदविब्रिष्टघटाना- धारलयात्। महाकाले महाकाशमेदाभावात्। AT ae प्रतियगितावद्धेदकसन्बन्धेन प्रतिोग्यगधिकर- शोगतरेवधिकरणडस्वभावप्रतियोगिताशमान्ये यत्-
६७
fagte मन्बन्धावदिल्लवयद्षोवदिखरलोभयाभावसेन बम्ब aa तद्धष्मावदिन्नस्य ततर रेतव्यापकलं Fre) याप- कषामानाधिकरण्यश्च याभिः यत्सम्बन्धः साध्यता- वरेदकसम्नन्धः। TFA: साध्यतावहेदकः। तथ यरि यङ्कवदिन्ञवाभावेमा जभिन्यु्यते तदा समवायेन यो वद्यभावसस परतियोगितावषेद कसम्म्धः ` समवा- aaa प्रतियेग्यनधिकर णपग्बेतादि टिः स एव तत्- प्रतियोगिताव्ेदकञ्च वहटित्रभित्यव्याभ्षिःष्यात् | चदि a यत्सम्बन्ावङिकनलाभावमा चमुश्यते तदा तादृ- we dara घटाभावस्य प्रतियोगितायां संयोागस- म्नन्धावदिन्नवसत्वादव्यात्तिः स्यादत उभयमुपां। TAY काला घटवान् कालपरिम्प्रणरि्यार षंया- गसग्बस्पेन ये घटाभावसत्प्रतियोगिने षट खागधि- करणे महाकाले THA! TVA संयोगन घटाभाव- सस्य प्रतियोगितायां कासिकसम्बन्धावख्छिक्नवघटला- वच्छिशनताभयाभावसलनाननाव्या्निः | धूमवान् TFT क्यादावतिव्याततिवारणाय सामान्यपदमुपाज्नं । गन् अरमेथवङ्किमान् भूमादि परमेयवङिलावच्छिल्- लमपरसिदधं | गुरुध्ागवच्छद्कलादिति ay! म॑। कब्बयीवारिमान् area प्रतीग्या कम्बुयोवादिमष्वा- बच्छिशप्रतियामिताविषयीकरणेन गुरधर्मा पंदर + कलखोकारादिति THT: ॥ ९२॥ '
ec भाषा० सिषाधयिषया श्ल्यसिद्वियंच न विद्यते |
fargte qesfaafaas waa fa तदाद । सिषाध- fawer शून्या बिद्धिरित्यादि । सिषाधयिषाविरह- fafwarar: िद्धेरभावः पदता तदान् पच्च Taq सिषाधयिषामाचं न पक्ताः। विनापि सिषाधयिषां घनगर्जितेन मेघानुमानात् fagr सल्यामपि मिषाध- चिप्तासल्वेऽनुभितिभवल्येव | अतः सिषाधयिषापिरह- विशिष्ट. सिद्धै fated | तथा च aa मिद्धिनालि तच सिषाधयिषौयां सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता । यचच सिषाघधयिषाऽलसि तच सिद्धौ सत्यामसत्यामपि प्ता, aa च भिद्धिरस्ि सिषाधयिषा च मास्ति aa न पचता | सिषाधयिषाविर दविशिषटसिद्धेः स्वात् ॥ नन् यत्र परामश्रामन्तरं fafgea: सिषाधयिषा तव सिषाधयिषाकाले परामभनाशरान्नानुमितिः यत्र सिद्धिपरामशंरिषाधयिषाः करमेण भवन्ति तत्र सिषाध- यिषाकाले सिद्धेन शात् प्रतिबन्धकाभावादेवानुमितिः। यअ सिषाधयिषािद्धिपरामश्राः षन्ति तच पराम- sare खिषाधयिषैव arfe । एवमन्यच्ापि भिदि काले परामधैकालेन रिषवाधविषा॥ योग्बविरभुविगेषग्- wernt दोगपद्निषेधात् कथं सिषाधयिषाविररविशि- लं fegfataefata चेत्। न । अच afwaraya
९९ भाषा" स् पत्तसच STATA AAA । ee ॥
fagre वान् ueiat वद्िमानिन्यलुमितिः। सुखमाघनमिति was स्मरणं वा। ततः सिषाधयिषा । तच पक्तासम्प- सये सिषाधयिषाविरदविभिष्टलविगरेषशसावण्ठकला- दितिं । wad बोध्यं यादृश्यादृशमिषाधयिषामचच भिद्धिमचे यशिङ्गकानुमितिलादृ मिषाधयिषाविर- ₹विशिष्टसिद्यभा वसतलिङ्गकानुमिना पक्ता । तेन भि- द्धिपरामश्रंमत्वेऽपि यत्किञ्चिन्त्नानं जायनामितीच्छा- यामपि नानुमितिः। वङ्कियायधूमवान् पन्बैता वह्धि- मामिति varawa प्र्यच्तादिभिन्रं वङ्किन्नानं जाय- तामितीच्छायान्तु भवत्येव | , एवं धूमपरा मधम आलोकेन वद्किमनुमिनेामोतीकामामपि मानुमितिः। मिषाधयिषाविर काले argufafgas नानुमिति- ware सिद्धिविशिय तत्तदनुमितिप्रतिबर्िका व - कव्या । तेन प्व॑तस्तेजसी पाषाणमया वदह्धिमानिति आनमन्तेश्यनुमितेनं विराधः TTY परतावच्छैदक- मामानासिकरण्येन माध्यसिद्धावपि तदवददेनानमि- तिद ध॑नात्। पकलतावच्छेरकावदेदे नागुमितिं मति qe तावदेदकावकेदेन fafgta pfaafarar | vaara- रेदकसामानाधिकरण्ठेनानुमितिं प्रति त fafgars विरोषि। ददन्तु बोधं । अयं Tea न वेति षषः arate थच पुरषलदयाप्यकरादिभागयं षति wea
Yo
भाषा अनेकानो विरदरशाप्यसिद्ः परमिपितः | fagre त्रासद्याममुमितायां पुरषलस् very भवति न त- नुमितिरतेऽनुमिरा विर इवि शिष्टसमानविषयकप्रद्यच- सामयी कामिनीजिन्नाखादिवत् खातख्छेण प्रतिब- frat. एवं परामभ्रानन्तरं विनापि प्रत्यचेष्छां पारिम्रत्यशानुत्यतेः । पर्थचेच्छाविरवििषटान् -मितिसामग्रो भिन्नविषयकमप्रत्यक्त प्रतिबस्थिका ॥ ६८॥ "प्रसङ्गसङ्गत्या. हेलाभासाम् विभजते। ware दत्यादि । तहच्तणन्ुं यद्िषयवेन श्नानस्यानुमितिवि- Tae तलं auf व्यभिचारादि विषयकलेन ज्ञा- स्यानुमितिविरोधिलयात् ते दोषाः । यद्धिषयकलश्च यादृ शविशिष्टविषयकलं बध्यं । तेन वाधभ्रमस्यानुमि- तिविरोधिलेऽपि तच प्ते वह्ृभाववानिति विष्ट स्याप्रसिदलान्न रेतुदोाषाः। नच वद्यभावव्याण्यपा- षाणमयलवान् पम्बेत इति परामर्भकासे वह्ियाण- धुमखाभासलं न ख्यात् तच वद्ुभावव्याण्यवाम् प्च दति विशिष्टया प्रसिद्धखादिति are । Cerra: | अन्यथा वाधभमखाणयनिन्यरेषलापन्तेः। तस्मात् तच TAT वब्या्यपाषाणमयलवान् इति परामध्काले बङ्कि्याण- धूमख्य नाभाखलं भमादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धमाचं। शेख मदुषटद्ति। सत्यश्च साध्याभाववदुिरेलादिकं रोषः तदत चे Var येन केनापि सब्बन्धेनेति waar: | परेतु
QR भाषा कालात्ययोपदिषटशच शत्याभासास् TIM ॥ ७०॥
आद्यः साधारणस्तु स्यात् स्याद साधारण AA |
fagre यद्विषयकलरेन ज्ञानस्यानमितिविरोधिलं ace रेवा- area anfare विरोधियाघ्यादिकमेव तथा ace रेताशानरूपषम्बन्धेन॥ ग चैवं वहिमान् भूमादि वाधथमे पके साध्याभावविषयकलेनामुमितिविगापि- लाज्तागरूपसम्बन्धेन तदत््ख्यापि "सत्वात् सद्धतारपि वाधितिलापत्तिरिति are | तच ज्ञानस्व सम्बन्धला- wera । wa सतप्मतिपचित दति यवहारेण तत्- कल्पनात्। तज वाधितव्यवहाराभावादित्याङ्ः। च्- भुमभितिविरोधिषञ्च अनुमितितल्कारणान्यतरविर- first) तेन vata भिचा र रहेहेवमरेणागुमिलयु- waaay यभिचारन्नानद्धाम्- भितिविरोधिललाभावेऽपि न afaftia मङ्गेषः॥ या- Vesa यावन्तो दोषास्ावदन्यान्यलं तच Varnes । पञ्चकथनन्त् तत्ममरवस्यलाभि प्रायेण । एवं साधारण्छाद्न्यतमलं श्रनेकान्तिकल्यं ॥ ७० ॥ आः साधारण anf | साधारणः साथवरन्य- afata: । तेन च व्यातिहपरलिबन्धः क्रियते । च्रसा- धारणः साथासमाताधिकरणे हेतुः | तेन माथना- मागाभिकरण्छयहः प्रतिबध्यते । यथा शब्दा fra: अष्टलारित्यारौ चासाधारण्डं | गब्दाऽनित्यः WAR AT
x भाषा" तथेवानुपसं RCL चिधानेकान्तिमो भवेत् ॥ ७१॥
fagre दिल्यादो श्रसाधारणयभरमः। We तु सपक्ताटन्तिर- साधारणः | सपक्ष निशित साध्यवान् । इत्थञ्च wer नित्यः शब्दलादित्यारै पके यदा साध्निश्चयमादा ,मासाधारणं तत्र रेतनिञ्चयादिति वदन्ति ॥ श्रन् पसंहारौ च श्रव्यन्ताभावाप्रतियागिसाध्यकादिः। तेन च व्यतिरेकव्यािग्रहप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते ॥ विरुद्धम् . साध्यव्यापक्रोश्धतभावप्रतियागी | अयञ्च साथाभावः ग्ररसामग्रोलेन प्रतिबन्धकः ॥ सत्प्रतिपक्ते तु प्रतिहत माध्याभावसाधकः। अतु रेतुरपेति विशेषः। ar ध्याभावसाधक एव साथ्यसाघकत्वेन उपन्यस्त दत्य करिविगेषेषिस्वापकलाख faite: ॥ सप्रतिपचः साथा- -भावव्याष्यवान् TS: । श्रण्होताप्रामाण्यकषाध्यवयाणव- स्वेमो पर्थितिकार्लनसाध्याभावव्याणवक््ेनो पस्यितिवि - षयस्तथा THA | श्र च परस्पराभावव्याणवत्ता- जानात् परस्णरानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलं ।। श्रव केचित् यथा चटाभावगयाणवन्ताज्ञाने विद्यमानेऽपि घट चचुः- संयोगे सति चटवन्ाज्ञानं जायते |यथा च सत्यपि पौतल्वाभा वव्छणश्रङ्खःलवन्ताज्ञामे पिन्तादिरोषे wy दति धीजायते हवं कारि दयव्याणवन्तादश्रने कोरिद्यप्रत्यक्षरूपः संशये भवति तथा सप्रतिपक्तम्यले संषयरूपागुमितिभवलयेव यच चैककोारिव्याणदर्शनं
#
रिद्धा° तचाधिक्वलतया दितीयकोरटिभागप्रतियन्भाशर ¢- We: । फलेन चाधिकमखभावः कल्यत रति वदन्ति । तन्न । तदभावव्याणवन्ताक्नाने सति तदुपनी- तभागविशेष्ाब्दसेधादेरनुद यात्। रौकिकरन्निक- घोजन्यदेाषयविगरेषाजन्यश्चानमाते तख अतिबन्कला । खाघवात्। न षेनीतभानविधेषे पाब्दनेषे च yaa प्रतिबन्धकता | गोरवात् । तथाच भरतिबन्धकसलात् क- यममुमितिः। न हि लोकिकमक्ञिकर्षम्यसे प्रदममिव सप्मतिपचग्यले संशयानुमितिः प्रामाणिकी येनान्- भितिभिन्नलेनापि विणेषणीयं। यत्र काटि दइययाणव- कताश्चानं तत्राभयतराप्रामाण्ठज्ञामात् deat नान्यथा ऽदहत प्रामा्यकरोव विरोधिन प्रतिबन्धक- लादिति॥ । आश्रवाविद्याचन्यनमवममिद्धवं + आाययामि दः We पलतावश्छेदकस्याभावः । यतर च काञ्चनमय: wear वङ्किमानिति श्यते तज cea मे काञ्चन मय दशति wet विद्यमाने काश्चवमयपर्धत पर्ा- भरप्रतिषैनभः फलं ` खरूपाषिदधिष्ठ पले श्यश्यलाभि मतस्वा्भावः । अभर च yet KE धूमारिग्यारो पक्त यणना- भिमतख्छ रेतारभावे भाते परे TMNT AMT
जगयरूपवरामर्जपरतिवन्धः फलं ॥
fargte
७४
साध्यासिद्धिरिपि वयाणलासिद्धिः । सा च माय साथ्यतावच्छेदकाञावः। तथा च काञ्चनमयवङ्धिमा- नित्यादौ ara साध्यतावच्छेदकाभावे ज्ञाते माण- तावच्छेदकविशिषटसाध्यवयाष्यवत्तान्नानंरूपपरामधप्र-
fara: फलं ॥
एवं Var रेतुतावच्छंदकाभावः साधनाप्रमिद्भिः) यथा च काञ्चनमयधूमादित्यादेष देतुतावच्छरेदकवि- शिष्ट हेतेज्गानाभावात् तन्तद्धेतुकव्यािज्नानारेरमा- वः फलं । एवं वड्किमान् नीलधूमादिव्यादेः गुरुतया नीलधूमलवं दतु तानवच्छदकमिति वयाण्लासिद्िरि- त्यपि acfa
काधसु पत्ते साध्याभावादिः | एतस्यानुमितिप्र- तिबन्धः फलं । तद्धश्विकतदभावनिश्चया लोकिकसनि- कषाजन्यदोषविगेषाजन्यतद्धस्मिंकतनज्तानमाते विरोा- Waa तु aa संग्यसाधारणं पच्च साध्यसंर्टवज्ञा- नमनुमितिकारणं | तदिरोाधितया वाधसप्रतिपक्त- येरेलाभासल्मिति युक्तं । एयिवयामितरमेद एता- दृ ्रानुमिल्यनापत्तेः । ws पक्ते शाध्यम॑खषटवज्नाना- भावात् | श्रघशिद्धखाध्यकानुमित्यपलापापत्तेः । सा- wind विनानुमिल्युत्पन्नेख ।॥ एवं waaay प्रमात्रज्ञानमपि न प्रतिबन्धकं । प्रमाणाभावार् ग- Taw) अन्यया सत्मतिपदाद्ावपि तदभाववयाणकव-
Oy
भाषा यः सपक विपत्ते च भवेत् साधारणस् सः
7
fagte त्ताज्ाने प्रमालविषयकलेमं प्रतिबन्धकतापक्तेः। किमत भरमलज्ञानानाखन्दिता वाधादिवुद्धः परतिबृन्धकता। त्र भमलशङ्काविधटने प्ामा्णश्नानं किदुपयुज्यते॥ न च वाध्यते पतै देतुम्ते यभिचारः प्ते रेव- भावे खरूपासिद्धिरेव रोष दति वाच्यं | वाधन्ञान- व्भिचारज्नानादेभेदात्। किञ्च दा परामानन्तरं काधबृद्धिसत् वयभिचारज्ञानादेरकिञचित्केरलार् वा- धस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकलं वाच्यं । णवं यवेत्पत्निचणा- वच्छिने घटाद गन्यायप्रयिवोवन्नानं तत्र awe प्रतिबन्धकं वाच्यं । नच घटे MATA कथं वाध दूति वां । पक्ततावच्छेदकदेग्रकालावच्छदेनान्मित रनभवमिद्धलात्। * दति वाधतद्गाणभिन्नायय ear भासाम्तदव्याणा अपि aaa एवानतभंवन्ति। अन्यथा रेतलवाभासाधिक्यप्रमङ्गार् वाधव्याणमत्मतिपला भिन्न एव । खतनमेच्छेन मुनिना एयगृपादानात् । मप्रतिष- waa न प्रतिवन्धक, tha प्रकटिताऽर्थः॥ ०4 ॥ यः aad विपदे च भवेत् माधारणम्हु मद्ति।मप- लविपकतटृन्तिः षाधारण cad: | मपल साध्यवान् । विपक्षः साधयाभाववीन् विरुद्धवारणाय मपचटृत्तिव-
+ दूति famarinma: पाटः 1 मन्प्रतिक्वतद्रायमिद्राया या उनवाभाष्य)प्यःप तन्मध्य eT | TRF पुष्पादि रहत '
७९ भाषा TATA व्यावृत्तः स चासाधरणो मतः 193 तथेवानुपसंदारौ केवलान्वयिपक्तकंः | यः साध्यवति नेवासि स विरद उदाहतः 11 99 |
a
fagre an agar विपश्षटत्तिलमेव are i faage साधा- रणलेऽपि दूषकतावीजख भिन्नतया तख पाचेकयात्॥ यशभयस्मार् BEM: सं चासाधारणो मत दति सपच्चविपचयाटत्त दत्यथः। सपचः साध्यवत्तया निशि- तः। विपक्तःसाध्यश्रून्यतया निखितः। भन्दा नित्यः गन्द- लादित्यादै यद् शब्देऽनित्य बन्दे हस्तदा UTA वि- पच्चलश्च घटलादौीनामेव तद्राटत्तञ्च श्न्दवमिति तदा तदसाधारणं यदा तु wee मिल्यलनिञख्यस्तदा नासा- धारणः | NTE प्राचां मतेन। नवीनमते TSAR Het केवलान्वयिपच्तक दति। के वलान्वयिधस्मौ वच्छिति- पर्क rau: | सब्ब॑मभिेयं प्रमेयलादिद्यारो सन सेव पचचवात् सामानाधिकरण्छग्रहखला राभावा- arafafa: | इदमु न सम्यक्। Toned eee TART कतेरभावात् | WY वा सहचाराग्रडलाव- तापि waraeaifefgta न तु रेलाभाषलं aT ` तथापि केवलाप्वयिसाध्यकलं त्लमिद्युक्तं ॥ यः साध्य- बतोति। एवकारेण साथ्यवत्वावच्छेदेन रेवभावे बा- धितः.। तथा च साध्ययापकीभूताभादय्रतियोगिनं ATU: ॥ ७१॥
७99
भाषा श्रा्यारिद्विराद्या स्यात् खपासिद्िरप्यय | ATARI स्यादसिद्वितस्िधा ॥ ७४॥ पक्तारिद्िरय्र पर भेमणिमयो गिरि। चदा द्रव्यं THATS चासिद्िरथापरा ॥ OY I वयापयतवासिद्विरपरा नोलधमादिके aT | विरुहयोः पराम देलोः सतृप्रतिपत्तिता ॥ ७६॥ RPA यच CTT वाध उद्ातः। उर्यन्तिकासीनघटे गन्धादिरयेच सौध्यते |} ७७॥
सिद्धा श्रसिद्धि विभजते। चराग्रयाभिद्िरिव्यादि ॥ ७४॥ पक्तासिद्धिरिति। श्राश्रयार्मिद्धिरि्यैः। नील- धूमादिक इति । नीलभूमलं गुरुतया म हेतुतावच्छ- दकं । समानाधिकरणवयायतावष्छेदकधरौन्तराघ- fonda वयायतावच्छेद कलात् | धूमप्रागभाववमद्ग- हाच समानाधिकरणफेति॥ ७५॥ विर्ङ्कयोरिति। कपिम॑येगतद् भाववयाणवच्वपगा- aust भ anfaufaaqaa om) व्िरद्भयारिति। तथा च सखसाध्यविरदमाध्याभावय्ाणवक्षापरामग्र कालोगसाथवया्यवक्ापरामदशरिवय व्यथः । ०९ ॥ ara fd । प्तः पक्तावच्छेदकविशिष्ट, wad: । तेन घटे mares न fa: एवं मूनाव- च्छिन्ना टतः कपिसंयागीत्यत्रापि बे थं oon
छट
भाषा ग्रामोणस्य प्रथमतः पश्यतो गवयादिकं। सादश्यधंगंवादीनां या स्यात् सा करणं मतं ॥७८॥ वाक्या्स्यातिदे शस्य BAIT उश्यते | गवयादिपदानान्त॒ शक्तिधोरुपमाफलं ॥ ७२ ॥ .पदज्ञानन्तु करणं दारं ततर TET |
सिद्धा उपमित यत्पाद यति । ग्ामीणसयेति । zara ` केन केनष्विद् waite wea गोसदगो गवयपद्- are ofa Ware य्रामीणेन कचिद्रण्ये गवये दृष्ट तत्र गोामादृश््ञानं यत् तर् उपमितिकरण ॥ oc ॥ तद गन्तरं Wai गवयपदवाच्य दृत्यतिदेशवा- UAT जायते तदेव व्यापारः तदनन्तरं तत्र गवया गवयपदवाच्य दति ज्ञानं जायते तदुपमितिः। नत्वयं गवयपदवाच्य द्युपमितिः। गवयानरे क्रि यहाभावप्रसङ्कात् । ७९ ॥ शाब्दवेधप्रकारं दशंयति। पदज्ञानन्विति।नतु कायमानं पदं करणं । पदाभावेऽपि मैीनिन्नीकारौा ान्दमोधात् । पदार्थधीरिति । पदजन्यषदा्॑खर व्यापारः अन्यधा पद ज्ञानवतः प्रत्यचतादिना vray. स्वितावपि शाब्दकाधापन्नेः तत्रापि * gar पद्जन्यलं Bret) yaar घटादिपदात् समवायमम्बन्धेन श्राका-
~ ea ---- -
* पड्तन्यापदर्थैपस्थितावपोति दिनकसयाद्ा ॥
भाषा शाब्दबोधः फलं तच शक्तिधोः सहकारिणो ॥ ८० ॥ fagre WATE जायते) श्राकाश्रस्यापि गराब्दषोधापन्त। टिः शरक्तिलक्तणान्यतरः सम्बन्धः । waa शक्रिज्ञानव्याप- यागः । पयं शक्रिप्रहाभावे पदज्ञानेऽपि ततमम्बन्धन स्षरणानपपत्तेः | पशज्ञानस्य सम्नन्धिज्नानविधयाऽय- स्मारकलं। क्रि पदन सद पदायस्य मम्बन्धः माचा स्माच्छब्दादयमयै FEA दतीग्ररेष्छारूपा।्राधु- निके नाज ्रक्निरस्येव । एकाद गभरऽदनि, पिता नाम HAT दतोश्रेच्छायाः TATA | धुनिकेत् aKa a श्रक्तिरिति सम््दायः॥ नथाम् Dace a MIM: fafersa । तेन आधुनिकदतेऽपि शरक्रिरमतीति वदम्ति॥ ufmaey व्याकरणादितः। तथा fel ufmay वयाकररापमानकंपाप्नवाकः IgTARITAD | वाकस्य रोषादिटतेवद नि म॑ निथ्यतःम्ड्पदग्बटदधाः॥ धातु्रृतिप्रत्ययादीनां ग्रक्रिग्रदा व्याकणाद्धवति। कचित् तु सति वाधके व्यज्यतऽपि। यथा व्याकरण राख्यातस्य wate winged! घनः पचतीत्यादा क्तं सेतैस्याभेदान्यः | AT मोग्वान जन्यत किन्न wat अर्तिहा लाघवात्। हतियताद प्रकाशीभुव भाषतं।॥ न च क्लरनभिधानाच् चेव्ादिपराननकाब, दतोया खादिति वाचं । ,कटंमह्धागन्निधानद तत्र तन््रलात् । ब्याभिधानयागच कम्मवाद्यमवरढ्
Go
fagre प्रथमान्मपदापा्ः कमंलादोत्य ख विशेषणलताव- ग्या विषयलमर्थः । तेन चेच टव गच्छतीत्यादौ म ते BMT: । यच ककारो न वििषणलतात्यययं तदा- रणाय प्रथमान्तेति । wer धालधातिरिकाकिगेष- UA प्रथमदलाथेः। तेन' चेच ट्व गच्छतीत्यच चेषा Raed | साकं tends सोकादेवीरणाय च दितीयदलं। तख दितीयान्तपखाप्यलाद्वारणएं। एं वयापरारेऽपरि नं शक्तिः गोरवात् ॥ रथो गच्छतीयादौ खब्यापारे आश्रयते वा लक्षणा ॥ जानातीत्यादैौ तु आयवे Malate प्रतियोगि निरूढलक्तणा | उपमानाद्यथा UMTS TAA ॥ एवं कोषादपि पकरिण्डः। सति बाधके रित् aaa) चथा नोलादिपदानां नीलरूपारौ नीला- दिविष्टि waft: कोषे दयुत्यादिता तथापि लाघ- वाम् नीलादौ क्तिः नीलादिविगिषटे watfan एवमाप्तवाक्यादपि। चथा कोकिलः पिकपदवाय श्व्यादिग्रब्टात् पिकादिशक्रियरः॥ एवं यवहारादपि। यथा प्रयोजकद्दधेन घर मानये- हयुक्तं AHA परयोज्यदृद्धेन घट आनीतः) तदवधार्य पारस्य बाला घटागयनरूपं कायं घटमागयेतिभन्द- प्रथाख्यमदधारयतु । ary घरटमपसारय गामानय Tag आवापोादापाभ्यां warfgugrat कामीन्वित-
=
fagre घटादे whi carta ।द्यच्च भूते नीलो घट द्ा- दिशब्दान्न शाब्दबोधः । "वटादिषद्ानां का्याजित- warfare सामव्यौवधारणात्। कार्यतादोधे प्रति च लिङादीनां सामशीत् तदभावान्र weary द्यपि केचित्। तथ । प्रथमतः कायीनितघराद भरववधार- रुऽपि लाघवेन पञ्चात् तख परित्यानीचिष्यात्। अत एव चेच rae जातः कन्या ते ate जाता व्याश मखप्रसादमुखमालिन्याशां सदः सेऽनमाच तत्- कारणलेन परिषा च्छान्दवधं ` निर्णीय तद्धेतुतया तं शब्दमवधारयति । तया च अभिचारात् काय्याचिते a aft: नचतत्रते Uae Meer AMT Ere मानाभावात् | Sa पुत्रमे जातो, BAMA az- भावाच | इत्यञ्च लायवादनचितषदेऽपि af यका घटपदस्य ecard शक्तिमवधारयति॥
एवं वाक्यशेषादपि शरज्रिग्ररः। यथा यव्मयशर्भ
वतीद्यत्र यवपददय दीर्धश्ुकविग््टश्ार्याणां प्रयागः की च सेच्छानां। तन् हि यथाऽन्या प्राषधयाा- यने श्रयते मोदमाना दपोत्तिष्टन्ति ॥
- वसन्ते -सरव्वमस्यानां जायत प्रशातनं | मादमानाञ्च ष्ठि gar: कणिरशालिनुः ॥ दति वाक्यगेषाद् cases अकतिरिंणथते। ay अक्रिभरमात्, प्रयोगः । मानाशरक्रिकनाने गेरवात।
M
fagre शरिपदारोा तु विगिगमकाभावास्नानाश्रक्तिकच्यनं ॥ एवं विवरणादपि शक्तिग्रहः | विवरणन्तु तमानार्थ पदान्तरेण तदर्थकथनं | यथा घटोऽरी्यस्य कल- शोऽसीत्यनेन विवरणाद् घटपदस्य कलग ्रजनिग्रदः। एवं पचतीत्यस पाकं करोतीत्यनेन बिवरणादाष्या- तस्य यन्नार्यंकलं कल्पते ॥ " एवं प्रसिद्धपदसान्निध्यादपि शरक्तिग्रदः। aut ce सदकारतरो मधुरं पिका रौतीत्याद्ै पिकपदख शरक्रिगरद दति ॥ aa जातावेव afm तु यक्ता यभिचारादान- ware) ofa विना च जातिभानखासम्वाट्ाक्रेरपि भागमिति केचित् laa uf विना द्यक्रिभानानु- पपत्तेः । न च व्यक्त लचणा । अनु पपन्ति प्रतिसन्धानं विनापि व्यक्तिबोधात्। न च व्यक्ति्रकरावानन्दं । सक- लब्यक्रावेकस्ा एव WR: खीकारात्। न चाननुगमः) गालारेरेवानुगमकलात् ॥ किञ्च गाः ्रक्येति शक्ति- यहा यदि तदा BAT ufm: । यदि तु गलं शकय fafa शक्रिग्रखूदा गालवप्रकारकपदांथ॑स्मरणं शाब्द- Awe A Gra समानप्रकारलेन शक्तिज्ञानस्य पदा- सरणं श्ाब्दबेाधं प्रति व हेतुलात् ॥ किञ्च गाते यदि afwagt tad शक्यतावष्डेदकं वा्यं।गा- लम गवेतरासमेतले सति eae खमवेतलं । तथा च
fagre गेदयक्तीनां प्क्यतावच्छेद केऽनुप्रेशा् ada Aredia
स्मात् तत्तलायाहतिविगिषत्द्चनिओोधारुपपाचा कस्यमाना शक्रिजेत्याहतिषिगिष्टयक्त विश्राग्यतीति॥
WITH feats किदं कियागरुटं किधेगिकरुढं । यचरावयवाथं एव वृध्यते तृ गिकं। यथा पाडकादिपदः॥
यचावयवगरक्तिनैरपेचेण समुदयशकिमाप्ेण बुध्यते age यचा गोपदघटादिषरं।, "
यत्रतु भ्रवयवश्रक्रिविषये ममृदायष्करिरयलि त- दागरढं | यथा पद्धजादिषदं | तथा [ह पद्धजपदम- aaa पद्धजनिकटरपमयं "बोधयति । ममृदाय- WRT च पद्मविन रूपेण पदा बोधयति ॥ न च केवना- PAINT YAS प्रयोगः zrfzfa ara afer केवलथेगिकार्थज्नानप्रतिवन्धकलादिति wre:
वस्तुतस्तु TATTAMATAA ATG AAA UIT निकतुंरन्ये भवति । afqara naa eae वाधः प्रतिमन्धीयते त्र Tawar कुमदादबाधः। यत्तु कुमुदेन रूपेण योधेन raul Tra च areearaaanfmaray faery Taare: 11
त तु स्यखपद्मादावद्यवार्वाधणत् ममदाय- आहया च पद्मवेन रूपेण ब्रोधः। यदि त तपदं विशराती यमेव तरा लतणेव ॥
८४
भाषाः AUT शवयसब्बन्धलातयययनुपपन्तितः। _ fagre यत्रावयवाथैरूकाथयोः खातच्येण बेधसदयोगिक- रूढं | यथेद्धिदादिपदं । aa हि ऊद्धंभेदनकन्ता
तरगृरादिरपि बुध्यते यागविगेषाऽपीति॥ ८० ॥ । लक्तणा शक्यसम्न दद्यादि, गङ्गायां चोष Tas गङ्गापदस्य शक्यार्थ प्रवादरूपे चोषस्ान्वयानुपपत्ति- स्तात्प ानुपप्तिव्वौ यच प्रतिसन्धीयते त्र लक्षणया ATS aw: | सा च शक्यसम्बन्ध; । तथा हि प्रवा- हरूपशक्या येमम्न्धस तीरे Wasa ATS ar ततः शाब्दबोधः। परन्तु यद्यन्वयानुपपत्निरंचणा- वीजं UAW यष्टीः प्रवेशयेत्यच WUT न स्यात्, यष्टिषु प्रेशान्वयस्यानुपपन्तेरभावात् | तेन यष्टि्रवभर भाजनतात्पागुपपत्चा यष्टिधरे लकणा । एवं काक- ‘war दभि रच्छतामव्यादै काकपदख दध्युपघातकं लचणा । waar दधिरचायासतात्यस्पविषयलात् ॥ एवं इत्रिणा यान्तीत्यारै विपद् सैकसास्वाहितेन SVU | ह्यमेवाजदत्लाथा लचणेलयुद्यते । एकसाध॑- बादिलेन रूपेण दंतितदन्ययेरगैधात्"।। यदि we * पपत्तिलंचणादजं सात् तदा कचद्ङ्गापदस्य तीरे BRITE मयादौ लच्एेति नियमे न खात् wea बाधं wader ufe Aaa रूपेण BAST तोरनेन Aaa: 1 यदि तु गङ्गातीर-
ल्प
fagte लेन रूपेण WHAT तेनेव रूपेण समरणं । श्रत wa लच्यतावच्छेदक न लचणा.। AMATI तच लच्णां विनाणुपपत्तेः | परन्तु एवंक्रमेण प्कयतावच्छे- दकेऽपि शरनिनं सात् । तत्मकारकणन्दाश्॑रणं प्रति ततूपद स्य सामयमिल्यैख खुवचलवादिति विभावनीयं ॥ यच तु wade खाग्रयपदषा्लर्पा seu खा लक्तितलक्ततुव्यते । यथा दिरेफादिपदं रफदय- सम्बन्धो भरमरपदे Wad . भमरप्रदस्यन्च मम्बन्ध भ्रमरे ज्ञायते । तत्र लकितजच्तणा } किन्तु लात्तफिकं पदं नानभावकं | लाचणिकार्थख meaty तु पदा- मारं कारणं | शक्रिलत्तणान्यतरमम्बन्पनतरपदाचौ- वितखशकया्चंशाब्दवेाधं प्रति पदानां मामथावधा- रणादिति arg: ॥ नवोनास्तु तदणनुभावकमेव ] पदाापम्वितिस्हु दवारं । wat qa WHT पदस्ाननुभावकलापत्तेरित्याङः | "वाक्य तु WHT- waaay लचणाऽपि नास्ति | यत्र गभो- रायां wet घोष caw तत्र नदौपद्म्य नदौतीग Boar) गभोरापदार्थस्य नद्या महाभदनाययः। कचिदेकदेग्रान्वयम्् सीृतवाद् । यदि तत्रकदमाच- योऽपि न सीक्रियते, तदा ALITA गभीरमदीतीग लक्षणा गभीरापदं तात्यग्यायाहकं ॥
व Sec नि + नबोन मतेाद्वखमं विद्रत्सख्मततयाःनादतपृष्मप्यवादत (
४
fagte
me
बडव्रीहावथेवं । तच fe चितरगुपदारौ ads. रेशाखयः खोक्रियते तदा गेपदस्य गाखामिनि -शक्तणा | गवि चिचामेदान्वयः। यदि atari न खोक्रियते तदा ance चिचगेाखामिनि लचणा।
feared तात्ययययाइकं
एवमारूढवानरे SICA वानरपदे वानरा-
राणक््मंणि लक्षणा | श्रारूढपदच्च ATA |
एबमन्बचऋपि ॥ .
तत्पुरुषे त॒ पुत्वपदे weer । तथाहि राजपुरुषा- faut राजपदाथैन परुषादिपदाथैख arenas यः। निपातातिरिक्रनामाथयोर्भरेनान्यवेधस्याय्- त्पन्नलात्। WUT राजा पुरुष carafe तथानय- Ara: खात् पटो न घट दद्याद घटपटाभ्यां नजः साललादेवाव्वयान् निपातातिरिक्रेति। नीलो घट TAT नामा्यारमेद सम्बन्येनान्याद्धेदेनेति॥ न च राजपुरुष TERT सुप्तविभक्तेः सरणं कल्प्यमिति are | भरृतविभक्रेरपि तते बपादयात्। तस्माद् राजपर्ादे राजसम्नन्धिनि GUT | तखा च पुरुषेण QUAI: i
इन्दे त धवखदिरौ च्छिन्धत्यारो धवः afera विभ्र्दिलप्रकारण बुध्यते तच wee ॥ न च सारिल्ये लेति वाच्यं । साहियश्न्ययारपि दद-
८७
fagte दर्धनात् ॥ न च एकक्रियावयिलरूपं साहिल्यम- सोति वाद्यं | क्रियाभेदे धवखदिरौ हिनीत्यादि- दनात् सादिल्यखाननुभवास । तस्मात् afer दिकं ae: | श्रत एव THAT AT सायु्यका्नो यजेयातामित्य र लचशाभावाद् इन्द WANA | किन्त वाखवे मेदा ae तच इन्दः । न च नोलघरयारमेद इत्यादौ कथमिति वाच्यं | aw नीलपदशट "नीलव चटपद्ख चटलमथः । HHT, LARIAT qua समारारदन्दे तु यदि षमैहारोऽयनभयत द्य च्यते तदाऽहिनकुलमिद्यादो पररपदेऽहिनकुलममा- दारे ल्णा | पूर्वपदं तात्पर्यं हकं ॥ न च भरी- By वाद्येल्य्र कथं मैमाहारलयाकयाऽपत्ताव्- द्धिविरेषष्ूपस्य वादनामवादिति ari) खौश्रय- टत्तिवदटपसम्बन्भेन तद्न्वयात् । एवं पञ्चपुनात्या- दावपि॥ परे तु अ्रिमकुलमित्यादो श्रहिर्नकुनय बध्यते । प्रतयेकमेकलावयः समाहारमन्जरा च । यत्र कलं waa पराणिष्धर्थत्यादिदतरेाकं तत्रैव । भन्य- ओैकवचनमसाध्विति वदन्ति ॥ » क्मधारयस्यलेतु नोलात्पलमिव्यादा भ्रभदमन्
aa नोलपदाथं उत्यलपदृाथ प्रकार; । न च aa weer । अत एव निषाद शपति amaigaa न
ca
12८ भाषा" सत्ियग्यिताकाङ्कातातय्यज्ञानमिष्यते ॥ ८१॥ कारणं सत्निधानन्त॒ पद्स्यासत्तिरु्यते |
fagre तत्पुरुषः | लक्तणापन्तेः। किन्तु कर्मधारयो लचणाभा- वात्। न च निषादस्य सङ्रजातिविशेषस्य वेदानधि- | काराद् याजनासम्मव दति वाच्यं। निषादस् विद्या ` भ्युकेस्तत. एव कन्यनात् । लाघवेन मृण्यारथ॑स्या चये तर्नुपपक्या कन्यनायाः फलमुखगोरवतयाऽदोष- लादिति.॥ saga श्रद्धंपिप्पलील्याश परपदे तक्छम्बन्धिनि लंक्तणा पूव्व॑पदाथंप्रधानतया चानय are दृति) tery समामेनक्तापि शक्रिः पदश्कव निव्वौहादिति ॥ पितरौ amir carer faziz जनकदम्पत्याः HITT स्तीजनकद म्बत्योलंचणा | एवमन्यवापि | घटा दृत्यारौ न लक्षणा । घटवेन रूपेण नानाघटख्थितिसम्भवात् ॥ श्रासन्तियाग्यतेव्यादि । श्रामन्तिज्ानं योाग्यता- ज्ञानं BATRA aera yay शाब्दबोधे कारणं ॥ ८९ ॥ तज्रासञ्सिपदा्थ॑माइ । सन्निधानन्विति । यत्प- दार्थस्य यत्पदार्थेना येः ऽपेकितखयारव्यवधानेनाप- fafa: कारणं । तेन गिरिभुक्रमभ्रिमान् देवद त्तेने- व्याश न शाब्दबोधः। TAT Wat द्रव्यं पट इत्या
td
fagte दावासकिभेमाच्छाम्दमोधः* । अरादज्िभमाच्छा्द- भ्रमाभावेऽपि न चति: i. मनु यच SY कुण्डली TAR दवदत्त दुक तजो लरपद सारे पू्॑पद- ATTY नाशात् WITH तु उन्तरपदक्प्गणा- सम्भव र्ति चेत्। न" प्रत्येकपद म॑रकारं रमं ताव- दविषयकसमर णस्या वधानेनात्पकेः | ararafqae?- HANIA मानासंस्काररेकसारणेत्यकोरपिं अन वात्। तावतपद संख्कारसहितचर.मवलंन्ना ae घक- लवात् । कथमन्यथा नानावथेकपदसारणं | परन् ता- वत्पदाथानां सरणादेकरेव खले कपोतनायात् ताव- त्पदाथानां क्रियाकम्भावेनानखयनाधर्ूपः प्राष्दमाप्रा भवतोति केचित् ॥ श्रपरे तु।
यथदाकाङ्धतं यागे सन्निधानं मपे i तेन Farhan: खार्थः oe रेवावगम्यते।
तथा च खण्डवाक्या्मोाधानन्तर तथैव पदाण्डत्या महावाक्यार्थबोध VAUTE: | एतेन तावदषाभि- uy: पदस्फाटाऽपि निरः । तन्नदसंम॑स्कारमडि- तचरमवक्षीपशमेन तद्ञ्जकेनेवापक्तेरिति ॥ एरक बाधं । चत्र दारमियकतं तत पिधेति पय ज्ञानादेव are नतु पिधानारिरूपाथं्चानात् | पद जन्यपदा्चापखितेखच्छाम्दमेधे waar । fay
+ जोर दत्यादिकपाठा दिनिकरसकततवा बिदद्धिः समान
do
भाषा पदाथ तच तदन्ता योग्यता परिकीर्तिता ॥ ८९॥ यत्यदेन विना यस्याननुभावकता HAA | fagre करियाक्पदानां तेन तेनैव यड साकाङ्कलं | तेन क यापदं विना कथं शाब्दबोधः खात्। तथा Tey. द्या स्यहयतीतिपदाध्याहारं विना चतुयनुपपत्ते पदाध्यादार श्रावश्ठकः।। योग्यतां निव्वकरि । पदार्थं दत्यादिना। एकपदा ऽपरपदाथ॑मब्बन्भा येाग्यतेव्य्थंः । तज्तानाभावाच afear सिश्चतीत्याद न शाब्दवाधः। नन्वेतखा या- ग्यताया ज्ञानं शाब्दभाधात् प्राक् wa न मम्भवति वाक्छाथैखा पुल्वैवादिति चेत्। न । तत्तत्यदार्थखारण सति क्रचित् संशयरूपस्य कचिन्निश्चयषूपस्यापि योाग्य- ताया शरान सम्भवात् ॥ नव्यास्तु योग्यताया ज्ञानं न शाब्दज्ञाने कारणं। afeat सिश्चतीत्यादे सेके वद्िकरणल्ाभावर्पाः- याग्धतानिखयेन प्रतिषन्धान् न शाब्दबोधः तदभा- वनिश्चयस रौकिकसन्निकषाजन्यदाषविगरेषाजन्यज्ञान- माते प्रतिबन्धकलात् शान्दमाधं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकलं सिद्धं । योग्यत््ञानविलम्बाख शाब्दबाधपिलम्नाऽसिद दति वदन्ति॥८्२॥ श्राकाङ्खगं निक । यत्परेनेत्यादि । येन पदेन विना यत्पदखान्वयामनुभावकलं तेन शह तस्याका-
९१
भाषा श्राकाङका, TARR तु तायं परिकीर्तितं aN
fagre ङग card: | क्रियापदं विना कारकपदं नाखयवेषं जनयतोति तेन तखाकाक्घा । aga क्रियाकारक- पदानां सन्निधानमासत्या चरितार्थ | पनु घटकरमा- alae प्रति घटपदेन्तरदितोयाकाङ्गान्ानं कारणं। तेन घटः क्लम्परनयनं हतिरित्यादौ न ्ब्दैवाधः। श्रयमेति पुत्रो राज्ञः परपाऽपमार्यतामित्यदो' तु
परुषेण स राभपदसख ता्यर॑यहाभावान् न तेन सहानयः ॥ † । तात्य निर्वक्ति । वकगरिङेति | यदि aera कारणंन BA तदा ्ेन्भवमानयेत्यार कचिद्ग्रम् कचिक्लवणस्य बोधा FT VTA तातप्थया हकप्रक- रणादीनामेव शाब्दबोधे कारणलैमस्िति वाद्यं | तषामननुगमात् | तात्यर्यद्वानजनकवैन तेषामनुगमे तु तात्प्य॑श्चानमेव लाघवात् कारणमम्त॒। इत्यश्च वेद ्लेऽपि AAMT: कल्यते ॥ न च तजाश्यापकतात्पणयज्ञानं कारणमिति ae । wir दावध्यापकाभावात् ॥ न॑" च प्रलय एव area ga: सगादिरिति वायं | प्रलयद्यागमप्रतिपा वृत् इत्यश्च अरकवाक्येपि , ई रीयतात्यथन्नान कारण । विभम्नादिग्कवाश्ये ठु शिक्तथिहरेव ATT wr” HITT | अन्येतु नानाथादा afeca तात्पय्यन्नानं
९२ सिद्धा कारणं । तथाच श्रकवाकयो विनैव तात्पथ्चानं ग्राब्द- ana वेदे तु ्रनारिमीर्मांसापरिगरधिततक्िरधाव-
धारणमिद्याङः ॥ e iN ane पि पु्वमनुभवस्मर णभेदा दद्ध द (TIAN | तजामुभव-
प्रकारा दिताः सुगमतया स्मरणं chad | त्र हि पु्वानुभवः कारणं |, श्रच केचिद् श्रनुभव- निन न कारणत्वं किन्तु ज्ञानेन । wT सरणा- नन्त्रं ATG श्यात् | समानप्रकारकस्मरणेन पुनव संसारस्य विग्टलात् । मन्मते तु तेनैव सरणेनमं- सारानरद्रारासरणान्तर अन्यत दल्याङस्तन्न | यत समृहालम्नने श्रं घटपटादीनां क्रमेण स्मरणमजनिष्ट सकशविषयवःसररणन AIA तज फलस्य संखारना- शकलाभाव(त् कालस्य रोगस्य षरमफलष्य वा a -खारनाशकलं वाच्यं। तथाचन क्रमिकस्मरणानुप- पत्तिः। न च पुनः पुन: ACUTE दृढतरसंस्कारानुप- vit: | प्रि्यद्ोधकसमवधानल दा्येपदाथंनात् ॥ म च विनिगममाविरषादेव श्चानलेनापि जनकलं श्या दिति वाच्यं । पिगेषधर्ेणाव्यभिचाराङ् wrt सामा- न्य्णान्यधासिङ्धवात् । कथमन्यया दण्डख भ्रमि- दारा दरव्यलेन रूपेण न कारणत म चान्तरालिकसा- "रणानां ंखारन। ्कलवसंभ्रयार् यभिचारसंश्रय दूति वाचं । अपमसंखारतश्ना्रकरपना पत्या चर मद्रण-
< भाषा" MUAH सुखादीनां करणं मन Ge | श्रयोगपद्याज् ज्ञानानां तस्याणुतमिदष्यते ॥ ८४॥ fagte शैव संस्कारनाश्कलकम्पनेन वभिचारमंशयीभावात्
ween
carat क्रमप्राप्तं AAT निरूपयति । सादाक्कार् शति) एतेन मनसि प्रमाणं दरितं। तथाहि gaara त्कारः मकरणकोा जन्यमाचान्कार लाचातुषवद् एत्य - नुमानेन करणस मनमः द्धः ॥ न सैं area चात्काराणामपि करणान्तरापि स्यरिति वां । ना- VATA ता दृ शसकलपाचात्कारकरणतया fag एवे दुःखादीनामसमवायिकारणएभंयागाग्रयतया म- a fafgitgar
मनसऽणएवे प्रमाणमाह । अरयोगपद्चादिति । wart चाचुषरानादीनां यैगपद्यमेककानात्य- लिना शीत्यनुभवसिद्धं । तत्र नानेद्ियाणं wala विषयसक्षिकधौ वतसमन्धादेकंद्डियेण शानमृत्यचते तद सम्बभादपि लगादिभिः परश्गानं नात्पद्यते | matted चासन्निधानं न, समवतीति ग fay ar म च तदानीमदुष्टविपिषोदाधरविलम्नादव ज्ागविलन एति ares तथा मति चषुरारोना- मपि कश्यनाऽनापन्तेः ॥ न च दीर्धीौष्वनोभकच्णारी
५४
भाषाः अथ दरव्या्िता श्रेया निगुणा निश्छिया गुणाः |
सिद्धा० मानावधामभाजाश्च कथयमेकदा नानेद्धियश्नानमिति वाच्यं | मनसाऽतिलाघवात् वरया मानेद्धियसमनन्धात् मानाज्नानोत्पत्तेः | उत्षलशतपव्रभेदादिवत्। धग पद्यप्रत्ययस्य तु भान्तलात् ॥ म च मनसः मद्धो चवि- काश्शालित्वादुभये पपत्तिरस्तिति वाच्यं । मानावय- वतन्नाशादिकन्यने गारवात् | लाघवात् निरवयवस्येव मनसः कल्पनादिति सङ्खेपः॥ दति सिद्धान्तमुक्रावन््ां द्रयपदार्चास्याः समाप्ता ॥ ८४॥ # ॥ द्रवं निरूप गुणं निरूपयति । श्रथेत्यादिना। गृण तल्जातै किं भानमिति Sai ae) दइयकर्व्भिन्नमा- मान्यवति या कारणता सा किञचिदग्नीवच्छिन्ना। नि- "रव्छिन्नकारणताधा भ्रमम्भवात्। नहि रूपलादिकं सन्ता वा तत्रावच्छेदिका।न्युनातिरिक्रदेण्टत्तिलात्। श्रतञ्चतुिर्यनुगं वाच्यं तदेव गृणलमिति fag ॥ xarfaat tf यद्यपि cari म लक्षणं कमा दावतिव्याेस्तथापि दयवव्यापकतावचछेदकषत्तान्य- afaan तदः। भवति डि awe दर यलव्यापकता- वच्छेदकं तदत्ता च गुणानामिति कबलं द्रव्यलं वा म द्रव्यलव्यापकतावच्छेदकं ANTS TARHOTT- भावात्। Rae सामान्यलादिकं न जातिरिति तद्य
भाषा
सिद्धा
९१५
पं रसः WUT परत्वमपरतलकं ॥ ८५॥ द्रवा गुरतं खेद वेगो मृ्तगुणा अमो। WATT भावना च शद वदयादयोऽपि च ॥८६॥ एतेऽमूत्तगुणाः सवव विद्िः परिकेर्िताः। ` स्यादि शच विभागानौ उभयेषां गुणे मतः॥८७॥ dary विभागश्च सङ्खया हित्वादिकासतथा। दिष्क्तादयस्तददेतेऽनेकाश्रिता गुणाः ॥ ८८॥ अतः शेषा गुणाः स्वं मता, HATA | दासः ॥ निगुणा दृति । यद्यपि fated कण्मोदाद्पि तथापि मामान्यवच्वे कश्चौन्यते च प्रति निगुणवं बे जात्यादीनां न सामान्यवत्ं FAT न ear Z- ae न निगृणलमिति aa anfaenfa: । निश्छियेति खरूपकथनं न तु WaT | मैगनादावतिया्ने zw मूत्तंगृणा इति । वेगेन श्थितिम्यापकोरणुपनक्- णीयः) wa न वततन्त THU: | WIN ताव- दन्यान्यतवं | एवमग्रेऽपि ॥ ८६ ॥ ; उभयेषामिति । मूक्तीमूर्तगृणा rare: ॥ ८०॥ अनेकाथिता दति। संयोगद्धिादीनि दि ्नीनि। जितल्चतुष्टादिकं ङ्च avifeemia arg y coil अतः war efa | रुपरमगन्धनय्कतपरि मारोक- एयक्तपरलापरलबृद्धि सुखदुः सेच्छादृषप्रयवगुरलद् -
a ne ुद्यादिषटकं खशन्ताः Se सारिद्विको HITE | अदृष्टमावना शब्दा अमो वैशेषिका गुणाः। स्यादिरपरत्नान्तो द्रवः संसिद्विकस्तथा ॥८०॥ गुरुतवेगो सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीर्तिताः | स्यादि रपरत्वान्तो द्रव सेद एवं च ॥ ५१॥ एते तु AAA अथ सशान्तश्दकाः | AIHA ATA गुरतवादष्टभावनाः॥ ९९॥ शते न्यः विमना ेस्ुैेधिका गुणाः। श्कारणगुणोतयन्ना एते तु परिकीर्तिताः ॥ ९२॥ अपाकजासु खशान्ता द्रवलच्च तथाविधं | सेदवेगगुरुरव्यक्परिमाणकां ॥ ९४॥
सिद्धा ° वललेदमंस्कारादुशब्दा द त्यथः द्रवे TAA ॥ ८८ ॥ वैशेषिका दति) विशेषा एव वैशेषिकाः खाँ ठक् विगरषगुणा हत्यर्थः ॥ स्ह्यादिरिति | सद्यापरिमाण- एथक्तमेयागविभा गपरवरापरलानीव्य्थैः।।< ०।९९॥ दीद्धियेति। waar लचाऽपि ग्रडणयोग्यलात् ॥
वाद्येति। रूपादीनां चुरादि पाद्मलात्॥ ९२॥ विभूनामिति । बुद्धि सुखदुः खेच्छादेषप्रयब्रधबौ- ध्ंभावनाशब्दा THU: ।\ कारणेति | कार एगण- पका रूपादय TWA | बृद्यादयस्त॒ न तादृशाः | अमारः कारणाभावात् | पाकजङूपादीनां कार-
€
भाषा सितिखापक aA स्युः कारणगुणेहववाः। संयोगश्च विभागश्च AIPA तु PATE 1 ९५॥ खभीन्तपरिमाणेकष्यक्लेदगन्दमे। भवेद समवायित्वमथ वैशेषिकं गुणे ॥ ८९॥ आत्मनः PAA AYA: | वेगेऽपि च द्रवत्वं च स्ंयोगादिदय तथा * 191 faba कारणत्वं स्यादथ प्रादेशिक भवेन्। |
9 ’ --*---- ~
मिद्धा ° एगुणपून्वकला भावाद् श्रपाक्ज TYR ॥ ९ २॥८४॥ evil walrafa) खशरौऽचानुष्ण ग्राह्यः। एकप्थक्ीि च लप्रत्ययखय प्रत्येकमन्यादट्, एकतरं एयक्रस् AWA | wares wagua faafad ॥ wazaaafaafafa | चटादिकपरमगन्धत्यश्ः कपालादिरूपरमगन्धस्र्मया भवनि | एवं कपा लादिपरिमाणादीनां चटादिपरिमाणाद्यममवाय कारणव ॥ wa शब्दस्यापि दितोयगरदं प्रति ॥ < \॥ निमित्तमिति । ब्द्यारीनां द्च्छादिनिमिन्त
तलादितिभावः। ९७॥ दिपैव कारणलमिति | रममवायिक्रागणतं निमि, कारणतश्च । तथा fe say उष्पास्यग्रम्यामम
e quiarafgaiaiguuaafes aa दत्यनाक anaes
cc
wine केगषिको विभुगणः संयोगादि दयं तथा ॥ ९८॥ चनं भवदपंद्रव्यादेरुपलगमकं। fagre पायी पाकजे निमित्तं | गुलं गृर्त्वपतनयारममवायि प्रतिघाते निमित्तं । Bit वेगस्न्दनयोारममवायो , श्रभिघाते निभित्तं । xad द्रवल्स्पन्दनयारमम- .वायि age निमित्तं। मेरीदण्डथागः शब्दे निमित्तं | भेय्याकाश्रम्यागेा ऽसमवायी वंशदलद्यविभागः we निमित्तं वंशदलाकाशविभागोऽसमवायीति। * az शिकोऽव्याणदृत्तिः ॥ ८८ ॥ चक्षुरिति | रूपवजातिः प्रत्यच्सिद्धा । KIT safe, प्रतीतिनसतोति चेत् । मास्तु Kozy योगस्यापि नीलपीतादि खनृगतजातिविगरेषाऽनुभव , fag wa रूपण्ब्दा प्रयोगेऽपि नीला वलेः पोता वष दरति ainerafat प्रतीतिर स्येव । एवं नील तल्ादिकमपि vaqafag i न Shar एव नीलरूपा- दियक्रय दत्येकव्यक्तिटृत्तिलान् नीललादिनं जाति- रिति वाच्यं । Wer wer रक्त उत्यन्न tare प्रतीतेनींलादेरुत्पादविनागशशालितया नानालात् | शरन्यथा एकनौलनागे जगद नीलमापञ्चेत Way at
` कन faifa परलादौनां aaah aco म नि;मत्तकारणवद- त्यः श्दश्चज्ञान।तिरिक्कभायं प्रति बोध्यं इल feqgea च निरय पाद्यः । "तेन परमाशद्विलादहार्कादिपररेमःशरतुलेऽपे न दतिः। इत्ययमनाहतः पाठः ॥
ae
माषा AAO: सदकारि स्यात् पकादिकमनेकधा ॥ ९५ ॥
fagre लरक्तादिसमवाययोरेव ` वितागोत्याद विषयक प्रत्यय दूति वां । प्रतोत्या ममवायानुष्ेखात् ॥ नच स एवायं नोल दति प्रत्ययाकताघवाकषैकमिति ara पर्यय तज्जातीयग्षियकलात् | वयं गरगीति वक्नाघवं प्रत्यचवोधित्ं । अरन्या घटादोनामथुश्च प्रसङ्गात् | उत्याद्विनाश्व्दयुद्धेः ममवायाकममरन लाप्ेरिति। एतेन रमािकं सास्यातं॥ वु द्यमिति । चतरा दह्यकिेषगुण sau: । एवमपि । द्रयादंरिति। उपलं उपलथिकारणं॥ द्रदमेव विद्रराति। चच्तप"दति। द्र खगृणकर् सामान्यानां चा्षप्रत्यच प्रति TRAST HTM Ih ्रक्रादिकमनेकधति। तद्रपं Wayans aay रादिमेदादनकप्रकारकं भेवति ॥ ननु HAT कथ सतिरिकरूपं भवति । दयं नीलपौतावागात्रयवो न तायन्नीरूपः। श्रप्र्यतप्रमङ्गात् । नापि याण नोलादिकमत्यद्यते । पौतावरच्छंदनापि नौनापन| ्रमङ्गात्। नाणव्याणद्तिनोलादि कमृतयद्चत | भाप दृन्तिजातीयगणानामयाणदशिल व्िराधात्। तमात् aqufata fama चिवमारमभ्यत। qanatsfa | नानारपकन्यन 4
नोनादीनां पोताद्यारमे प्रति
नानाजातोयङूपर श्रत aa faafa ओरवात् । Tae
१००
भाषा जलादिपरमाे तन्निल्यमन्यत् VAT | THY THAT मधुरादिरनेकधा ॥ १००॥
~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~ ----~---
fegr बन्धकलकल्पनाद् श्रवयविनि न पीताद्युत्पत्तिः। एतेन स्रौ arena: 1 रसादिकमपि नायाण्तिः किन् मानाजातीयरसवदवयवेङा रमेऽवयविनि रसाभावेऽपि न ofa: तत्र रसनया श्रवयवरस एव Twa रसनद्धियःदौनां द्रयग्रहसामर्थथाभावात्। अ्रवयविनेा नीरसत्वेऽपि चतेरभावात् ॥ नयास्तु तत्रायाणट- त्येव नानारूपं! नीलादेः पीतादिप्रतिबन्धकत्वकन्यनं गौरवात् | भरत एव | लोहिते ag ata मुखे पुच्छे च पाण्डरः | ओतः खुरविषाणाभ्यां स नीलो टष उच्यते।॥ इत्यादि शस्वमणुपपद्यते | न च याथावयाणटृन्तिजा- तीययेदयाविरोधः) मानाभावात्। न चलाघवा- देकं रूपं । ्रनुभवविरोधात् | Wau घटादेरपि लाचघवारैकं स्यादिति 1 एतेन खश्रादिकं व्यास्यात- fafa वदन्ति॥ << ॥ जलादीति । जणलपरमारी तेजःपरमाणे च रूपं नियं एथिवीपरमाणएरूपन्तु न मित्य । पाकेन रूपान्त- tram: ! म हिचरस् पाकानन्तरं तदवयवेाऽपक् खपलभ्यते। न हि रक्रकपालख कपालिका नोला-
१० भाषा" सकारो TaN rele च एनवत्। BUTT भ्गोप्राणसतोपकोरकं॥ १०१॥ सोरभश्ारीरमश् स द्रप OTR: | URINATE UTA ॥ १०९॥ चनुष्णशीतशतोष्णमेदान् स विविपो aA: | कारिन्यादिः कतिक निद्यतादि च TAA Ag
fagte कयवा भवति | एवक्रमेण परमाणावपि पौकमिद्धिः॥ भ्रन्यन्ललतजःपरमाणएरूपभिसरूपं मरेतुकं जन ॥ रसं निरूपयति । रसस्िति। १०० ॥ सहकारीति। रामनज्ञाने रभः कारणमिदयर्थः | पू्ववदिति । जलपरमाणौ रणे faa म्पि रणाऽनिद्य द्यः ॥ गन्धं निर् पति । प्राणयाद षति । उपकारको प्राणजव्यन्नाने कारणमिदयर्थः। WaT गन्धः सनवाऽनिव्य एव ॥ १०१ ॥ सभ निरूपयति । स्रं दृति । sears दति सा्ंनप्रद्यचते a; कारणमिद्य्थः॥ १०२॥ अनुषणाीत दृति । एयिया वावा witrsa- ष्णाधीतः। जलस्य प्रीतः । तेभस उष्णः ॥ asa ति। कठिनसृकुमार णः एथिया एवय | कटिः नलादिकनु न संयोगनिष्ठा जतिब्रिरपः। चतरा Ware: | पुंवदिति । जलतेआवायुपरमाण-
१०६ भाषा एतेषां पाकजत्न्तु किना नान्यच कुचचित्।
fagte awit निल्यासद्धन्नससलनित्या TAU ॥ ५०३ ॥ एतेषामिति ॥ एतेषां रूपरसगन्धस्पशानां | नान्य. चेति। एथिव्या fe रूपरसगन्धस्पशपराटत्तिः पाप करसंयोगाद् पलभ्यते। न हि श्तधापि श्रायमानेज- लादौ रूपादिकं quad | नीरे सोरभमोष्णच्च अन्वयगतिरेकाभ्यामैपाधिकमेवेति निर्णीयते । पव- .नष्टथियोः-शीतखक्रौदिवत्॥ तत्रापि एथिवीष्वपि मधय परमाणावेवं पाकं दति afafaar वदन्ति। तेषाम यमाश्यः। अवयविनाऽवष्टरेष्ववयवेषु पाके न मम: वति। परन्तु वद्किमेयोगेनावयविष विनष्टेषु way परमाणुषु पाकः। YAH पक्षपरमाणमंयागाद् TAT दिक्रमेण पुनहावयविप्न्तम्त्यत्तिः | तेजसा मति. | शयितवेगवश्रात् qaqa द्यटिति ब्यृहान्तरोत्य ्तिेति ॥ श्रय इणुकादिविनाश्मारभ्य कतिभिः at: एनरत्यत्या रूपादि मद्धवतोति frag ्धिपेषयाय प्रक्रिया ततर स्यात् ॥ संयेागविभा गचोर नपेक्तकारणं aa दूति व्रैशेषिकष्ठत्रं । सखात्तर ठत्तिभावान्तरा- नपेचलं aad: । waar कर्माणाऽणुत्तर संयोगज- नने पुल्वसंयेगनाभ्रापेचणांदव्या्निः स्यादिति॥ तत्र विभागनविभागानङ्गीकारे नवक्षणा तदङ्गीकारऽपि विभागः किञ्चि्पेक्ता विभाग जनयेत् निरपेक्षस्य
eR
भाषा तत्रापि परमा स्यात पाको वेशपिकरे नये ॥ १०५॥
fagte
aa aad स्यात्" । ततरु यदि दरयारमकभंयागव्रिना- श्रविभिष्टं कालमपेच्य विभागजविभाग म्यात् तदा दशक्षणा ॥ श्रथ द्रयनाश्रविशिषटं कालमृवयवं वाप विभागजविभाग: स्यात् तदा एकाद्गरत्तणा ।,तथा ६ वद्िमंयागात् परमाण कम्मं । तत; परमाण्वन्तुरषा विभागः। तत आररम्भकमेयो गनाश्रः। तता इ्णेकनाशः। ततः परमार श्चामादिनाप्रः | नता रक्रा दात्पत्तिः। तते द्रयारम्भानगणक्रिया। तता विभागः। ततः TA
AMAT: | तत आआरम्भकमयागः। तता द्णकात्यजिः। तता रक्ताद्मत्पन्तिः॥ नन ग्घामोदिनाग्र्तण TAT
्ति्तणे वा परमाण द्रव्ारम्भानगणक्रियाऽस्विति Ray न अभनिमंयक्ते पर मालो यत् aM तदिनागमन्तः रेण गणात्यन्तिमन्तगेण च तत्र परमाणा क्रियान्तरा- भावात्। Seah HATA: | निगण द्रयद्रव्यारः ममानुगृणक्रियानुपपन्तञ्च॥ तथापि परमाकौ प्रामादि
निदत्तिसमकालं रक्रायुत्यत्तिः स्यादितिचत्। नट सूपादिध्वंषख TWAT EIA ofa नवचणा॥ श्रय दशचणा।साच श्रारसकमंयाभविनाशविगि कालम aw विभागेन विभा गजनने, सति BTA! तया fx afe,
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gama परमाणरः TUM xfa anf afafca: पाठटः॥
५ पका) दूति WHE
६०४
मिद्धा° संयागाद्ं इणकारम्भके परमार क्रिया। तते विभागः। तत आरम्भकसंयेगनाश्नः। तते इणकनाशविभागज- विभागे | ततः श्वामना शपर्वबसंयो गना | तते TAT- त्य ्थ॑त्तर संयोगी | ततो वदिन द् मजन्यपरमाणकम्मण नाशः । ततोऽदृष्टवदात्मम॑यागाद् द्रयारम्मानुगृण- क्रिया। तति विभागः। ag: Sasa: | तत ATT RTA) TAT CRT | तते THT TAT MARTA MIA । वह्किमंयोागात् परमार HA | तते विभागः) तते द्रयारम्मकमंयोगना्ः। तता णक arm: | ततो द्णकना विशिषं कालमपेच्छ विभागज- विभागः। ततः पूर्योगनाशः । तङ उत्तरसंयागः। ततः परमाणकर्मानाश्ः | ततेऽदृटवदात्ममंयोगाद् द्रया रम्भानुगुणक्रिया | तते विभागः । ततः७पु्व॑संयोग- नाशनः | तति दार म्रकमंयागः। तता TTR | तता रक्तादि । मध्यमशब्द्वदेकस्मादभ्निमंयागान्न रूप नाशरक्नात्पादै | तावत् कालमेकच्यापरेरखिरलात्॥ किञ्च यद्युत्पादको.नागश्रकखदा नष्टे रूपादावग्निनागे नीरूपञिरं परमाणएः स्यात्। नाश्कसचेदुत्पादकरदा THAT त॑शभ्निनाभे रक्रतान WTA एवं परमा- न्तर कश्चिन्तनात् पञ्चमादि चणेऽपि गुणत्पत्तिः। तथा एकत्र परमाणो कषमं । तते विभागः। तत आआरमकमेयोगनाशपरमाणन्तरकश्मणो ततस्तु द्रण
१०५ माषा नेयायिकानान्त॒ नय इएकादावपोे।
मिद्धा° Bare: परमाखनरकशञ्च विभाग दत्येकः कालः । , ततः ामादिनाभ्ः विभागा gedit इ aa: "कालः । ततो रक्तात्यततिदरयारमकमंया- गस्येकः कालः । श्रथ द्रणकात्पन्तिः । श्रथ रक्रा . त्पत्तिरिति ves i gaara पर arent कम्मंचिन्तनात् प्रष्ठः गणात्यञ्जिः। तथाहि परमाणकश्मणा परमान्तरविभगः। तत WIT AR संयागनाभ्रः । श्रय द्वणुकनापपरमाषन्तरकषणो । श्रथ THAT: परमीषन्तरक्रंजच विभागः। तता Taare: परमान्तरे पू्रमयागनाग्र्च । ततः पर माखन्तर संयोगः तते द्मणकीत्यत्तिः श्रथ रक्रा त्यन्तिरिति ॥ एवं श्वामनाश्चण परमान? कर्मः चिन्तनात् सप्तचणा | रक्रात्यत्तिममकालं परमाण्व न्तर कमौचिन्तनात् श्रष्टक्णाति॥ ९०४ ॥ ्रेयायिकानामिति। नैयायिकानां मति द्रणकादो अवयविन्यपि पाके मर्वाति।तेषामयमाशयः। gaafaai® सच्छिद्र वादेः ठक्ावय नवर ववपन्नवटयः स्वपि पाका न विदध्यते।परेगेषिकमते ऽना वचतवतन्राप्र कर्ने गारवात्। Tay भारय घर द्यादिप्र्यभि- ज्ञाऽपि सङ्गच्छते यत्रतु न प्रत्यभिज्ञा तवात्रयविना-
१०६ भाषा० गणनव्यवदारे ठु चतुः संख्याऽभिधोयते ॥ १०५॥ निलयेषु नि्धमेकल्वमनिलये नित्यमिव्यते | दिल्लाद्यः पराहता UTS मताः ॥ १०९॥ AMATO एते CAAT |
fagre ओाऽपि खोक्रियत इति। स्यां निरूपयितुम् i गण- ` भेति। गणनव्वहारासाधार कारणं मङञो्यथः॥९०५॥ मिद्येयिति । faery परमाणवादिषु wad नित्यं afaa घटादौ एकलममित्यमिव्ययैः ॥ fearear व्यासश्चट्ति*संस्था श्रपेचाुद्धिजन्याः ॥ ९०६॥ अनेकेति । यद्यपि दविलादि समवायः प्रत्येकं घटा- दावपि ata तथाेको दावितिप्रव्ययाभावाद् एका भ दाविति प्रत्ययसम्नवाच faardiat varfre- QU: कश्चन THATS A श्रयाऽग्युपगम्यते ॥ श्रपेकताव्- द्विनाशादिति । प्रथममपेचाबुद्धिसतता दिलोत्पत्तिः। तता fatewgra दित्ववमि्विंकण्पकरूपं | तता दि- afafronad । श्रपे्ाबुद्धिनाये तते दिलना् दृति ॥ यथ्चपि ज्ञानान्तरं न चिचणएमाचस्थायि योग्य » विभुविशेवगृणाग सान्तर वत्तिंगुणा लात् तथाण- पेशाबुदेल्तिशण शाविलवं कस्ते । अन्यथा निविकन्य- काले अपेागुद्धिना्रार् wat दिलसेव are: wa
१७
अपेकानषटिाशा् नागल FELT: ॥ १०७ ॥ ARATE TALC EA |
fagre नतु fraud | तदानीं fawararary | विचमान- सेव चुरादि श्लौगभननोपगमात्। तदद् दिलपर- व्यचादिकमपेचाबुदधेनाशकं कल्यते ॥ न रापचाृदध- area कथं दविलनाश दति ark कालान्तरे दिलप्र- व्यक्ताभावात्। MUTA gaa aT ATTRA दूति कल्पनात् । wa एव तल्यर्ोयापेकावुद्भिजन्यदि- लादिकं तेनैव रुष्य दति कल्यते ॥ न चापेषावहधेि- लप्रह्यक्तकारणत्रमस्िति area लाघवेन faa via कारणवरैवोषितलात्। ्रतीद्धिये द्चणकादावपेकाब्- इ्यागिनां। सगादिकालीनपरमा्वादागरगीया- पे्ागृदधिग्ह्माष्डानतरवर्भंयागिना मपा का दि- लादिकारणएमिति ॥१०७॥ अपे्ाद्धः त्यत श्राह अनेकति | Wana ददाकारिका दत्यथंः। ददन्तु बाध्यं यत्रानियतेकल- कान" तत्र दिवादिमिन्ना बहलमस्यात्यद्यते यधा सेनावनादाविति कन्द लीकादः ॥ शराचायी मुरला दिकमेव wed मन्यन्ते । तथा faaarfqar- पिका qyaamifa: | मेमादो चात्पमं विवादा faa लाहा दोषात्) care हने वक्यं wala VAT
१०८
भाषा परिमाणं भेन्मानव्यवदारस्य कारणं ॥ १०८ ॥ aay दघं मदद्खमिति तद्द् ईरितः। श्रनिल्ये तदनिदय सयान्नितये नित्यमुदाइतं ॥ १०९ ॥ स्यातः परिमाणणच् प्रचयादपि जायते । अनिलं SPAT तु सद्धाजन्यमुदाइतं ॥ ११०॥
भिद्धा ° तिरूपपद्यते Tsay भंस्यान्तरवे तन्तारतम्याभाग- दिश्यवधेय,॥ परिमाणं निष्पयति। परिमाणमिति। परिमितिच्छवहारासाधारणं कारणं परिमाणमि व्यथः ॥ ९०८ ॥' तचतुरविधं we मद् द्धं Fe") तत् परिः माणं । नित्यमित्यच परिमामिल्यनुषज्यते ॥ ९०८ ॥ यत ceria परिमाणमित्यनुवत्तंते । अनि- व्यमिति पूर्व॑णाचितिं । तथा चानि परिमाणं wat जन्यं परिमाणजन्यं प्रचयजन्यं Gare: ॥ तत्र म्या- जन्यमुद्ारति । इणकाद्ाविति। णकस्य जमर शाख परिमाणं प्रति परमाणुपरिमाणं इ्णकादि- परिमाणंवा न कारणं | परिमाणश्ध खसमानजा- तीयोक्छष्टपरि माणएजनकलयात् । द्रणकादिपरिमाणन्ु परमा एवापे्या Awe । चसरणुपरिमाणन्ु न
* xeugha परन्यचरिदं। तजारलश्वल्ये awaciia च समनि- अढे रति ।। निध्पूयोजनतसा विदद्माडतन्वाद्धरोृताऽयं पाठः |
१०९
भाषा परिमाणं षटादे। तु परिमाणएजमुचयते। प्रचयः शिथिलाख्या यः संयोगेन जनयते | १११॥ परिमाणं दलकादे। नाशस्ताग्रयनाशतः।
-----------+---- -
fagre सजातीयं । अतः ' परमा दिलमह्च द्मणकपमि - माण gua Prana च तमरेणुपरिमाणसाम- मवायिकारणएमिद्य्ैः ॥ ११० ॥ # परिमाणजन्यमुदादर ति पैरिमाणं षटाद्ाविति॥ परिमाणएजं कपालादिपरि माणभम्यं ॥ प्रचयजन्यमुदा- हन्तुः प्रचयं frei प्रचयं ति ॥ १९५ ॥ , arn दूति | wera परिमाणमस्य । न चावयव नाश; कथं परिमाणनाश्रकः सल्यणवयविनि frag रपरमाणविदधषे तदृपचये ' चावयविनः प्र्यभिश्नान $पि ufcarerata प्रयदमिदधवादिति वायं | परमाणविघ्नषे quay नागरावग््रमभ्युपयलन्नाप्र प । एवं maw महाव्यविना नाग
चसरणकनाग्र श्थावश्यकवात | मति च ना्रक$नन्यपगममातरण नाश्रस्यापवदितुमश्रकयालात् | श्रीरादाववयवापचय
ऽमवायिकारणनागद्यावमरकला द्विना ्रावण्र- ami म च पटाविनाभरेऽपि तन्वन्तरमंयामात् परि- माणाधिक्छं खादिति वा | तत्रापि वमाद्यभिघा- तेन समवायिकारणतमसंयागनाश्रा् qe areata
११० भाषा सह्लाकतु FT स्यात् एथक्परययकषारणं ॥ ९१९ ॥
सिद्धा* कलात् ॥ किञ्च तन्वशरद्य तत्मटावयवते पूर AMS एव न सात् । तत्तन्तुरूपकार णाभावात् | तत्तन्तोरवयवलाभावे.चै न तेन परिमाणाधिक्यं सं BRT यान्तरवत् । तस्मात् तन्न तन्न्तर संयोगे एति पूष्वैप नातः पटान्तरो मन्तिरित्यवष्टं ward | अ्रक्यविनः प्रत्भिन्नानन्तु साजाद्येन दीपकलिकादि- वत्॥ न VAT एव तन्बन्तरसदकारात् पू॑पटे सत्येव पटानतरमौरभतामिति are मूक्तयाः समान- देशताविरोष्रात्। एकदा नानाद्र यख तचानुपलभ्य वाधितलाख । पुत्र यख प्रतिबन्धकस्य विना द्रया- गरो त्यन्तिरि यव मभ्यपेयलात् ॥ एकं कारणं {निरूपयति । स्यादिति | yaa प्रह्ययासाधारणं कारणं waa । तन्नित्यतादिकं सद्या- वत्। यथा "डि निद्येषु एकलं नियं अमिव्येऽनिल्ं अनित्यमेकलं ्राश्रयदितीयचचरेनेत्यद्यते श्राश्रयना- आन्नष्यति तथैकष्टक्लमपि | दिलादिवद् दविषटथक्रा- दिकमपोत्यथं॥ गन्वचमश्ात् यग् इ्यादावन्यो- न्याभावोा भाषते तत् कथं एय गु्ाकरं सीक्रियते न चास्तु wa न लन्योन्याभाव दति वाच्यं। रूपं म ट दरति प्रसील्यनापन्नेः ॥९१९॥
१९९
भाषा अन्योन्याभावतो नास्य चरितार्थमृषथते। असात प्रथगिदं नेति ANAS विलक्षणा ॥ ११९॥ श्रप्रा्योसु या पराति सेव संयोग रितः।. वीर्तितस्तिबिधस्ेष तरायोऽन्यरकर्ाजः ॥ १६४॥ तयोभयक्रियाजन्यो भेत् संयोगजेऽपरः। , श्रदिमः श्येनरीलादिसंयोगः परिकीर्तितः ॥ १९५॥ मेषयोः सन्निपातो यः स दिग् उदाहतः।
te
fagre ow fe ed घटावधिकं gam गुणान्तरमललिनवा चे चटावधिकष्टयक्कमस्ति येन ITAA: कल्य saa are अन्योन्याभावत इति ॥ विलचतणेति॥ नगु श्ब्दवेलकण्छमेव म aviawufata चेत्। न। fa- नार्थमेदं घटात् एथग् दतिवद् घटे नेद्यत्रापि पञ्चमी सयात् । तस्माद् चद्॑कयागं पञ्चमो ast गजी उन्योन्याभावतेा भिन्नो गणानतरं कल्यत दति॥ \१३॥ संयोगं निरूपयति । अप्ाफ्येरिति । तं विभजरत। कीर्तित दति । एष संयोगः ॥ १९४॥ ४ सन्निपौतः संयोगा दितोच swans: । ठतीयु इति संयोगज car: । waite: ष्ादिति ूर्वणा- fad ॥ ९९१५ ॥ । आदिमः अभिघातः । दिती area: a arn दति ॥ विभकपरह्ययकारणं विभागं निरूपयति
११९
भाषा कपालतरसंयोगात् संयोगसश्कुमयोः ॥ VRE I दमयः सयात् कजोऽपि FA परिकोर्तितः। ATTA ATTA शब्दचेतुरिष्दादि मः ॥ ९१७॥ शन्दादेतुटितोयः Marana चिधा भवेत्। THRU RAMA दयकश्ाद्गवाऽपरः ॥ ११८ ॥ विभागजसुनीयः स्यात्,ढनोयोऽपि हिधा भवेत्।
fagte विभाग द्ति॥ एककर्मति। उदाहरणन्तु Bates. भागादिकं पूव्ववदोष्यं ॥ ९१९६ MAYO ॥ ९९८॥ इतीय विभागजः कारणमाचविभागजन्यः का रणाकारणविभागजन्यदयेति | श्राद्यस्तावत् । यवर कपाले SH ततः कपालदयविभागः । तता घटाग- मकसंययोगनाशः | AAT घटनाशः । ततस्तेन कपान विभागेन सकममणा कपालस्य देशरान्तरविभागे जन्यते | AAT देशान्तरमेयागनाश्नः। तत उत्तरदेश्रमंयागः। ततः करना tial न च तेन कर्णेव कथं देशा न्तरविभागा न जन्यत दति वाच्यं । एकस्य कर्म्मण आ रद्यकसंयोगप्रतिद्न्दिविभागजनकलस्यानार कमं - यागप्रतिदखिविभागजनकलविरो धात् । waar fa कसत्कमलकङुद्रलभङ्गपरसङ्गात्। ARITA TH कसला गप्रतिदन्रिविभागं जनयेत् तदा ऽऽरमकमंया- गप्रतिइन्दिविभागं न जनयेत् । न च कारणविभागः
१९१
भाषा चेतुमाजविभागेतयो देलरेतुविभागजः॥ १६८ ॥ परत्वश्वापरतवश्च fafa परिकीर्भित। देशिकं कालिकख्चापि मूत्त एव तु दैशिकं ॥१९०॥ परत्व FATA NRA TTA भवेत HITS तदस्यत्वनुदवितः स्यादितीरितं ॥ १९१ ॥
fagre मैवद्रव्यनाशरा् TH कुते देशान्तरविभागोा न जन्यत इति are शआरम्भकसंगरागप्रति्ैड्िविभागवतेऽव- यवस्य षति द्रव्ये देधान्तरविभीौगाषम्भवात् | यच्च wafer wanefia: ततः शरीरेऽपि विभक्र- wera भवति। तत्र च अरीरतरेविभागे इणक्रिया न कारणं | व्यधिकरणलाच्छरोरे तु करिया नास्ति। शरव यविका यावदवयवकम्पनियतलात्। TARA ATT णाकारणविभागेन काग्ाकाय्विभागा जन्यत ड्ति। अत एव विभागे गणानर । FATT श्रीरे fauna Bar न स्यात् | WA CAAA विभागा नान्यथा सिद्धा भवति॥ ९९९ ॥ परापरब्यवहारनिमि परलापरते निकपयति। परलश्चेति । दैभिकमिति ॥ ९९० ॥ शेशिकपरलं अंडतरद्र्मंयोगाकरितलङ्नानाद् waa | एवं ACTA SAAT TTS | ST बभिला्थदितोयापेषा । यथा पाटकषिएुब्ात काशो
११४
भाषा तयेरसमवायी तु PATS श्रये | दिवाकररपरिखन्दपनवातयन्नतवुदधितः ॥ १९९ ॥ परत्वमपरत्वन्तु तद् नन्तरनुदधितः | श्रच TATA स्यात् संयोगः कालपरि्डये।॥१९३॥ शरपकतामृदविनाेन नाशस्तेषामुदाहतः। युद्धे प्रकारः प्रागेव प्रायशाऽपि निद्धपितः॥ १९४॥ शरथवश्ष्टाऽ्यप् प्रकारः परिदश्य । अप्रमा च एमा चेति जञानं दिविधमुयते ॥ १९५॥ तच्छन्ये AHA स्याद्प्रमा सा निरूपिता |
fagte मपेच्छ wart: परः। पाटलिपुत्रात् कुरुकेचमपेच्य
प्रयागाऽपर इति ॥ ९२९ ॥
तये शिकपरलापरलयोः । श्रममवायी श्रममवा- यिकारणं । तदाश्रये दँ भरिकपरवापरलाश्रये॥ दिवा- करेति॥ ९२२ ॥
अचर परल ्रपरत्वश्च कालिकं गराह्यं यख द्धर्य- परिस्यन्दापेक्तया यस खर्परिखन्दाऽधिकः स ज्येष्ठः | यख न्यूगः स कनिष्ठः । कालिकपरवापरले जन्यद्र य एव । अजर कलिकपरलापरवयेोः ॥ ९२६३॥
wat काखिकरेश्रिकपरलापरलानां ॥ क्रमप्राप्ना afg "निरूपयितनाईइ । बदधेरिति age nea
शरप्रमां विभजते । aver इति । तदभाववति
११५
भाषा ततप्रपश्चा विपर्यासः संशयोऽपि eA A: 1 VRE II श्राद्या दद याऽऽत्मवुद्िः METAL पोततामनिः। wea ATO या संशयोऽथ WEAF 11 १२७॥ किंसिन् नरो वा खाणुव्ादियदवि रं्रयः। तदभावपरकारा धी्तप्रकारा तु निश्चयः ॥ १९८॥ स संशयो मतिथी सरादेकचाभावभावयेोः।
सिद्धा ° तत्प्रकारकं wre भम Te AMT: WATT
पञ्चः ॥९२६॥
आद्य दृति। विपर्यास दद्यः । रीरारौ यदा- त्लम्रकारकं WTA गारोाऽहमित्याकारकं। va, श ङ्द पोतः शङ्खः इत्याकारकं avai faqaes तद्म cfu rou
fafefzfa fafafefa fat निचय शक्षणमार । तदमभावति । तदभावाप्रकारकन इति. तद्मकारकं शानं faqa: if Vee il
dud लयति । dna दति। waufdafang- भावाभावप्रकारकंश्नानं षंश्य Tae: साधारएति। उभयसाधारशा ये WHOM एं्यकारां। यथा उरनं खाएवसाधारणं wrar we ware वत सन्दिग्पे | Ud असाधारणज्नानं SITY | यथा Wega निदयामिल्ययादृकत wee एरीला ब्दा निषठानवति
११९
भाषा साधारणादिधरस शानं संशयकारणं ॥ १९० ॥ दोषोऽप्रमाया जनकं प्रमायास्तु गुणि HAA |
fargte उन्दिग्ध । विप्रतिप्निस्तु शब्दा नियो न वेल्यादि णब्दा- त्मिका ग संशयकारणं । शब्द याशनिक्षानादीनां firg- यमाचजनकलसखाभाव्यात् | किन्तु तच शब्देन कोारिद- यश्ागं जन्धते | संशयस्तु मानस एवेति | एवं Wt प्रामा्छसंशयादिषयसंश्रय दति । एवं वयाणसंश्यादपि व्यापकस्य cafes बधं किन्तु संधये धर्िंज्ञानं धर्मीडधियसल्िकषौ वा कारणमिति ॥ ९९९ ॥ दाष द्ि। अप्रमां परति दाषः कारणं प्रमां प्रति गणः कारणं। तजापि पिन्तादिरूपा दोषा भ्रननुगताः। तेषां करणव भ्रषधव्यतिरेकाग्यामेव feg । ava भरमाजगकलन्तु श्रनुमानात् सिद्धं। यथा प्रमा न्नान- ATTA TATA TIAA जन्यज्नानलाद् श्रप्र- मावत् म च दाषाभाव एव कारणमस्ति वायं । पीतः wy इतिन्नानसखले पिन्तदाषसत्वाच्छङ्लप्र- मामुत्पन्तिप्रसङ्गात् । विनिगमनाविरहाद् भ्रनन्दा- THAN कानरणलमपेच्छ गुणकारणताया न्याय- लात् ॥ म च गृणसत्वेऽपि पिश्तप्रतिबन्धाच्छङ्वः न Sarat अतः पिलादिरोषाभावाां कारणलमवश्ं are तथा च किं गख हेतलकश्पगयेति ae ।
१९७
भाषा पित्तदरत्वदिङ्पा दोषा नानाविधः HAI १३० ॥ प्रये तु वेण विरेषणवता सम । स्निकषा गुणस स्यादय लनुमिनौ गुणः ॥ WR Ul प्ते साध्यविश्ष्ट च परामश गुणो भेत् ॥ शक्ये सादश्वुद्िल्'भवेदुपमिने गुणः॥ १९२॥ TEATS याग्यतायाल्लात्पयस्याथवा प्रमा । , गुणः स्याद् भमभिन्नम्त ज्ञानमत्रोच्यते प्रमा | १२२॥ अथवा तत्प्रकारं यज्ञानं सददिभेष्यकं ) सिद्धा ° तथायन्वयब्यतिरकाभ्यां गुण्खापि हेतुलसिद्धः।. णवं भमं अति गणाभावः' कारणम्न्िापि सुवच | तच रोषाः & earargrarare | पित्तति। कषित् पिश्लादिभमे पित्तं gra) कचिखन््रादेः स्वम्पप- रिमाणभमे दूरलं Sra: | afew वंधारगभमे मण्ड् कवघाञ्जनमित्येवं दोषा भ्राजिजनका TTT: Hs wy के गणा paar yal प्र्यक्ादो कम्रा गणान् दरयति । प्रत्ये लिति। wae विग्पणवर् faneafaadt गणः श्रनमिते साध्यवति षाध्ययाय- ेगिष्चन्नानं गणद्ति । एवमग्णुष्यः॥ ९२१॥८०९॥ प्रमां निरूपयति । भमभिन्नमिति॥ १२२ ॥ , जन यज refineries रजत ट्तिशज्नानं जतं तज रभरताेऽपि प्रमा ग शात् AMT भमनिन्न-
११८ भाषा तत् प्रमान परमा नापि भमः ाजनिर्व्विकशयवा ॥९३४॥ पकारादिः तयं दि समन्भानवगाडि तत्। _ fagte लाभावाद् श्रत आद ) अरथेति। तददिभ्रेयकं amar रकं ञानं प्रमा card: | ददन्तु वेध्यं) येन सम म्न तदन्ता तेन सम्बन्धेन cafes तेन सम्बन्पेन
AMAITHA वाख्यं। तेन कपालादै संयागादिनाघटा- ‘fom’ arfaanfa: uu एवं सति निन्विकन्यकं प्रमान स्यात् तख.सप्रकारकल्वाभावाद् WA WE । न प्रमेति। ननु Ss कपिसयागक्ञानं भ्रमः खात् प्रमाचयखा- दिति wai न) प्रतियागिव्यधिकरणएमंयागाभाववति GATING भ्रमलात्॥ न च Ts संयोागाभावाव- च्छेदकावच्छदेन BAMA WaT a Ara तच मंया- गाभावस्य प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणवाभावांदिति वां । ` तजर संयागाभावावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन संयागज्नानस्य भ्रमलवात्। लक्णस्याननुगमात् | लचणाननुगमेऽपि न चेतिः।॥ ९३४॥ प्रमालमिति। मीमांसका fe प्रमालं खता यादय भिति वदन्ति । तज गुरूणां मते राभस quate: पलात् तज्ादमामाण्यं तेनेव श्यते दूति ॥ भटानां मते ज्ञानमतीद्धियं। श्ानजन्या ज्ञातता प्रत्यक्षा | तथा .च ज्ञाममनुमोयते ॥ मुरारिमिश्राणां मतेऽनु- वसय ज्ञानं गद्यते सर्वेषामपि मते तज्त्रानवि-
Ae
॥ सिद्धा ° षयकज्ञानेन तज्त्रानप्रामाणं WER । विषयमिशयं fx ज्ञानं * । श्रत भ्नानवित्तिषेयो विषयः । ततं दूष- ufa म खते ग्राद्यमिति। संपरयेति। यरि -भरान- प्रामाण्यं खता We खात् तदाऽभ्यामदगरोत्पत्नज्नान तेद्यंश्यो न स्यात्| da हियदि ज्ञानं श्रातं तदा प्रामाण्यं ज्ातमेवेति क्रथं संशयः । यदि तुञ्जावृ न ज्ञातं तदाधमिंजञानाभावात् कथे tes) ara श्ानप्रामाणमनुमेयं | तथा हि Te जानं WAT मन्वा दिप्रट्तिजनकलाद् wad त्वं यथाऽप्रमा । एदं एयिवीवप्रकारकं भानं प्रमा | गन्धवति एथिवीलप्रका- रकश्चागलात् । एवं TS HATA प्रमा । सेहवैति जललप्रकारकञ्नानलयात्॥ AT RAMI कथं जात मिति वां । एथिवीलप्रकारकलम्य wat यावात् | aa गम्धवदिरेयकल्ापि सुग्रहत्वात् | AMAITA- लावच्छिन्नतददिगेथकलं परः न द्यति मं्रयानगा- wa न चप्रमालद् माधव्य प्रसिद्धिः कथमिति वाच्यं LT TAMAS, VAT AT HATA |W SAT- रभेदेन प्रामाणभेदाद् घटलवति पटलप्रकारादः ay प्रभिद्धिरिति वाचयं | घर्टलप्रकारकलग्य म्बविभे-
bee
* विषयिषयताकनियतस्पिपथताकप्तय क जञानमन्यचः | "इ ५१ प्रकारस जानं विषयविवयताकप्रयष्क विच्यरिषयषय्यद) (निप wa शति प्रत्यचाविषयनादित्यनृमन | क्ािप्रत्यद [दपय(पयन
warefafa भावः
१९०
षिद्धा* कलस च सते ग्राह्मलात्। Wee च पून॑मुपखित- लार् घटविशेग्यकं छटलप्रकारकमिति ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यस्य
` बाधकाभावः । व्यवघायपरन्तु प्रामाण्यं न ग्यते । तजर ्सश्यसामगरोस्ते संग्यशेवापपकतेः। किञ्चाभ्यास- द्रायां तीयागुयवसौयादिना आमास खत एव गरहसम्भवात् प्रथमामुवयतसायपरं न तद्रा हकलमिमि कल्यते संश्यानुरोधात् ॥ wa पआामाण्छानुभिते प्रा- arene ग तच्छ. विषयनिश्चयरूपलाथ तजर प्रामा- wer वध्यः । मोऽणनुमिल्य करणेति फलमुखो का- Tweet वा नानवस्येति चेन्न । ्रषृरहीताप्रामाणमर- wae निश्चयरूपलात्। यर च प्रामा्यसंशयसेव परं प्रामाण्धानुमितेरपे्ाया eee ware भितिरिगयत एव weit तु न संगथः। कचित् ate नुपथितेः कचिदिगेषदभनादितः कचिदिषयानरस- श्वारादिति सङ्गेयः॥ नन् सर्वषां पानानां यथाथ लात् प्रमाणे तदिगेव्यकलवं fated aii ग च TH रजतार्थिनः wefan म खात् तव मते भ्रमस्ाभावादिति are as हि राषाधीमख एरोवभिंनि श्षतन्तोपखितरजतमेदाग्रहख् रेतलात्। , स्यरजत खले तु विशिष्टक्नानसय सत्वात् तरेव कारणं । we वा तजापि भेदाग्रह एव कारणमिति । ग वाऽन्य- था स्थाति: षम्भवति। रजतप्रच्यक्षकारशस् रजतषति-
ARR
भाषाः Wate न खतेो ग्रां संभयानुप्प्ित ॥ १६३५॥ न
fegte कव॑खाभावात्। UE रजतम रनुपपततेरिति रेच सत्धरजतखले प्रहन्ति परति विगिष्टज्ानख रेदतावाः Brad wate तत्कल्नात्॥ मं च सम्बारिभर- इतत तत्कारषं विषमवारिग्रटततो तु मेदागरहः का- रणमिति वायं । लाघवात् प्रटृन्तिमामे तथ रेहुन- कल्यनात् । इत्यञ्च रङ्गं रभतद्विग्िष्टबद्यनरोापेन ज्ञानलपणाप्रत्या सत्तिकन्पनेऽपि न रतिः । फलम गारवस्याद्षलात् | किञ्च oe रकररजतयेारिमे रजति इति ज्ञानं जातं aa गं कारणमाधाऽपि। अपिच यत्र रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रजतरङ्गे इति ज्ञानं तजाभयत्र यगपं्रटृत्तिनिटन्नी erat tt दङ्गमेरग्ररं रजत रजतभेद ग्रहे ऽन्यथास्यातिंभयात् । नकते TE TF भेदाय्ख रजते रजतभेदायर्ख च मत्तात् दाषाद्क TH रजतमेदारख रअते'रङ्गभराग्रहस्य च BATA, किञ्चाममितिं परति भदाय्रख was जलद वङ्धि- वाणधूमवदभेदाग्रहार् अनमितिनिंनाधा। यदि v fafagara area तदाऽयागेाखकं afsarqua- wreraafamatrarcrafad | vet waar स्थाना प्र्यचमेत्र प्रमाणं। TH रजततया जनामीौग्यनभवा
दितिसशङ्खपः॥९२५॥
१९९
भाषा० व्यभिचारस्यायदाऽपि SEMA TA |
STANTS तकोः.कचित् शङ्ानिवत्तकः ॥ १९६॥ fagre पृष्व याशिरक्रा तद्होपायस्त न दभ्रित दवय तस्तं दशयति । बभिचारखेति। वयभिचाराग्रहः सद- चारयदख वयापिग्रदे कारणमिन्यर्थः । खभिचार- यख व्यातनिगरहप्रतिबन्धकलात् तदभावः कारणं | श्रन्धयव्यतिरेकाग्बां सदचारयदस्यापि हेतुता । war- दभनन्तु न कारणं | यभिचारासुत्ती सषृदरेऽपि कचिद् व्या्षिग्रहात्। कचिद् यमि चार श ङ्ाविधूनन- दवारा योद्थेगमुपयुच्यते । चच तु श्योदभनादपि शद्धा नापैति तत्र विपक्तवाधकतकरऽपेकितः । तथापि afefacfeafa धूमः स्यादिति वद्याशङ्धा भवति तदा सा बह्किधूमयोः कायैकारणभावख प्रतिसन्धानाज्निव- Hal यद्ययं वह्किमान् न UTA ATT धूमवान् न UTA | कारणं विना काीनुपपत्तेः। यदि कचित् कारणं fa भापि भविश्यति wean एव वा भवि्यतीति तत्रा- TET भवति तदा घा व्याघातादपसरणीया। यदि कारणं विना ara सात् तदा धमाथ वहे स्यं arene नियमत उपादानं ata न स्यादिति। यत्र खत एव WET wantin तच म तकपेक्ापीति त- दिदमुकं तकं: कचित् गर्धानिवक्तंक इति ॥ ९३६ ॥
भाषा
fagte
१९३ साध्यस्य व्यापके। यसु सनोरथापकसथा |
ददानों परकीय तियशप्तिबन्ामुपाधि fa- euafa । साधरेति । साध्यवाभिमतयांपकले मति साधनलाभिमतायाप्रकदव्यरथः। ननु भै श्रामो मिता तनयाद् दत्य शाकपाकजलं नोपाधि; Gra) तख साथव्यापकलाभावात्। श्वा मलस घटादावपि TATA एवं वायः WaT WAIT CHA उद्गूतरूप- ad नोपाधि; स्यात् । प्रत्यचवस्दात्मारिषु स्वात् ततर रूपाभावात् । एवं ध्वमो "विनाशी जन्यलाद् TAA भावलं नपाधिः ere व्िनागरिलस wena म- स्वात् ॥ तत्र च भावलाभाव।दिति Fa । agat- afeqaraaiuad तद खौ वरित्निमाघनाव्यापकवमि- च्यथेतात्पग्यात् | मितरातनयलावच्छिनरामनम्य या: पाकं शाकपाकजवं। एवं aren sara aaa sae व्यापकमुद तरू पवत वदिद्रव्यलावच्छिन्रभाधनम्याया- gag) एवं wat व्रिनामी जन्यलादित्यत्र WATT च्डिनिसाध्यवयापकं* भावैवं | मद्धतात् एतादृष धमा नासि | यद्वच्छिन्नख स्ख यापक तद वस्छित्नष्य साधनस्यायापकं किञ्चित् स्यात् । चनिदारिणित्
भ,
arg द््यादथिप भिजाननण््नान
* काकः श्यो मिनातनध रा पाठः ॥
चिद्रश्चामलख्य यापकं रकपमल tla wat
ARB
भाषा" स Saar Presid ETF ॥ १२७॥ स्वे साध्य॑समानाधिकरणाः सदुपाधयः हतोरेकाश्ये येषां खसाध्यव्यभिचारिता ॥ ११८ ॥ व्यभिर्चरस्यानुमानमुपाधसु TAS |
fagts waa उपाध्यभिकरणं यल्छाध्राधिकरणं यचापाधि- {ल्यं साथ्यव्भिचारमिरूपकमधिकरणं तदन्यतरला- वच्छिनरसय TUS व्यापकलै साधनख चाव्यापकलम्- ate: सम्भवतीति ॥ ९२७॥ wa एव लच्छमपि रूपमेतदन.शारेण दशयति | aa दति ॥ साध्येति ' स्वं उपाधिः खश्च साध्यश्च ware तयोव्यभिकारिता rae: ॥ ९२८ ॥ ware TAA TATE । यमिचारखेति। उपा- धिष्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानं उपाधेः प्रया- अनमित्ययंः । तथाहि यच Weare उपा- पिस्तज प्टद्धमापाधियभिचारेण साध्ययनिचारान्- मानं | यथा धूमवान् वक्करिल्यादौ वङ्कधूमयभि- शारी श्राद्रेन्धनवयभिचारिलाद् दति. व्यापकवयभि- चारिणे व्यायायभिचारावश्वकलात्। यच्त् किञ्चि इ ाचच्छि्साष्यव्यापक उपाधिखत्र agdafa उपा- पिव्यमिकारेण साश्चयभिचारानुमानं। यथा भामे मिजातभयलाद् cas fasted श्लामलव्यभि-
१२५
has AN / [स भाषा" शब्दपमानयेनेव एक् प्रामाण्यमिष्यते ॥ १३९ ॥ TTL a वेपनं मत
सिद्धा° aft) मिचातनये शाकपाकजववयभिचारिवादिति। वाधानन्नीतपरेतरस्तु धाध्ययापकतायाहकप्रमाणाभा- वात् खव्योधातकलाच नेापाधिः। वाघोन्नीतसु,पकते- तर उपाधिभेवतयेव । यच वङ्किर॑नष्णः हतकलाद् र~ त्यादै प्रतयकेण wean वक्तीतरलमपाधिः। यच साधयव्यापकलादिकं सम्दि द्यते स षैन्दिग्धोप्राधिः। प are सन्दिग्धोपाधिरपि ` मेद्धावैनोयः कथकण्म्प- दायानुरोधादिति ॥ केचित्त भ्मतिपलेत्यापनर्मृपा- धिफुशं । तथाहि अ्रयागोलकं धूमवदङेरिद्यारा भ- योगालकं धूमाभाववट् श्राद्रन्धनाभावाद् दति मग्र तिपलसमभवात् | tere साधनव्यापकोाऽपि कविदुपा- far यथा करका थिवी कटिनमंयोगवलादिव्यारा अनष्णाश्ोतस्य्व्लं ॥ ग चातर खरूपमदुपाधिरेव दृष मिति वाद्यं | सर्व॑तोपाधेदृषणान्तरमाङग्यात् VT चत साध्यव्यापकपकाटृत्तिरुपाधिरिति वदि । षष्दा- पमानयारिति॥ १३८ ॥ । ेरेषिकाणां मति परत्यनमनुमानश्च प्रमाप बन्दा पमानयारनमानविधयैव प्रामाण्यं, । सथा fe दण्डन गामभ्याजेत्यादिषदानि शरदिकषदानि वा ताप
RR
भाषा तन्न सत्यग्िा व्यप्निगोधं श््दादिमोधतः ॥ ९६० ॥ दविध्यनु भवेद् TATA | शिद्धार विषयस्रारितपदाथसंपरगज्ञानपुन्वकानि आकाङ्कादि- मत्पदं कदम्नलाद् घट मानयेतिपदकदम्बवत् । यदा एते पदाथा मिथः संसर्गवन्तः योग्यतादि मत्यदोप- स्थापितवात् तादृ ्रपदारथंव्। दृष्टान्तेऽपि दृष्टाना- miu साध्यसिद्धिरिति । एवं गवययज्निम्रत्यचान- vat गवयपदः गअयवप्रटत्तिनिमित्तकं* Bafa ट्य न्तरे TAWA प्रयुज्यमानलात्। वथा Frag गल- प्रटत्तिनिमिन्तकं । यद्वा गवयपदं सप्रटत्तिनिमित्तकं साधुपदलाद् इत्यनुमानेन पक्चधम्रैताबलाद् गवयलप्र- इत्तिनिमिन्नकं भासते तन्मतं दूषयति । तन्न सम्यगिति॥ विना व्याधिज्ञानं शब्दादिते बोधस्यानुभविकलवात् | न fe स्त्र शब्देभ्रवणाद्यनन्तरं व्याधिन्नाने मानम- सीति । किञ्च aa शब्दस्थले यदि afew कल्प्यते तदा संव्व्॑ानुभितिख्यले पदज्ञानं कन्यया शब्दबोध एव fa न खोक्रियत दति ॥ ९४० ॥ दविध्यमिति। अनुमानं fe विविधं केवलान्वयि- केवलव्यतिरेक्यन्वयव्यतिरेकिभेदात् । तजाषद्धिपक्तः , केवलान्वयी । चथा शेधं अभिधेयादित्याद । तच fe cada Hong farered ॥ ननु सेवां
* मवला वच्छित्रे एक्यमित्यथेः ।।
१९०
भाषा अनयव्यापिक्तव BATE ॥ १४१॥ साध्याभावव्यापकाल्व दत्गोवसय agar |
सिद्धा ° watet याटन्तलात् केवलानय्यमिषटिरिति चन्न | वयाटत्तलस्य सनय॑साधारपये तरेव देवला खयिनात् ॥ किञ्च ठत्तिमदत्यन्तनाभावाप्रतियेगिवं केवलाय - fad | aw गगणाभावादौ प्रसिद्धं uo WATT: केवलव्यतिरेको । यथा थिव , cater, भिद्यत गन्धवक्चादित्यादौ | तत्र fe जल्नादिज्रयादग्रमदख्य पव्यैमनिदिततया निितमाध्यवतः मपच्धाभाव दति ॥ सत्प्विपकोऽन्बधव्यतिरेकी | यथा वदङ्धिमान् धूमादित्यादौ | तच सपन महानसादं fatwa जल- wae सादिति ॥ १४९ ॥ ,.
ax तिरेकिण अतिरेकयाभिन्ानं ' कारणं
तदै यतिरेकव्या्निं faaifa । साध्ामावयापकलै- रेलभावस agag दति । माध्याभाक्यापकौभूता- भावप्रतिये गिलरमित्य्ः। wat are | यन FA Sa यच येन रूपेण व्यापकता TAA ABARAT वच्छित्प्रतियागिताकतद्मौ व्छिन्नाभाववक्ताभ्रीनादर् wanda यद पौवच्छिन्स्य वयायता शृत तः तसमनन्धावच्छिशप्रतियो गिताकतङ् मं च्छिभ सिद्धिः । स्यश्च यज विगरेषएतादि मन्नन्धंमतरलवयाप-
१९८ भाषा अधीपत्तसु नषे प्रमाणानारतेव्यते ॥ १९२ ॥
सिद्धा ° कलं गन्धाभावे an तच गन्धाभावाभावेनेतरवा- त्यम्ताभावः सिध्यति। यत्र ठु तादाव्यसमन्धेनेतरवा- पकता गद्यते तच ताद्व्यसम्बन्छेनतरद्याभावः सि- waft एवान्योन्याभाव्ः॥ एष यच संयोगसम्बन्धेन धूमं भ्रति संयामसम्बन्धेन वद्ेवयौपकता गृधते तर संयाग- सम्बन्धावच्छनप्रतियोगिताकवद्यभावेन जलहर सं- योगसम्नन्धववच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकधूमाभावः सिथ्यति। अत्र च वतिरेकव्यातियरे यतिरेकसदचारज्नानं का- TW केचित्त व्यतिरेकसेदचारेणानयव्या्िरेव दते नतु व्यतिरेकव्यािज्ञानं कारणं यच यतिरेकसर- archaea व्यतिरेकी्युच्यते¶ घाध्यमरसिद्धिर घटादावेव ज्ञायतां पञ्चात् एविवीलावनच्छेरेन साध्यत दति acta श्रथापत्तेखिंति । श्रथापत्निं प्रमाणान्तरं मन्यन्त aaa तथा हि aa carne शतवषंजी वितं ज्यातिः- शास्ताद्वगतं जोविना गृहा स्वश्च प्र्थच्ादवगतं तत्र अतव विल्यथागपपत्या वदिःसन्लं कल्यते तद- । नुमानेन गताथेलानञे्ते तथाहि Wace afe- MUTA AMAT WHA । aarmarfagr जायमानायां एृदसल्लवाधा दहिःस्वमनुमित भासते।
१९५
भाषा० वयतिरकव्यापनिबृद्या चरिताधाहि सा यतः। सुखन्तु जगतामेव कामय भ्ण जन्यते ॥ BR ॥ अधर्ममजन्य दुःखं स्यात् shige सरतस | निरदुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तञक्ञानाद्व जायतं ॥ ९४४॥
fagte एवं पीनो Zagat दिवान aR Tare aaa aaaargaraaagiad fagfa । दिकामाजन- ay रात्रिभोजनं सिध्यति ॥ भ्रभावपर्यक्त्यानुभ- विकलादनुपलब्माऽपि न ममाणान्तरं । fargra- पलमस्याश्नानस्य VHA ज्ञानाकरणकलात् WIT | wag tag AMAT TATA T TATA । चेष्टापि प्रमाणान्तरं न। तस्छः सदधेतयाहकभन्द- सआरछनेन लिादिषमभीललाच्छन्द एवा न्तमावात्। यत्रतु व्याघ्यादिग्ररख्ानुमितिरेेति ॥ ९४२९॥ सुखं निरूपयति। Gay जगतामेव काम्यं धर्मण जन्यः दति । काम्बमभिलाषरिषयः। धरति waa सुखलेन कार्यकारणभाव TAG: I Use दुःखुत्निुपयति । रधर | अधरबविन दुःखतेन कार्यकारणभाव cau: । प्रतिकूलमिति दुःखम ज्ञानादेव aaat खाभाविकर्विषय saa: i इच्छां
निरुपयति । निदुःखल दृति॥ ९४४॥
१३० भाषाः इच्छा तु तदुपाये स्यादिशोपाय्वधोयदि । चिकीर्षा शतिसाध्यलप्रकारच्छा च या भेत् ॥ १४५॥ ततुः क्निसाधये्टरधनलमं ये तिभबेन् । बलेवटदष्टरेतुत्वमतिः स्यात् प्रतिबन्धिका 1 ९४९॥ तदचेतुलमुदरे चेत्तव क्यचिन्मते |
सिद्धां , इच्छा fe फलविषयिणी उपायविषयिणी च। फलन्तु सुखं दुःखाभावञ्च । तत्र फलेच्छां प्रति फल- ज्ञानं कारणं | श्रत एव खतः पुरुषार्थः सन्मवति | यज्च्रानं सत् खटृत्तितयेथ्यते ख खतः पुरुषाथे दति तल्लक्षणात् | दतर च्छा नधीनेच्छाविषयलं फलिते ऽः । उपायेच्छां प्रतीष्टसाधनताज्ञानं कारणं ॥ चिकीषति । ` रतिजञाष्यलप्रकारिका ठ्तिंसा्यक्रिया- विषयिणीच्छा दिकीषा । पाकं त्या साधयामीति तदनुभवात् ॥ ९४५ ॥
faadi प्रति रतिषाध्यताशन्ञानमिष्टवाघनता- ज्ञानश्च कारणं । wa एव eat रतिसाध्यताभा- ara चिकोषौ ॥ बलवदिति । बखवद्धिषटुलाधनताज्ञानं तज प्रतिबन्धकं `। wat मधुविषसंषटक्राकलभाजने म शिकोषा । बलवद्रषः प्रतिबन्धक cae ९४६॥ ^ aufena tf बलवद निष्टाजनकलन्ञानं कार- अमि्यर्थः .शतिसाध्यता ज्ञानादि मता बलवद निष्टा
१९ भाषा दिष्टसाधनताबुद्विमवेद देष करणं ॥ १४७ ॥
प्रवृत्तिश्च न | एवं प्रयत्तैविध्य परिदर्भितं ॥ eee ॥
चिकीषी छतिसाध्ये्टसाधनत्मतिसर्था |
सिद्धा° धनताज्ञाभद्न्यस्च बलवद निष्टाजनकलश्नार्म विनापि featitat विलब्बाभावात् कखचित् cerectt दर्भिंतः। दषं निरूपचति। दिषटसधनतेति। दुःखोपाय- विषयकं इषं प्रति दिष्टसाघनताज्ञानं कारणमिच्यर्थः। बलवदिष्टमाधनताज्ञानञ्च प्रतिबन्धकं । तेन माम रोयकदुःखजनके Wat न देषुः॥ ९४७ ॥ ` aa निरूपयति । प्रट्तिखेति । प्रठ्िनिटत्ति- जीवमभानियन्नमेदात् waaay इत्यथैः ॥१५४८॥ चिकीषैत्यादि | मधूविषभेकान्रभोजनादे। बल- बदनिष्टानुबसिलेन चिकोषौभावान्न प्रदृत्निरिति ara: | कतिखाथताज्ञानादिव बलवद निष्टा ननृवन्धिव- ज्ञानमपि खतन्त्रा्वययतिरेकात् wave कारणमि- त्यपि वदन्ति ॥ काययैताज्जानं प्रवत्तंकमिति ura: । सथाहि ज्ञानस्य प्रटृत्ता अनर्नीबायां चिकोषातिगि नापेकितमस्ति। सा चङृतिसाथताश्नानमाध्या। दच्छा- याः सपरकारप्रकारकधोमा ध्लनियमात्। चिकि हि रतिषाथ्यतप्रकारिकंच्छा । तच हर्तिंभाष्यतं प्रकार
१९
fagre रत्रकारकज्चानं चिकीषौयां तद्रारा प्रतौ च रेतुः। न विष्टसा्नताज्ञानं तत्र हेतुः । इ्यसाधेऽपि प्रद त्यापत्तेः। हलोर प्रतिबन्धकमिति चेन। तद- भावापेचया तिसाध्यताश्ानस् लघुलात्। न च दयो- रपि tae गारवात् ॥. ननु तन््मतेऽदि मधुविषसंएक्ा- gama Feat च प्रद्त्यापन्तिः कार्यताज्ञान- स्वादिति चेन्न । खविगेषणवन्ताप्रतिन्धानजन्यका्ं- तान्नानस्य प्रवम्त॑कृलात् । काम्ये हि यांगपाकादौ का- मना खविरेषणं । aay बलवद्निष्टाननुबन्धिकाम्ब- साधनतान्नानेन कार्यताज्नानं। ततः WET: प्र सजने न प्रवत्तते। तदनो कामनायाः पुरुषविगेषण- त्वाभावात् | ‘faa च शाचादिकं पुरुषविगेषणं | तेन शचादिज्ञानाधीवकृतिसाध्यतान्ञानात् "तेत्र WIA: ।। ननु तदपेचया weds बलवद्निष्टाननुबन्धीषटसा- धनताविषयककातान्ानमेव हेतुरस्तु बलवदनि- ाननुबन्धिल्च श्ट त्पत्तिनान्तरीयकदुः खाधिकदुः- खाजनकलं बलवद्षटविषयदुः खाजनकल्वं वेति चेन्न । दषटसाधनलकृतिसाध्यैलये युंगपज्तञा ATTA | सा- प्लयाघनलये विरोधाद् sfage तु aed सि- स्य च साधनलं। न च एकमेकेनेकदा सिद्धमसिद्धश्च Waa तस्मात् कालभेदादुभयं ज्ञायते। Ha लाघवेन बलवद निष्टाननुवन्धी्टषाधमले सति हतिसाध्यतान्चा-
१३९
fagte नख हेतुलात्। न च साध्यलसा्वनलयोविरोधः। यद्ा- कदाचित साध्यलसाघनव्योारविराधात्। एकद्ासा- ध्यलसाधनलयेाञ्चाज्ञान(त्॥ नवीनाम्तु ममेदं कृतिमा- ध्यमिति ज्ञानं न प्रवत्तंकमनागतेषटखज्नातुभगक्यलात्। किन्तु aT र ay: इतिमाथं यदिष्टं तादृश्रलं खस्य प्रतिसन्धाय तञ प्रवर्तते तेनेदनकमस्य तत्- साधनताज्ञानवतसदुपकरणवतः, पाकः छिमा धसा दशञ्चाहमिति प्रतिसन्धाय पाके परवत्तत.दत्या सन्न । खकन्पितल्ि्यादि परतन परावन, कामोद्धदादिभा म- ATMS च तदभावात् | श्दन्तुवरोथ। तदानोमिष्ट- साधनलादिज्ञानं wate तेन भाविधावरान्ये ara न प्रटृत्तिः। तदानीं छतिमाध्यवाज्नानात्। wa zat भजने न प्रवतत्तते। तद्ानोमिष्टमाधनलाज्ञानात्। प्रव- Wa च रोगदूषितचिन्ता विषादिभचवणे। तदनं बल- वदनिष्टाननुबन्धिलज्नानात्॥ न चास्तिकस्बागन्यागम्- नश्रचषध दिप्ररनौ कथं बशवदनिष्टाननुबस्पिननुद्धि- नैरकमाधनलश्नानादिति वाच्यं । उत्कटरागादिना .नरकमराधनताधीनिरोधंनात् टषादो ह afaare ता्नानाभावान्न चिकोषोप्रद्युत्त । किन्तिष्टमार्गता- सानादिच्छामाचं५ fag प्रटरत्तिरूपा बाध्या। तन लीवनयोनियनषाध्ये प्राण्पञ्चकमञ्चार 7 wafer: | TAY प्रवन्तंकलानुरोधादिधरपितावानधैः। इत्यश्च
Re
सिद्धा° विश्वजिता यजेत carat यच फलं न शूयते ततापि खगः फलं कल्यते । नहर हः सन्धयामुपासीतेत्यार दर्टानुत्पतते अ्रन्ति। HUNT चार्थवादिकं ब्रह्मलेा- कादि एत्यवायाभावेा वा फलमिति वाचं । तथा सति HTS PASAT फामनाभावेऽकरणापत्तेष। we फलश्रुतिखत्रा्थवादमा त्रमिति चेन्न । aE णशराद्धारौ नित्यलभमिन्तिकलयेारिषव aT, काम्यलननेमिन्तक्लयोरिव नित्यलकाम्यल्ये रणविरोा- धात्॥ नच कामनाभावेऽकर णापन्तिः | चिकालसत- वपाठादाविव कामनामद्भावसयैव कल्पनात् ॥ ननु वेदबेाधितका्ताज्ञानात् watt: सम्भवतीति चेन्न । दृष्टसाधनत्मश्चाय तादृशकार्यताज्ञानषरसेणापि भद्ततेरमम्भवोत् ।। "यदपि पण्डापुव्वेफलमिति तदपि नं । कामनाभावे करणापन्तेरोयात् | कामनाकल्यने लाथैवादिकफलमेव रात्रिसत्रन्यायात् कस्यतामन्यथा प्रृत्यनृपपत्तेः 1 तेन ।
चयं कचिद् पान्त दुरितख प्रचचते। अनुत्पत्तिं तथा चान्ये प्रत्यवायख मबते॥ `
, एवं । । ।
सन््यामुपाते ये तु सततं शंसितव्रताः ।
` विधूतपापाल्ते यान्ति ब्रह्मलाकमनामयं ॥ एवं ।
fagte
RY
TUTE: श्राद्धं पिटश्यः प्रीतिमावशन्। द्ल्यादि कमेव फलमु ॥ न च प्दिप्रोतिः कथं
फलं व्यधिकरणलादितिषवाच्यं । गयाश्रादादाकि
उदे ष्व सम्ब्धेनेव फलजनकलस्य कवित् कन्पनात् | श्रत एवोक्तं श्राखद्र्भितफलमनष्टान॑ता Cai दइ्ति। पिणं ana तु खस्य wine यावन्न त्यनेमित्तिकानष्टानसख सामान्यतः स्गेफलकन्पनात् पण्डापन्वारथप्रटत्तिञ्च न ana न्ड aqua
दुःखाभाववत् खतः पुरुषाथः । न वा ततूमाधम । प्रह्यवायानत्यसी कथं प्रटश्िरिति.घत्। द्रत । यथा fe नित्यृते प्रह्यवायाभावसतष्टति तदभात तद्- भावः। एवं प्रद्यवायाभावस्य म॑ FATT AAS तदभावे तदभाव द्रति यामेममाधारणकारणताया दुःखप्रागभावं प्रत्यपि grag! एवमव प्रायि ware दुःखप्रागभावदेतुलमिति॥ ननु न TH भक्येदित्यत्र विधं कथं नअथीन्वयः। दृषटमाधनना- भावस्य हतिषाध्यतवाभावस्य च बाधयितुमश्क्यवा- दिति Fa) तच वाधादिष्टमाधनलं छृ(तिमाष्यवश्चन fond: किन्त बलवदनिष्टाननुञ्लिवमा तदभावद् नञा बोधते | श्रयदम वलवदनिष्टागनर्बन्धोएटमाधनत सति हतिखा्यलं fred: । तेद भाव मजा बाध्यमाना fafagrarat fanaa famqarara विश्राम्यति ॥
१३६
रिदा" ननु ्ोणेनाभिचरन् Vata कथं बलवदनिष्टाननुव- न्विवमर्थः । wre मरणानुक्रूलयापारख दिंसानेन नरकसाधनलात् ॥ (` च वैधलान्निषेध इति वायं । श्रभिचारे प्रायचित्तापदेशात् ॥ न च मरणानुव्रूल- व्यापारंमाचं यदि fearagr खङ्गकदरख कूपकं दिंखकलापत्नि गैललप्रान्भक्तपजन्यमरणे खात्मवधि- तकापत्निेति,. वाच्यं । मरणे ट कलस्यापि विगेषण- ATA Wa एव "सप्रमीतिलाभ्यङ्गख न fart) श्रन्या- दश्यकचिप्तनाराचरतन्राह्मणस तु वाचनिकं प्राय- faufafa चेन्न! श्येनवारणायादृष्टादारकलेन fa- शेषणात् । भत्, एव का्रीमरणाद्थेषृतभिवपूजादेरपि न रसालं ॥ न च साचान्मरणएजमकरीव हिंसां श्येनस्त न तथा किन्तु तल्नन्यापुब्ैमिंति वाच्यं | खेद्ाघातेन ब्राह्मणे ब्रणपाकपरग्परया ते दिसा- लानापनत्तेः । केचित्तु wae feared a तु मरणं । ष्ेनजन्यखद्गघातादि रूपा fear श्रभिचारपदार्यः | तख च पापजनकलवं । श्रत: WAG प्रैधलात् पापा- जनकलेऽपि श्रमिमपौपं प्रतिसन्धाय सन्ता म प्रव oat ॥ आचायौस्तु-आाप्ताभिप्रायो विध्य्थः। पाकं SUT cae आज्ना्विरूषेच्छावाचिताक्िप्मा च- सदच्छावाचिलं लाघवात् एवश्च खग॑कामे यजेते- तया चाग ख्ंकामहतिशाथतयाऽभी cae | तत
१९०
Viste उपादानस्य चाध्यक्षं प्व भनकं भषेत् ॥ १४८ ॥ नद्रततसु भेद are दिटसाधनताधियः। Ce ee Ss
fagre आाेष्ेनेष्टसाधनलादि कमनुमाय wana | wey भक्तणाशा तदभावैश्र waa | ay वेदे पौरुषेयं नाभ्येति ते परति .विधिरेव तावद्रभे ष्व शतिः 5 माथौः Gara माने ॥ न स awe वार्धकं । कपि- सलकणादारिकमारभ्याय्थनतं कढंारण सेव प्रतीच मानलान्। WAT सपीनामयकदं कलापक । तैव कदटेखरणएमस्तीति Vesta wife aye त्मा रिल्यादिकर्तसमरणमस्येव । वं प्रति मन्वन्तरं "चषा श्रतिरन्या विधीयत cafe cei
BACT भगवान् वरा Waar gr
शिवाद्या खपिपर्यमांः WATTS 7 ATTA: I दृति aca स्ठतिमावरं॥ न इ Greqaaaarfe समवादप्रामाण्णं स्वादिति are) । नित्यमर्ज्नलन निराषलात्। श्रत एव परषाकरभरमादिमगरवानर ` कपिषारेः कललं वेदस्य । किञ्च व्ोनामेवानिश्यनमय वच्छमाणतवत् सुतरां तब्ृन्दभ॑ख वदस्यानित्यव- fafa ॥ उपादानकैति । उपादान षमवायिकारु- शस्या धयचं wad प्रटत्ता "कारणमिति ॥ १४८ ॥
दिष्टसाधनतान्नानस्य द् खमाधनविषयकनिठन्ि
Re
भाषा यतरो जीवनयेनिसतु HAA भवेत्॥ १५०॥ शरोर प्राणसेश्चारकारणं परिकीर्तितं * | Baza गुरुत्व सयात एथिग्यादिदये तु त्॥९५१॥ अनित्ये तदनिलयं स्ान्नितये नित्यमद्ाइतं | तदेवासुमवायि स्यात् पतनाख्ये तु करणि ॥१५९॥ सांसिद्विकद्रवत्वं स्ान्नमिन्तिकमथापरं।
सिद्धा परति अनकल्मन्वेयदतिरेकादवधारितमिति भावः ॥ यन्न दति । "जीवनयोानि यत्नो यावच्जीवन मनुवत्तते |
ख चातीदधियः॥२५०॥ तज प्रमाणमादं । WAR प्राणसञ्चारकारणं परिकोत्तिंतमिति। पाणषश्चारो हि भ्रधिक श्राषादि WAAAY: | TAY प्राणसषच्चारस्य यव्रसाध्यलानमा- नात् प्रत्य्चयन्नखख वाधाशातीद्धिययन्नसिद्धिः। स एव जीवनयोमि प्रयत्नः ॥ गुरुत्वं निरूपयति । श्रती-
दिवमिति ॥ ९५९ ॥
अ्ननिन्ये दणुकादै ageaataa । नित्ये पर- मार निनं । गुरुवमिल्यनुवन्तंते । aged असमवायि ` अखमवायिकारफ़ं। पतने आदपतने इत्यर्थः ॥ ९५२ ॥ १ द्वलननिरूपयति। साविद्धिकमिति। xa fafa
~ ------&,
* तत् प्रकोनितसिति gerne |
१३५८ भाषा सासिद्विकनतु सलिले दोयं कितितेजसोः ॥ १५३॥ परमाण जलं निल्यमन्यत्रानिल्यमुच्यत | नेमित्तिकं वङ्कियोगात्तथनोयधुतादि पु ॥ १५९॥ द्रवत्वं खन्दनं दतुनिमितत सङ्गत तत्। संहा जल स् निल्यौऽणावनिल्योऽवयविन्यसे॥ १५५॥ FATA ATA ददनस्यानकूलता |
fagre मासिद्धिकं नेमित्तिकश्चे7ि। fete नेमित्तिकं पर- माणाविति॥९५द॥ जलपरमारौ gaa निल्यं wary एयिग्रोपग- ATUTST जलद्चणकादीं च द्रवतवमनिन्यं। gated जसि कुत्रचित् एथियाञ्च मैँमित्तिकं yaa | तत्र ar at afafaaraaciafa ।\ afafaafata asifa पद न्तेजाऽथकं। तथा च तेजःमंयागाग्मिमंया- गजन्यं नेमित्तिकं द्रवत्वं । ae सुवश्ादिरुपं तजि चृतजतुप्रशटतिष्टथियां वर्तन Tae ९५४॥ दरबल weed हेतुनिंमिन्त wee तु तदिति" ` रेहुरिति च्रसमवायिकारणएमिदयर्थः । मरे मणुका- दिसेयोगविशेषे तद्र वलं खे खहितमिति args | तेन दुतसुवलदीनां 4 सङ्गः ॥ ay frevafa । अन इति । जल एवेत्यर्थः power सेद ॥ ९१५.॥ मन् एयियामपि तैलकतेद उपलभ्यते । न चाना
भाषा PACA वेगाऽथ खितिखापकभावने ॥ we |! RATS तु वेगः स्थात् कर्जा पेगजः कचित् | शितिरखापकसंसकार) fear केचिचयतर्यपि॥ १५७॥ ANAT विभ्रेयः कंचित् खन्देऽपि कारणं।
शिद्धा* जलोयः॥ तथा सति दइनम्रातिकर््य खादत आङ! तैलान्तरे तत् प्रकर्षौ द देनश्यानुकरूलतेति । ततप्रकषौत् सं हप्रकत्। तैल उपलभ्यमानकेहाऽपि जलीय एव। re प्रशृटतलादम्रालक्रष्यं । अपृष्टे fe शलं aft नाशयतीति भावः ॥ संस्कवार्निरूपयति । dearth | भेगथितिश्थापकभावनाभेदात् संख्कारस्िविध ca चैः॥९५६॥ ` ` aad त॒ वेगः स्यात् कजे वेगजः afy- दिति । क्जवेगजभेदादेगे दिविध card: । शरारी fe नोदनजनितेन कर्णा वेगा जन्यते । तेन च प्व कम्मनाशादुन्तरं wal । एवमग्रेऽपि । विना च वेगं कणः कर्मतिबन्धकलात् पूलवक्ंमाश् उत्तरका - त्पत्तिञ्च न स्यात् ।, यतर वेगवता कपालेन जनित अरे पेम म्यते सृ वेमे वेगः॥ खितिंखापक दति । शआङृष्टशाखादीकां कपित्यागे ° पुनगंममसख खितिखा- पकसा्यलात् । केचिदिति | way चित्यादिषुखि- fra के चिक्न्यन्ते तदप्रमाणमिति भावः ॥९५७॥ eee free
१४१
भाषा भाषनाख्यस् संस्कारो MAPA TA: १५८ ॥
सिद्धा
उपेत्तानात्मकस्तस्य निश्चयः कारणं HAA |
सरणे प्रयमिननायामथति BATE ॥ १५९ ॥
रसो खितिखापक्रः । कचिद् श्राषृष्ट्ालाद ॥ भावमाख्य दरति ॥१५८॥
तख GATS | उपेक्तात्मकज्ञानात् स॑स्कारानु- त्पत्तेरपेक्ानात्मक दुक्त, । तत्प्ंश्यात् संखारानु- wiftea waa । तेनोपेचान्यनि्यवेन संसारं मति हेतुतेति भावः॥ ननु सरणं पर्युपेचान्यनि्चयलेन tad तेनेपेचारि खले म सरणं इत्यञ्च संसारं परति श्ञानलेनैव देत तास्विति चेत्र । विनिगमनावि- ररशापि संस्कारं प्रति उपेषान्यनिन्जयलेन देत तायाः fagarq | fey उपासे संखकारकर्पनाया गर- लात् dart प्रति चेपेचान्यतेन हेतुतायाः fag लवात् ॥ तत्र प्रमाणं द्थयति। सरणे प्रत्यभिन्नाया- watt हेतुरुच्यते इति wat संसारः पूरणं,
`म्रत्यभिज्नानश्च जनयति | wa: संसारः करयते |
A है विना erat पृव्वीनुभवख सरणि बननासाम्थात्। खख्यापारान्यतर भिवे कारणलास्वात् ॥ न श्र vafant प्रति तन्तासंखारस्य Wan प्रत्यभि- भायाः संस्कारभन्यलेग तिला पन्तिरिति वाच्यं ।
९४९
भाषा० WHMCS साद् धगमः खगीदिसाधन। गङ्गा्लानादि यागादि व्यापारः परिवीर्तितः॥१९०॥ प See ee eR ee aes सिद्धा श्रप्रयोजकलात् । पर त॒ अनुदुद्धसंखारात् प्रत्य- भिन्नानुदयादुदु द्संख्कानध्य Warten तत्तत्ख- रणस्येव प्रत्यभिज्ञां प्रति, देत॑लं कख्यत Tare: ॥ १५९ ॥ अदुष्टं निरूपयति । घण्माधर्री विति। खगादिस- FAQS खगेसाधनीभूतगरीरादीनाञ्च साधनं धब Taw aw ware दर॑यितुमाद। यागादीति। यागादिवयापारतया*हि wal: कल्यते | अन्यथा या- गादीनां चिर विनष्टतया निवयापारतया च काला- न्तरभाविखगैजनर्कलं न स्यात् तदुक्तमाचार्थः चिरष्वसं फलायालं न कम्मातिशयं विना दृति ॥ ननु यागध्व॑स एव व्यापारः खान् न प्रतियोगित- इंसयारोकत्राजनकलं | सर्वच तथात्वे मानाभावात् 1 न च तन्मते फलानन्द मन्मते चर मफंलस्यापून्यनाश- कलान्न तथालमिति वाद्यं । कालविशेषस्य सदका- रिलाद् द्रत्यत्राह | गङ्गालानेति । गङ्गाखानसख्य डि खर्गजनकलेऽनन्तानां* जलसंयोगध्वंसानां वयापा- रलमथेकमपूने "कल्प्यते लाघवादिति भावः ॥ ९६०॥
१९४९
भाषा० क्डमनाशजलसयशादिना ALATA AA |
SH नरकादीनां चेतुनिन्दितकगरजः ॥ ९९१ Il प्रायित्तादिनाश्योऽ त श्नीवक्त्ती विम गुणे |
fagte ननु ष्वेषोऽपिन वापारो ॥ न च नियौ पारस चिरष्नलस् कथं कारणलमिति वाच्यं । wr न्यथासिद्धनियतपुमवबन्िवख तत्रापि स्वत् | ऽग्र वहितपृत्वत्तिलं fe चचुःसंयागोदे; aed न त॒ स्वव कायैकाखटृत्तिलमिव समवायिकारणस्य का- twafaaa we) क््ानाश्जलसखभादिना नाग्र- wat मत दति । यदि" हि sgh न खात् तदा क्ंना्ाजलखभादिनां नाश्वलं whe न era । न हि, तेन यागादिनाशः प्रतिबन्धी वा कन्तः शक्यते | qe wads awatfefa i एनेन देवताग्रीतिरेव फलमित्यपासं | Were waa देवताप्रीते- रसमरवात् । देवातायाञ्चेतनलेऽपि तत्गरीतेरनुदे य लात् । प्रीतेः सुखखरूपलेन विष्णुगरीत्यादै तद सम वात् । जन्यसुखादे स्तत्राभावात् । तेन विष्णु परी विजन्यर" लेन पराभिमतखगोादिरेव विष्णुप्रीतिन्देन लच्ुते ॥ sua नरकादीनां ta निद तक्षंज दूति । नरक दुःखादिषकणलदुःखानां नारकिशरोरादोनाञ्च सा- WAM इत्य्ैः॥ ९६९॥ , ' भरमाणमाह | प्रायञ्चित्तादिनाश्वाऽो | MATA
१४४
भाषा" दमो तु वासनोजन्यो श्ानादपि विनश्यतः ॥ १६९॥ fagre faat गणाविति i यदि धमनी न era तदा प्रायञ्चिंन्तादिनाश्यलं न ara न हि तेन ब्रह्महन- नादीर्नां ars: प्रतिबन्धो वा विधातुं waa तख पूल्वविनष्टलादिति भावः । जोवेति । ईश्वरस्य war- uarararftfa ala: दमा तु वासनाजनये ज्ञा- .नादंपि विनण्यत.दति । cat धम्माधन्चैी। वास- मेति । wat श्ञानिना छते सुरृतदुष्कृतकर्ेषी नं फलायालमिति .भावः । ज्ञानादपीत्यपिना माग- परिः ॥ "ननु wear कथं धर्मौ धयंना- शकलं | नाभुक्तं सीयते कमं करपकोरि शतैरपीति वच नविरोधात् | wae सचन्नानिना इटिति काय- et waaadut भागेन य दति चेन्न । तच ae गस्य बद बेधितनाश्रकोापलचितलात् । कथमन्यथा प्रा- यथित्तादिना वर्णां नारः | तदुकरं । ज्ञानाग्निः , सत्पकक्माणोत्यादिना। श्रूयते च। चीयन्ते Wwe कम्माणि तस्िन् दृष्टे परावरे दति ॥ नम् त्वन्ञानि नस्ति wettest [सुखदुःखादि च न स्यात् ज्ञानेन च॑ हैषा कमणां माशादिति चेन्न | प्रारमेतरकम्मणामेव नात्" तन्तच्छ रीर भागजनकं दि यत्कं तत् प्रारभ तदभिप्रायमेव नाभुक्रमिति वचनमिति ॥ ९६२९॥
१५
भाषा" श्टो ध्वनिश्च वख EH LNT ध्वनिः। कष्दसंयोगादिजन्या AIG ATLA मताः ॥१९२॥ सवः शब्दो ara ATA TAA वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन तदुर्त्िसु कीरिती ॥ १९४॥ ATR ATO: कर्धि । उतयन्नः को विनष्ट र हूति वुदेरनिल्यता ॥ १६५.॥ `
सिद्धा शब्दं निरूपयति शब्दः airy quy खदङ्गा- feat ध्वनिः। कण्ठसंयोगादिजन्या are seer मताः Wee war wah: Fare TEA इति ॥ मभाटत्तिराकाशक्मेतः ॥ दूर खथ्द खा ग्रह WATE | ओति ॥ मनु खदङ्गाचवच्छेदेनोतयक्े शे तते कथमुत्पत्तिरत, श्रा । वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्मतिर कीत्तितेति wena परिर्दिग- वच्छिननाऽन्यः शब्द सेनेव शब्देन जन्यते | तेन WITH gram: । एवंक्रमेण ATA गृह्यत इति ॥९६२॥ ९६४ ॥
कदम्बकोरकन्यायादु पत्तिः कल्दिकाते इति। AT
amare दथरिच TUNE घत्य्चने। ततचानयेश- शब्दा उत्यञ्चन्त दति.भावः । चिन् कल्पे Area weed इति ॥ ननु mage नित्यलादुक्भिः कच-
~~ 8 # + कद्म्बगारुकंति पाठाकरः।
१४६ भाषा सोऽयं क इति Aaa, साजात्यमवलम्नते | तदेमीषधमिलयादो FATAL TATA |! १९६॥ इति ओमदामदापध्थिायविद्यानिवासभट्राचाय्य॑सुन ओयुतधिश्रनाथपच्चाननभद्ाचाय्यविर चिता भाषाप- PRT: समाप्तः॥ * ॥
व galas eg ee ee ES fagts an wre । उत्पन्नः a1 fare: क दति -बदधेरनिल्य- तेति। श्ब्दानासुत्पादविनाप्रत्ययप्रालिलादनित्यल- मित्यर्थः ॥ ९६५ ॥ ननु षु एवायं ककार दत्यादिप्रत्यभिन्ञानाच्छ- ब्दानां नित्यवं ।' इत्यं "चात्पाद विनाशवुद्धिभ्रमरूपा चेत्यत wet सोऽयं क दृति बुद्धिस्तु साजात्यमवल- wal तदेतीषधमित्यार सजातीयेऽपि द्भेनादिति । तच प्रद्यभिज्ञानसख तत्सजातीयलं विषयो न त॒ तद्म waar विषयः | उकनग्रतीतिविरोधात् | Tere eae रपि बद्यानं waafata नन् सजातीयलं साऽयमिति- प्रत्यभिज्ञायां भासते tf कुच दृष्टमित्यत are तदेवेति । यदौषधं" मया कतं तदेवृन्येनापि इत- मिल्यादिदर्भनादिति भावः॥९६६॥ दति ओरमदामदोापदव्यायविचयानिवासभटाचाय- पुवश्रीय॒तविश्चनाथपश्चाननभद्रएवा्यविरचिता षि- द्धानतमुकषायली संपूरा Wen
we
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